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The topic of human movement, and the question of how humans learn new 
behaviors, has puzzled philosophers and scientists since classical times. A 
commonly held assumption is that there are two qualitatively distinct learning 
systems, one responsible for remembering knowledge of facts and events, and the 
other responsible for forming associations and learning new skills, including motor 
learning. The evidence in support of this dissociation has been independently 
reproduced through many different experiments and methods of analysis.  
 
One line of evidence that has recently been investigated is the dual-component 
nature of adaptation learning. When humans and animals are challenged with a 
change in their environment or the physiology of their bodies, such as what might 
happen through growth and development or because of injury, the nervous system 
adjusts its control mechanisms to maintain accurate movements. Learning of this 
form is known as adaptation, and had originally been theorized to be achieved 
through an implicit learning mechanism. Furthermore, it was often thought that this 
same learning mechanism was responsible for more general forms of learning, such 
as learning the use of new tools.  
 
This model has recently come under scrutiny as evidence has emerged 
demonstrating a role for memory of facts in adaptation. If there are at least two 
mechanisms responsible for adaptation learning, which one of them, if either, is 
actually responsible for more general skill learning? If one, but not the other, of 
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these mechanisms is responsible for skill learning, what is adaptation really a model 
of? And how might the conclusions of other studies that used adaptation as a 
general model for learning need to be reconsidered? For instance, the results from 
neurophysiological studies of adaptation may find neural correlates that are 
uniquely related to adaptation but not to other types of motor learning. Having a 
better behavioral- and computational-level understanding of the mechanisms 
involved in adaptation learning is necessary to address these and potentially many 
other questions.  
 
Given the challenges present in the study of adaptation, there is a need for other 
models of learning and movement that give different perspectives and emphasize 
other aspects of learning that might be missing from adaptation. For instance, 
adaptation involves correction of movements around an existing ability, such as 
reaching. How is reaching itself learned? Acquiring or building new behavioral 
abilities might involve qualitatively different mechanisms compared to adaptation. 
Furthermore, new methods for analyzing the kinematics of movements are 
necessary, as adaptation paradigms typically limit their analysis to the choice of 
reaching direction only.  
 
In this dissertation, I will present several original, empirical studies on the role of 
cognition and explicit knowledge in motor learning. I will investigate the 
computational mechanisms that underlie learning new behaviors. I will introduce a 
new model for human motor skills and skill learning, and show how this model fills 
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gaps that exist in the repertoire of models, methods, and concepts currently popular 
in the science of learning. I will show evidence that adaptation learning is made up 
of at least two qualitatively distinct learning components. One component appears 
to be deliberate, driven by explicit knowledge, and is computationally expensive. 
The other is implicit, driven by sensory-prediction errors, and is automatic and 
readily expressed. I will demonstrate that the deliberate component becomes 
automatic following practice, and will argue that this process is a plausible 
mechanism for how more general motor skills are learned. Implicit recalibration 
does not change with practice and therefore appears unlikely to be responsible for 
skill learning. I will show that learning a new continuous-movement behavior, like 
skiing or riding a bike, is done through the creation of a flexible feedback control 
policy. I will discuss the inconsistency of sequence learning and chunking 
hypotheses, and contrast them with the control policy theory.  
 
The studies, results, and conclusions presented here demonstrate that motor 
learning intrinsically involves cognition and explicit representations of knowledge. 
The classical concept of motor learning being a subset of implicit memory is 
inconsistent with the present findings and other recent work. Instead, a view of 
motor learning as being a phenomenon emergent from the interaction of multiple 
forms of memory and algorithms of learning is emerging. 
 
Committee: Amy Bastian (Chair), Adrian M. Haith (Reader), John W. Krakauer 
(Advisor, Reader), & Reza Shadmehr 
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Preface 
Empirical investigation is a uniquely challenging endeavor within science. There 
may be unusual or difficult methods to master, advanced theories to learn, a 
mountain of prior work to become familiar with, and bureaucratic obstacles at every 
step. Success requires a set of skills rarely found concurrently in any individual. 
When universities are lucky, a set of people choose to congregate who possess a 
minimum threshold of abilities and motivations to undertake original, interesting, 
and valuable work. Even more rare are individual labs that attract people with those 
necessary qualities. The Brain, Learning, Animation, and Movement (BLAM) Lab 
comes as close as any I have seen to attaining that threshold.  
 
The BLAM Lab has become an intellectual crucible. Each member may have had his 
or her own goals and theories when they joined, but subsequently evolved to adopt 
far greater understanding and purpose. My work, and that of my advisors and 
coauthors, emerged from the BLAM broth to be more interesting and subversive 
than any of us imagined it would be. I sought to better understand learning and 
movement, and discovered psychology, biology, and complexity along the way. 
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1 Introduction 
Humans have long lauded ourselves for our remarkable capabilities. Feats of the 
mind and feats of physical dexterity are commonly cited as characteristics that set 
humans apart from other animals1,2; traits that make mankind king of the animal 
kingdom. Might these remarkable mental and physical abilities be related? Might the 
mental computational power that produced language and algebra also assist in 
learning the nuanced limb coordination required of painting, wielding a hammer, or 
swimming the breast stroke? 
 
The history of this question – what the relationship is between cognitive faculties 
and dexterity of movement – is as old as recorded philosophy. In the treatise De 
Anima, Aristotle suggested that there is a distinction in human thought between 
theoretically reasoning and practically reasoning3. One interpretation of his stance 
is that practical reasoning includes the computations and processes for acquiring 
goals through action, while theoretical reasoning is responsible for representing 
objects or abstract ideas, much like the blueprints of a building represent the 
building itself3. The question and concept is clear, though, that there appears to be a 
distinction between abstract thought and the faculty to execute goal directed 
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behavior. The spirit of this philosophical position persists, reflected in 
contemporary theories related to the existence of dichotomy in memory, learning, 
and mental processing between two qualitatively distinct systems.  
Much of the foundational evidence for contemporary theories of the existence of 
multiple memory systems comes from lesion studies, particularly selective memory 
deficits resulting from damage to the medial temporal lobe in humans4–8. Brenda 
Milner, for instance, found that a patient with severe amnesia could nevertheless 
learn a new motor skill, mirror drawing, despite this patient’s severe memory deficit 
for facts and events5. The subject of that study, the now-famous patient H.M., 
suffered from severe retrograde and anterograde amnesia (he could neither 
remember new information nor recall information learned within several years of 
the existence of his lesion) as a result of a surgery to remove tissue from both of his 
medial temporal lobes9.  
 
Many additional studies have expanded on the earlier findings from amnestic 
patients to discover additional dissociations or double dissociations that appear to 
demonstrate the existence of multiple distinct memory systems7. For instance, 
despite their memory deficits, amnestic patients can learn to handle a stylus while 
viewing it through a mirror5, improve in the rotary pursuit task6, and learn to read 
words that have been mirror-reversed4. Amnestic patients are also equally sensitive 
to priming effects as controls10–12, and can form habits normally8,13. These results 
support the idea that multiple memory systems exist and are differentially sensitive 
to specific types of neurological damage. Other forms of brain damage or 
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degeneration, such as Parkinson’s Disease (PD), engender different behavioral and 
learning deficits that appear to confirm the concept of multiple memory systems. 
For instance, while amnestic patients can learn habits as normally as control 
subjects, PD patients are impaired in the opposite way – they have relatively normal 
memory for events and facts, but are impaired in learning new habits8. Thus, lesion 
studies demonstrate that manipulation of particular circuits within the brain can 
selectively repress one or the other of seemingly two memory systems.  
 
There are other, behavioral ways to obtain or infer dissociation in memory and 
processing aside from selective brain lesions or circuit deactivation.  Manipulations 
such as diverting attention through dual-tasking14, or limiting reaction time15,16, also 
demonstrate memory system dissociation. For instance, manipulating attention 
during a serial reaction time task through a dual-task condition selectively impaired 
recall memory but not the ability to reduce reaction times under the repeating 
sequence14, which is thought to happen because of a procedural learning process17–
21 or some other implicit mechanism22. This result implies that learning of one type 
– whatever was responsible for reducing reaction times under a repeating sequence 
– was independent of the memory responsible for learning the sequence explicitly.  
 
One of the leading theories for the nature of the multiple systems of learning is that 
one is declarative and the other is non-declarative7. This model suggests that the 
declarative memory system is responsible for knowledge of facts and events, is 
impaired through lesions of the medial temporal lobe that causes amnesia, and is 
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sensitive to manipulations that divert attention14 or that eliminate the chance for 
intentional reflection or recall15,16,23,24. The non-declarative system, on the other 
hand, is thought to be responsible for learning and retaining skills, habits, and 
associations, functions that can be impaired in patients with conditions such as PD. 
This system is also thought to be responsible for the effects of priming, where 
explicitly undetectable stimuli nevertheless affect behavior, e.g. by instilling 
emotions or biasing choices25. Furthermore, the model suggests that declarative 
memory is explicit, i.e. accessible to conscious awareness, while non-declarative 
memory is implicit. This latter concept is so intrinsic to the model that the terms 
“declarative” and “explicit”, and likewise the terms “non-declarative” and “implicit”, 
are sometimes interchanged26,27. 
 
The dual-systems model of learning has been highly influential7. However, many 
questions remain about the validity of the explicit-vs-implicit dichotomy, and about 
the true nature of skill learning. For instance, recent work has suggested that 
knowledge of facts may be intrinsic to learning behaviors that otherwise would be 
considered as procedural28. For example, would an amnestic patient be able to 
appropriately serve a tennis ball after having been taught the actions to do so? 
Serving in tennis is a learned motor behavior that would seem to fall within the 
category of procedural memory. However, without knowledge of what a tennis 
racquet is, how it is meant to be used, or what the goal of a serve is meant to be, 
would normal serving behavior be expected? An experiment in amnestic patients 
tested this very question29. Patients were trained to use obscure, novel objects, and 
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then were tested for their ability to recall the use of those same objects later. 
Amnestic patients learned the correct use of the objects just as well as control 
participants when they were reminded of the intended use on each day of training. 
However, the amnestic patients were not able to recall details about the objects (e.g. 
color or function), or how to grasp the objects to initiate their use, while control 
participants were able to do these things. If a patient’s hand was placed in the 
correct configuration for manipulating the tool, they could perform the correct 
actions normally. Thus, it appeared that declarative memory was necessary to recall 
the intended use and correct initial configuration for the use of the novel objects, 
but was not necessary for doing the appropriate actions themselves. This study also 
demonstrates the precariousness of categorizing behavior as being either 
declarative or procedural; using these tools required both types of memory and thus 
cannot accurately be called either.  
 
If skills are neither wholly procedural nor wholly declarative in nature, what are 
they? One idea is that learning new skilled behaviors is supported in parts by both 
systems16,23,29–34. Under this hypothesis, it should be possible to interrupt learning, 
or even manipulate the outcome of learning, by selectively modulating one of the 
component systems. Modulation of the systems allegedly involved in learning could, 
in theory, be achieved through any of the methods previously mentioned as 
selectively affecting one or the other of the separate memory systems. Several 
studies have attempted precisely this. One study of visuomotor adaptation learning 
instructed participants in what the appropriate action should be to cancel an 
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imposed rotation of their computer cursor. After being provided with this “cheat”, 
participants cancelled the perturbation, but with additional practice, their reach 
directions gradually drifted so that the absolute error of their reaches actually 
increased23. This finding demonstrated the independence of a declarative-like 
component, that appeared to be deliberate, and an implicit and seemingly automatic 
component that reacted to sensory-prediction errors regardless of intention. Other 
studies have confirmed this conclusion, including one that limited the amount of 
preparation time prior to movement to eliminate the use of deliberate action16, and 
another that directly measured the deliberative component on each trial of 
adaptation by simply asking participants where they were aiming each reach35. 
These studies demonstrated that, at least for visuomotor adaptation, learning is 
supported by at least two qualitatively distinct mechanisms, one that is deliberate, 
sharing characteristics with declarative memory, and one that is implicit and 
seemingly automatic or not under deliberate control. 
 
One question that remained, however, was which of the two learning components 
was responsible for retention of the memory for adaptation. Adaptation is an 
unusual model for skill learning because it is subject to decay, where behavior 
reverts to baseline with the passage of time or when feedback is removed36. One 
sign that anything is retained from prior experiences at all is savings, or faster re-
learning under similar perturbations37–43. Understanding how motor skill are 
learned and retained long-term can be studied using adaptation tasks by asking 
which of the learning components in adaptation are responsible for savings.  
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To address this question, my advisors, John Krakauer and Adrian Haith, and I 
devised and conducted a set of experiments.  In one study, presented in Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation, we asked how much prior experience with a perturbation was 
necessary to instill savings. Were savings supported by recall, for instance of actions 
or of an explicit strategy, very minimal prior experience should be sufficient to 
obtain savings. If savings required prolonged practice with the perturbation, it 
would have appeared that a procedural mechanism was responsible, and that any 
explicit component that might have been active was not retained. In another study, 
we used a method to manipulate the preparation time prior to movement in order 
to more directly measure implicit adaptation and observe whether it was 
responsible for savings, in a similar way to Ferandez-Ruiz, et. al16. This study is 
addressed in Chapter 4.  
 
In addition to our studies, a few other recent studies have attempted to address 
these same questions about the nature of savings in adaptation. A consistent 
conclusion has been that savings is primarily supported by recall of some explicit 
representation of actions or of strategies44,45 (Morehead; Hadjiosif). In a third study, 
we recognized that some motor skills require prolonged practice to consolidate and 
shed any potential reliance on declarative processing or memory46–49, and so we 
extended the amount of practice that we provided participants during an adaptation 
task to see if the mechanisms supporting savings changed. This study is presented in 
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Chapter 5, and is to our knowledge the first that addresses the question of 
consolidation of the multiple components in adaptation over longitudinal learning. 
 
Visuomotor adaptation is only one model for motor learning, and has its limitations 
and drawbacks as a model. For instance, it only considers learning to counteract the 
effects of an imposed perturbation to otherwise over-learned behaviors, especially 
simple reaching. Many behaviors most associated with skilled movement, on the 
other hand, require the formation of novel actions that may require continuous 
feedback and arbitrary associations. Other tasks that serve as models for skill 
learning, such as sequence learning14,18,50,51, or arbitrary visuomotor 
associations52,53 do not necessarily encapsulate each of these features. In particular, 
these tasks typically build up longer movements from pre-existing abilities, such as 
finger tapping or reaching, and are usually discrete rather than continuous. While all 
of these models are helpful for answering particular questions and gaining certain 
insights, their limitations make it difficult to address other profound questions and 
to gain a broader perspective on the nature of skill learning. A task that attempts to 
address these limitations is the motor acuity task54 (Bioarxiv paper), where 
participants must learn a novel, continuous control strategy.  
 
The fourth study described in this dissertation, in Chapter 6, investigates learning of 
a continuous feedback controller longitudinally with practice. Certain properties of 
learning can be informative for inferring the underlying mechanism. For instance, 
measuring changes in mean behavior55,56, stereotypy18,55–58, feedback responses54, 
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and the covariance structure of movement56 can give clues as to the mechanism of 
learning. This is particularly true when assessing the response to perturbations54, or 
measuring the transfer of behavioral characteristics under different conditions than 
those encountered during learning59–62. For instance, measuring the extent of 
generalization of behavior provides information regarding whether learning 
involved model-free or model-based mechanisms63. In Chapter 6 of this dissertation, 
I present a study that uses a novel task implemented in a custom-designed driving 
simulator video game (Max & Haley, Inc., Baltimore, MD) to study continuous-action 
learning longitudinally. The task tests for generalization at four different times 
throughout learning to assess how the underlying mechanisms involved in learning 
may have changed over the course of practice. While this study does not directly 
measure or evaluate the implicit-versus-explicit nature of learning, it makes an 
important first step in expanding the tools, methods, and concepts for studying 
motor skill learning. This study expanding beyond discrete, overlearned behaviors 
into a model that is more consistent with the behaviors that make us most human.  
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2 General methods 
In contemporary psychology and behavioral science, empirical experimentation and 
quantitative analysis has supplanted the introspective analyses of the early 
philosophers64. In accordance with this strong tradition, I have investigated the 
questions I proposed in the Introduction through controlled experiments, recorded 
observation, and quantitative analysis.  
 
In the empirical investigation of any phenomenon, the scientific approach is 
typically to begin with a hypothesis for a model that includes the factors, objects, 
and modes of action for how a phenomenon may emerge. The hypothesis must be 
tested in some way, contingent on available methods and possible control over the 
phenomenon. Tests vary in the validity of their conclusions. For example, a 
simulation may be done to test the plausibility of a model, comparing the pattern of 
results from the simulation with that observed in nature. For some questions and 
hypotheses this method is the only one available, such as for testing many 
phenomena in climate and earth sciences. This approach is also popular in human 
behavioral science to test whether a given model or algorithm can plausibly 
reproduce behavioral results. Other tests may come in the form of “natural 
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experiments”, in which natural variation or serendipitous circumstances of nature 
allow for observation of the consequences of certain conditions and the comparison 
with other, more normal conditions. For example, in sociology, it might be possible 
to study the consequences of certain public policies by comparing localities that 
instituted a certain policy versus others that did not. In psychology and 
neuroscience, this approach has been widely used and highly influence. For 
instance, studies of the consequences of naturally occurring or incidental brain 
lesions or diseases have been the incipient evidence for highly influence theories of 
memory. Finding that having bilateral lesions to the medial temporal lobe results in 
debilitating memory deficiencies has led to theories for the independence of 
declarative versus non-declarative memory. However, studies of these forms are 
potentially confounded, because it remains possible that the reasons for a condition 
emerging naturally may correlate with consequences of that naturally occurring 
event. The most powerful and convincing form of evidence is generally through 
randomized control studies, in which a manipulation or condition is applied 
selectively to a randomly selection sample of a population of interest and compared 
against members who did not receive the condition. This approach allows the 
establishment of causality, and although there are potential hazards and pitfalls of 
drawing conclusions from the results of such studies, they remain the most 
powerful tool in an empirical scientists’ arsenal.  
 
Each of the studies presented herein take this latter approach, using randomized 
control studies to investigate the mechanisms of movement and learning. In 
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addition, in forming conclusions and attempting to place the raw findings in a 
broader context, I draw from other evidence from simulation studies and incidental 
lesion studies.  
 
Visuomotor adaptation 
One popular experimental model for human learning is the visuomotor adaptation 
task65–67. One manifestation of this model is the visuomotor rotation task, in which a 
cursor that serves to represent the position of a participant’s hand is perturbed 
through the application of a rotation of a certain angle from the actual direction of 
reach67. Evaluation of behavior in this task usually comes in the form of measuring 
the angle at which participants launch their movement on each reaching attempt. 
Evidence for learning in this task comes in the form of observing that participants 
adjust their reaching direction so as to cancel the effect of the rotation. This effect is 
robust and has been reproduced many times.  
 
This basic model of learning has been coopted to study many other aspects of 
learning. For instance, it has been used to study memory of adaptation, or savings, in 
which learning is faster during subsequent exposures to similar perturbations38,39,68–
72. This task has also been subject to additional modification in order to decompose 
the underlying components to adaptation learning, for instance through the use of 





I will argue that a neglected characteristic of human learning is learning novel 
continuous movements. Typically, learning tasks involve discrete decisions, like 
forced choice tasks (e.g. Decker, et. al.75), and discrete movements, such as sequence 
learning tasks (e.g. Diedrichsen, et. al.18), which may include learning changes to the 
value of stimuli or choices. Most learning tasks can be distilled down to a choice, if 
even among continuous options, such as adaptation learning. It is far less common 
to study the way that continuous movements are learned, such as in76. One approach 
for the study of the kinematics of movements and how they change with learning is 
to introduce a novel behavior and measure the kinematics of movements 
throughout learning54. I will introduce a new model for continuous-movement 
learning that uses a custom-built video game implemented on a tablet computer. I 
will also introduce novel methods to analyze the behavior from this task, both in 







3 Recall of actions supports memory for adaptation 
Long-term memory for adaptation is established following minimal initial practice, 
which is consistent with an action recall mechanism. 
 
Adaptation learning in humans occurs in response to changes in movement dynamics 
or changes in the environment and serves to maintain movement accuracy66,67,77,78,79. 
One theory for the information processing that occurs during adaptation is that an 
internal model that assists in generating motor commands for a given movement is 
updated in proportion to the sensory-prediction error observed as a result of the 
movement perturbation23,66,67. More recently, theories and empirical data have 
suggested that in addition to an error-based mechanism, another mechanism is 
simultaneously active during adaptation that may be explicit in nature, such as 
choosing to reach in a direction other than directly toward the target23,74,80–83.  
One important observation related to adaptation is that human subjects adapt to a 
perturbation in fewer trials when they have previously experienced that 
perturbation, a phenomenon referred to as ‘savings’37–39,41–43,84. How savings occurs is 
a matter of debate. There have been a number of theories for savings that can be 
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broadly categorized as recall, modulation of error sensitivity, and representational 
redundancy. Recall refers to a mechanism for converging on an action that had 
previously been successful in countering a rotation 42,85. The error sensitivity theory 
suggests that prior experience with a given perturbation durably changes the future 
response of the apparent error-driven mechanism to similar perturbations, resulting 
in savings 60,70,86–88. A third theory for savings suggests that, although subjects may 
behave similarly at baseline from one day to the next, re-adaptation is faster during 
the second exposure because adaptation begins from a different underlying state 78,89–
92.  Although all of these explanations differ in important ways, they all assume that 
periods of prolonged prior exposure to a perturbation are necessary in order to elicit 
savings.   
 
Recent work has shown that savings is attributable to a single component of learning 
45,93,94, which appears to be the component that may be driven by explicit processing 
95. This mechanism may involve, for instance, choosing to aim in a direction other than 
the one towards the target when adapting to a rotation 83.  Thus, savings may plausibly 
result from recall of this explicit component of prior learning, rather than modulation 
of the implicit one.  If so, savings may be obtainable following far less prior practice 
than has typically been thought, assuming that an explicit memory can be acquired 
rapidly.   
 
To investigate this hypothesis specifically, we conducted an experiment to determine 
the minimum amount of initial exposure to a perturbation that is sufficient to obtain 
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savings.  To do this, we varied the duration of initial exposure to a visuomotor 
rotation, and tested for savings a day later.   
 
Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
80 right-handed, neurologically healthy subjects participated in this study (18 – 40 
years old, 49 women), which was approved by the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine 
Institutional Review Board.  
 
Experimental Setup 
Subjects were seated at a glass-surfaced table with their right forearm supported by 
a splint equipped with air-vents allowing near-frictionless planar arm movements.  
Subjects' arms were obstructed from their own view by a mirror, on which was 
projected a graphical interface from a downward-facing LCD monitor installed above 
the mirror (60 Hz refresh rate; LG). A cross-hair cursor presented on the screen 
represented the position of a subject's index finger, as reported by a Flock of Birds 





Subjects were instructed to make rapid “shooting” movements from a home position 
(a green circle, diameter 0.7 cm) through a target (blue and grey concentric circles, 
 17 
diameter 1.0 cm) located 8 cm away (Figure 1A).  After reaching to the target, subjects 
were instructed to return their hand and cursor to the start position again.  The cursor 
indicating their hand position was not visible during this time, unless it was within 1 
cm of the start position.  On a specific predefined subset of trials, the cursor’s 
instantaneous position was manipulated by imposing a rotation (30° in all but one 
condition) of the cursor location about the start position in either the clockwise or 
counter-clockwise direction, depending on the condition (Figure 1A).  Any 
perturbation was turned off in the inter-trial interval.  The target location was fixed 
for each subject but was randomized across subjects in order to mitigate any 
biomechanical biases that may have been present at any individual target location.   
 
50 subjects were randomly assigned to one of four “principal” groups or a control 
group (Figure 1B).  The principal groups differed only in the number of trials of the 
initial rotation: 2-, 5-, 10-, and 40- trials (n = 10 subjects per group).  Note that 
subjects in the 40-trial group actually only received 39 trials of the rotation due to an 
implementational error; we nevertheless maintain the “40-trial” notation 
throughout.  All subjects in each group made 59 reaching movements under “null” 
rotation conditions in which the cursor accurately reflected the location of the 
subjects’ index finger.  Both the initial and subsequent perturbations were 30° 
counter-clockwise rotations for these principal groups.  The training durations of the 
first rotation were chosen to vary the amount of adaptation achieved across groups 
during the initial exposure.  We refer to these groups as ROT2, ROT5, ROT10 and ROT40, 
respectively.  The control group, ROT0, did not experience a perturbation on the first 
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day and thus served as a baseline against which to establish the existence of savings 
in the principal groups.  ROT0 practiced reaching to the target under null-perturbation 
conditions (no rotation) on Day 1, and then first encountered the rotation on Day 2.  
10 subjects who had never experienced a rotation were assigned to this group.  All 
subjects in each group returned the next day to complete 65 trials of a 30° counter-
clockwise rotation.   
 
Three additional groups, ROT15DEG, ROTCOUNTER and ROT5MIN, were tested to further 
explore the conditions sufficient to achieve savings.  Each group was composed of 10 
new, naïve subjects.  Group ROT15DEG tested whether the magnitude of the first and 
second rotations must be the same to bring about savings.  For the first rotation, 
subjects experienced a 15° counter-clockwise rotation for 39 trials in order to match 
the conditions experienced by group ROT40.  The second rotation was identical to that 
for the principal groups.  A further group, ROTCOUNTER, was tested in order to 
determine whether the sign of the first and second rotations must be the same to 
observe savings. For the first rotation, subjects in this group received a 30° clockwise 
rotation for 5 trials and were tested for savings the next day by experiencing 65 trials 
of the opposite rotation, which was the same savings probe as in all the other groups. 
In the last group, ROT5MIN, we tested whether savings requires an overnight period 
between exposures or can be achieved with only a short break between sessions on a 
single day.  Subjects in this group received 5 trials of a 30° counter-clockwise rotation 
and then started Session 2 five minutes later, which again consisted of the same 




All data were analyzed offline using Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA).  Kinematic 
data were sampled at 130 Hz. These signals were filtered with a 3rd-order Savitzky-
Golay interpolation filter with half width 35 ms. Reach direction was determined by 
computing the angle at which each movement passed a circle centered on the start 
position with a radius of 8 cm (the distance to the target).  Each subject’s reach 
direction bias, determined by taking the mean reach direction during a 59 trial 
practice block without a rotation was subtracted from the reach directions measured 
during the rest of the experiment to mitigate any potential biases due to 
biomechanical differences across subjects and target locations. Analysis results were 
qualitatively unchanged if the initial reach direction (the angle at which each 
movement was launched, measured at 200 ms after movement initiation) was used 
instead of the angle that the cursor passed the target radius.  
 
There are at least three ways in which prior experience with the rotation can 
influence behavior in subsequent exposures.  First is retention of adapted behavior, 
expressed as a reach direction bias on the first trial of the second exposure 96; 97.  
Second, and of primary interest to us, is savings, in the form of a faster relearning rate 
41.  Third is an asymptote effect, in which the mean steady-state reach direction after 
adaptation is closer to the direction that would fully cancel the rotation 84.  We 
quantified each of these aspects of behavior as follows:  The initial bias was defined 
as the measured reach direction on the first trial of the second rotation.  Adaptation 
 20 
rate is reflected in subjects’ average amount of learning early in adaptation, which 
was defined as the mean reach direction on trials two through six on Day 2. This range 
of trials was chosen a priori as it encompasses the period during which learning 
progresses most rapidly in prior studies 42,36.  Alternative trial boundaries for this 
measure (possibly including the first trial or later trials) did not qualitatively alter the 
results.  Finally, asymptote was defined as the mean reach direction over the last 40 
trials of the second rotation. 
 
The control group, ROT0, served as a basis of comparison for bias, savings, and 
asymptote effects measured in the other groups.  Three one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted with group as the main factor and the relevant measure (i.e. initial bias 
(Trial 1), early learning (Trials 2-6), and asymptotic learning (Trials 31-65)) as within 
group factors.  In the event that the outcome of a test returned a significant main 
effect, we planned post-hoc t-tests between group ROT0 and each of the other groups 
to detect which groups were significantly different from naïve, correcting for multiple 
comparisons using the Tukey-Kramer method.   Additionally, a one-way ANOVA was 
used to test for differences in these three behavioral measures (bias, savings, and 
asymptote) among the four principal groups.   
 
A single-trial analysis was also used to more closely examine behavior at the very 
beginning of re-exposure to the rotation. This “single-trial learning rate” was defined 
as the change in reach direction from the first to the second trial of a rotation. The 
reason for including this alternative analysis was that if a subject had a larger single 
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trial learning rate at the start of their second exposure compared to their first, they 
must have formed a memory for how to counteract that rotation.  The use of a single 
trial to determine an estimate for learning rate has been employed by others 70,88,98,99.  
To formally test this difference, a paired t-test was conducted for each group 
comparing the single-trial learning rate between the first and second rotation 
exposures within each subject.     
 
Analysis for the three additional groups (ROT15DEG, ROTCOUNTER, ROT5MIN) was the 
same as that described for the above groups with respect to quantifying bias, savings, 
and asymptote.  All additional groups were compared against ROT0 with respect to 
the mean initial adaptation measure (using a t-test) and groups ROTCOUNTER and 
ROT5MIN were compared against ROT0 with respect to the difference in the single-trial 
learning rate.  For the single-trial learning rate analysis, we reversed the sign of the 
reach direction for ROTCOUNTER for Day 1 in order to compare across rotation sessions. 
The single-trial-learning-rate analysis was not performed for the ROT15DEG group 
because of the difference in perturbation magnitudes across sessions.     
 
An additional analysis was conducted to measure how closely the initial few trials of 
the second rotation exposure matched to the best performing trials from the first 
exposure. This analysis was conducted to determine plausibility of the recall 
hypothesis of savings. In this analysis, we tested for correlation between the best trial 
from Day 1 (the reach direction closest to canceling the rotation, at 30-degrees) and 
the reach direction during the first two trials of Day 2 (excluding the very first trial, 
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which regressed back to baseline given the overnight break) that best matched that 
value reached on Day 1.  
 
Group sizes of 10 were chosen based on a power analysis conducted using pilot data.  
Specifically, we used an estimate for the effect size of the initial adaptation measure 
of 6.5° and an estimated standard deviation of 6°, with a probability of a false negative 




Participants in this study engaged in a reaching task, moving their right hands from 
one target to another on each trial (Figure 1A). A 30° counter-clockwise rotation was 
introduced on Day 1 of the study, and on Day 2, the same perturbation was given to 
test for savings. The number of rotation trials on Day 1 was varied across four 
different groups so that the effect on savings of differing amounts of prior practice 




Figure 1: Visuomotor rotation experimental setup.  (A) During baseline movements, 
cursor feedback accurately reflects the position of the subject’s hand (veridical, 0° 
rotation).  With onset of the 30° rotation, cursor feedback is rotated about the origin (the 
start position) by 30°.  Dashed line: hand path, solid line: cursor path, green circle in 
isolation: movement start position, blue circle with grey ring: target.  (B)  Perturbation 
schedule for principal groups and the control group (n = 10 per group).  Double gray 
vertical lines indicate a break across days. 
 
Varying the amount of prior practice with the rotation had the effect of varying the 
compensation achieved during that time so that groups different in the extent of 
compensation that they achieved on the first day. On average, ROT2 adapted 3.8°, 
ROT5 adapted 17.0°, ROT10 adapted 23.0°, and ROT40 adapted 26.8° (Figure 2).  Thus, 
the pre-defined groups spanned a wide range of experiences during the initial 
exposure to the rotation. 
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Savings was observed even when initial adaptation was brief and incomplete  
Despite having differing amounts of adaptation during the first session, groups ROT5, 
ROT10 and ROT40 all showed savings during Day 2; each group adapted faster 
compared to the rotationally-naïve group ROT0 (Figure 3).  There was a significant 
difference across the five groups according to mean performance during early 
learning (the average reach direction on trials 2 – 6; ANOVA, F(4, 45) = 6.0, p = 
0.0006).  Post-hoc tests comparing early learning in each group that experienced a 
rotation on Day 1 to that for the control group, ROT0, revealed that each group except 
ROT2 exhibited significant savings (ROT0 vs. ROT2:  p = 0.49; each other comparison: 
p < 0.01). An ANOVA revealed a marginal difference across the four principle groups 
(ANOVA, F(3,36) = 2.76, p = 0.056).  
 
In addition to savings in the rate of adaptation, we examined how other 
characteristics of performance (i.e. bias and asymptote) in the second session varied 
with the duration of exposure in the first session.  The initial bias across all of the 
groups was not detectably different (Figure 3; ANOVA, F(4,45) = 1.88, p = 0.13; 
ANOVA excluding ROT0, F(3,36) = 2.08, p = 0.12), and nor was the asymptote during 
the second session (Figure 3; ANOVA, F(4,45) = 1.37, p = 0.26; ANOVA excluding ROT0, 






Figure 2: Rotation learning curves. Subject-averaged learning curves from the initial 
rotation session for the four groups that experienced a rotation on Day 1. Shaded 
regions indicate ±s.e.m.  Reach direction is abbreviated as “Reach dir.” Right panel: The 
mean attained reach direction for each group at the end of their initial exposure to the 
rotation.  Values represent the mean reach direction across subjects on the last trial of 












Figure 3: Savings in adaptation. Left panel: Re-learning data for the principal groups. 
Adaptation curves for the second rotation exposure are shown for each principal group 
with group ROT0 superimposed in black. Right panel: Mean performance across groups. 
(Top) Adaptation rate (Day 2, Trials 2-6) (Middle) Initial bias (Day 2, Trial 1)  (Lower) 
Asymptote performance (Day 2, Trials 26 – 65) 
 
Any amount of prior practice was sufficient to alter single-trial learning  
Each group exhibited a similar increase in compensation early during learning in the 
second rotation compared to compensation from the naïve group, ROT0. This was 
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apparent as an increase in the difference in reach direction between each group’s 
compensation on Day 2 and the compensation of group ROT0 (Figure 4). Positive 
values in Figure 4 connote savings. This accelerated learning was transient for ROT2 
and ROT5, lasting just a few trials, but was sustained for more trials for ROT10 and 
ROT40. Thus, apparently, savings was sustained only in groups that had reached 
asymptote on Day 1. Notably, however, the additional 30 trials on asymptote 
completed by ROT40 did not lead to stronger savings, compared to ROT10.   
 
In summary, group ROT2 appeared to have faster re-learning transiently, but did not 
register savings through the early learning measure presented above. This 
contradiction prompted us to perform a finer-grained analysis of the differences in 
re-adaptation among the groups.  Specifically, the amount of learning from the first 
trial (the different in reach direction between trials 1 and 2) was analyzed to test for 
a difference between Day 1 and Day 2.  Since each group aside from ROT0 performed 
at least two trials on both days, this measure of learning rate yielded a within-subject 
measure of single-trial savings.  Each group had a greater single-trial learning rate in 
the second rotation exposure compared to the first exposure (Figure 5; paired t-tests, 
p < 0.05 for each groups with Bonferroni correction). Moreover, the magnitude of this 
effect was comparable across groups (ANOVA, F(3,36) = 1.08, p = 0.37).  This analysis 
established that even very limited (as few as 2 trials) prior experience with a 
perturbation could lead to single-trial performance improvements during re-
exposure. This effect is clearly illustrated by plotting the reach direction on Day 2 as 
a function of the reach direction on Day 1 (Figure 5) and noting that all groups follow 
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the same pattern of faster learning on day 2, at least for as many trials as had been 
experienced initially.  
  
Figure 4: Differential savings. Difference in adaptation curves of each 
group from that of group ROT0, binned by trials of 5 (except the initial 
trial, which is connected by a dashed line). 
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In summary, although all the principal groups exhibited some degree of savings, there 
was a difference in the pattern of savings across groups. Savings was equally strong 
at the single-trial level in all groups, but was sustained for just a few trials in groups 
that had very limited initial exposure (i.e. ROT2, and ROT5).  Only the groups in which 
subjects reached or nearly reached asymptote during the first session showed 
sustained savings (i.e. ROT10 and ROT40).   
 
What kind of mechanism might be responsible for this pattern of results, where 
relearning is faster up to the point that adaptation initially reached, but then appears 
no faster thereafter? Figure 6 may help to clarify; here, the adaptation curve for each 
group was aligned according to the total number of rotation trials experienced. The 
figure reveals that participants appear to rapidly re-acquiring the reach direction 
attained at the end of the initial exposure, and then adapt at a naïve rate thereafter. 
Critically, there was no evidence of performance on Day 2 surpassing that of naïve 
learners who had experienced a comparable number of rotation trials in total. There 
also did not appear to be a gradual exponential convergence towards the behavior of 
naïve subjects, as might be expected from a change in sensitivity to error. Instead, 
participants appeared to rapidly reacquire the position on the adaptation curve they 
had attained during adaptation to the initial rotation. This view of the data suggests 
that savings represents a process of rapid retrieval, or recall, rather than a change in 









Figure 5: Similarity of savings. (Left panel) Difference in single-trial learning between 
Day 2 and Day 1. (Right panel) Reach direction on Day 2 vs. that on Day 1.  Grey line 
represents the unity line where data would be expected to lay if adaptation were 
unchanged from one day to the next. 
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Another way to test the idea that, upon re-adaptation, participants recall the best 
attained adapted state from their first experience is to check for a correlation 
between the reach direction on the last trial of the first rotation, and the closest 
matched reach direction between the second and third trials of the second rotation 
(it appears the recall mechanism may require a few trials to re-acquire the previous 
state, which is why this analysis allowed for comparing the best of two trials). This 
correlation was seen to be significant, comparing data from all subjects across groups 
(Figure 10; r2 = 0.45, p < 0.001).  
 
Savings was sensitive to the direction but not the magnitude of the rotation 
The results above showed that experiencing even a small number of trials of a 
perturbation is sufficient to create some form of memory leading to savings.  To 
further explore the conditions necessary to bring about savings, three additional 
groups were tested. ROT15DEG experienced a 15° rotation on Day 1 for 39 trials and 
was assayed for savings with a 30o rotation the next day, ROTCOUNTER experienced five 
trials of a clockwise rotation and then was tested the following day with a counter-
clockwise rotation, and finally, ROT5MIN experienced five trials of a counter-clockwise 
rotation and was tested for savings with the same rotation just five minutes later. The 
purpose of including these group was to further test the conditions which form a 
memory associated with savings; i.e. is the memory only associated with a specific 
perturbation, and is a break required for some form of consolidation to occur.  
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Savings was detected for group ROT15DEG (Figure 7); early learning (mean reach 
direction measured during trials 2-6) was faster than that for naïve participants (t-
test, p < 0.01). The behavior of group ROT15DEG was compared with that of groups 
ROT5 and ROT40 because these were the principal groups matched for attained reach 
direction on Day 1 (ROT5), and for number of rotation trials on Day 1 (ROT40). An 
ANOVA comparing these three groups revealed no difference in savings (ANOVA, 
F(2,27) = 1.14, p = 0.34).  Bias and asymptote measures also failed to show a difference 
across these three groups (bias: ANOVA, F(2,27) = 1.46, p = 0.24; asymptote: ANOVA, 
F(2,27) = 1.56, p = 0.22).  The single-trial learning rate analysis was not applicable for 




Figure 6: Savings as recall. Day 2 learning curves aligned by total number of perturbation 
trials experienced.  Curves represent mean across subjects; error bars not shown for clarity.  
All error bars and shaded regions indicate ±1 s.e.m. across subjects. 
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ROTCOUNTER was added to test whether the perturbation needed to be in the same 
direction during the first and second rotation exposures in order to observe savings. 
A comparison of performance during early learning (trials 2-6) in this group with that 
of group ROT0 revealed no evidence for savings (Figure 8; t-test, p = 0.84). Thus, the 
direction of the two rotations seems to matter for the formation of the memory 
supporting savings. Confirming this finding, a comparison of groups ROT5 and 
ROTCOUNTER, which is the group that is matched in number of initial adaptation trials, 
did show a significant difference (t-test, p < 0.05).  Finally, an analysis of the single-
trial learning rate further supports the conclusion that there is no change in response 
to the perturbation from the first to the second rotation (Figure 8; paired t-test, p = 
0.46) in this group. These groups (ROT0, ROTCOUNTER, and ROT5) also failed to show a 
significant difference in bias and asymptote between the two days of testing (bias: 
ANOVA, F(2,27) = 2.54, p = 0.10; asymptote: ANOVA, F(2,27) = 1.51, p = 0.24), and thus 





Figure 7: Magnitude generalization. Top panel: initial adaptation for ROT15DEG.  Middle two 
panel: re-adaptation. Lower panel:  early learning (Day2, Trials 2 – 6), initial bias (Day 2, 

















Figure 8: Direction specificity. Top panel: initial adaptation for ROTCOUNTER.  Middle panel: re-
adaptation. Lower panel:  early learning (Day2, Trials 2 – 6), initial bias (Day 2, Trial 1), asymptote 
performance (Day 2, Trials 26 – 65), and difference in single trial learning. 
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Savings was insensitive to the passage of time between the first and second exposures 
Prior studies of savings in adaptation suggest that an overnight break might be 
necessary in order to establish the memory for savings 84.  Thus, a final group was 
added, ROT5MIN, that tested whether the overnight break given to all other groups was 
necessary in order for the memory supporting savings to have been established. 
Participants in this group experienced 5 trials of a 30° rotation and were re-exposed 
to the perturbation following a 5-minute break. There was savings for this group 
compared to the naïve group (Figure 9), based on comparison of performance during 
early learning (trials 2-6) (t-test; p < 0.01).  This group also showed no detectable 
difference in early learning from group ROT5 (t-test; p = 0.88), which is the group 
matched for all conditions except time between initial and final perturbation 
exposures. The single-trial learning rate was also greater during the second exposure 
compared to the first in this group (paired t-test; p < 0.05). Comparison of the biases 
across groups ROT0, ROT5 and ROT5MIN did show marginal significance (bias: ANOVA, 
F(2,27) = 3.37, p = 0.051) (Figure 3C) likely due to the comparatively short interval 
between the initial and second adaptation sessions in ROT5MIN 96.  Asymptotic 
performance on either Day 2 or Session 2 was not significantly different among these 
comparison groups (ANOVA, F(2,27) = 1.41, p = 0.26). These results suggest that 
savings does not depend on an overnight consolidation period; comparable savings 








Figure 9: Passage of time insensitivity. Top left panel: initial adaptation for ROT5MIN.  
Bottom left panel: re-adaptation. Right panels:  early learning (Day2, Trials 2 – 6), initial 




To test the plausibility of the recall mechanism from the data, we conducted an 
analysis to test for a correlation between the best performing trial from Day 1 (i.e. the 
trial that reached closest to 30°, and the trial from the first two trial of Day 2 that most 
closely matched that best reach direction from Day 1. There was a significant correlation 
between these two quantities when pooling data across groups ROT2 to ROT40 (Figure 10; 
Linear regression analysis: R2 = 0.467, p < 0.001). 
 
 
Figure 10: Recall of best reach direction. There was a significant correlation between the best 
reach direction on Day 1, and the direction reached on Day 2 within the first two trials of the 






Theories regarding the formation of savings in adaptation tasks commonly assume 
that extended practice is required to instill a memory 38, 90, 60, 42, 96.  Knowing the lower 
bound on the duration of initial experience with a rotation required to obtain savings 
could provide important insight into the nature of this phenomenon.  We therefore 
sought to determine the minimum amount of exposure of a rotation that is sufficient 
to form a long-term memory for adaptation by varying the number of trials of initial 
exposure across four groups of subjects and assaying for savings a day later.    
 
Notably, savings was present even after only two trials of initial exposure to a 
rotation.  The specific pattern of savings differed, however, across groups: they all 
showed a similar benefit of prior experience according to the amount they learned 
from the first trial of re-exposure, but this advantage over naïve learners was only 
sustained all the way until asymptote was finally reached in groups that had initially 
reached asymptote during their first exposure. These differing patterns are most 
starkly illustrated by group ROT2. Depending on the analysis used, we could either 
conclude that ROT2 showed strong savings (based on single-trial learning rate) or no 
savings (based on mean reach direction during early learning) because this group 
rapidly jumped to the position on the adaptation curve it had previously acquired, but 
then adapted as if naïve thereafter.   
 
Further experiments revealed that the duration of the break between the first and 
second rotation exposures had little bearing on whether or not savings would be 
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observed; participants exhibited the same amount of savings whether that break was 
overnight or only 5-minutes.  Additionally, in order for savings to be observed, the 
direction of the rotation had to be consistent across exposures, but the magnitude 
could differ. 
 
Savings as recall 
How can a long-term memory for adaptation be established if not via gradual 
processes requiring practice at asymptote?  Recent evidence showing that explicit 
processes contribute to initial adaptation83,80,74,16 may provide a possible explanation.  
Specifically, since an explicit aiming component is present early in adaptation83, 
subjects might form a memory for this aiming strategy early during the initial 
exposure and recall it once they have identified that the rotation is present when 
tested again later.  
 
Alternatively, subjects may form a memory for action 42,85, as opposed to a memory 
for an aiming direction 83, or a memory for the perturbation 70. We have previously 
suggested that this may occur through an implicit reinforcement learning mechanism 
that is established through experience42. Specifically, repetition of a successful action 
on asymptote might be necessary in order to reinforce and remember it. Our new data 
suggest, instead, that subjects remember something about their prior rotation 
exposure even in the absence of such repetition on asymptote.  That said, it is still 
possible that other latent mechanisms may be active in parallel with a recall 
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mechanism when experimental conditions promote them, and thus either 
phenomenon or both may be active depending on the experimental conditions. 
 
Potential mechanism supporting savings as recall 
Why would one remember an action or aiming direction that was ultimately 
unsuccessful (i.e. led to a target miss), as is often the case given the bias toward 
baseline often exhibited at asymptote 36,100,101? It is plausible that a memory for action 
could be formed because of strong positive reward prediction errors experienced by 
subjects during the initial course of adaptation.  However, as was just mentioned, 
performance is typically worse under a perturbation than during baseline. Thus, 
nominally, the reward prediction errors during adaptation would be negative (i.e. 
reward is less than expected), because performance is worse under the perturbation 
compared to at baseline.  Whether subjects interpret a given action as an 
improvement (a positive reward prediction error) or continued failure (a negative 
reward prediction error) may depend on whether they detect that a change-point had 
occurred in the experiment following the rotation onset 102.  If the imposed rotation 
is interpreted as a change, actions and/or strategies that reduce the initially large 
errors experienced after the onset of the perturbation may be associated with a 
positive reward prediction error, and thus may be remembered even though they are 
ostensibly worse.  
 
Recall as a general mechanism of meta-learning in adaptation paradigms 
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Other studies have also observed behavior that is consistent with the idea of recall as 
a mechanism for savings.  For instance, two recent experiments have shown that if 
experience with a particular perturbation (e.g. a force field perturbation or a 
visuomotor rotation) is followed by a single episode of a novel perturbation, the first 
few actions under the new perturbation are directed in accordance with cancelling 
the previously experienced perturbation 88,95.  These findings are consistent with the 
idea that such actions were stored in memory and retrieved (albeit inappropriately) 
when another perturbation was experienced. Retrieval of actions previously used to 
counter a perturbation can even be triggered by withholding an expected visual 
reward 103, suggesting that reward prediction error, rather than re-experiencing the 
same or a similar perturbation, may be the key trigger for retrieval. 
 
A recent study suggested that savings may not be due to recall of prior actions, but 
rather might be due to an underlying sensory error-driven learning process 
increasing its sensitivity to previously experienced errors 70. The authors of that study 
showed that experiencing a particular error at one time leads to a durable change in 
response to the same or similar errors in the future. These findings, however, can also 
be interpreted under a recall hypothesis if we posit that errors of a specific magnitude 
can augment reward prediction error to act as a cue for retrieval of an existing 
memory.   
 
The sensitivity-to-error model proposed by Herzfeld and colleagues 70 cannot account 
for all of our results, however. In particular, it predicts that adaptation rate upon re-
 43 
exposure to a given perturbation will steadily increase as the duration of the initial 
exposure to the perturbation increases, even after one reaches asymptote.  In our 
data, however,  the duration of initial exposure had little effect on the overall 
magnitude of savings. In particular, having just reached asymptote (as in ROT10) is 
sufficient to exhibit nearly identical savings behavior as having experienced nearly 
30 trials on asymptote (as in ROT40).  Similarly, only reaching halfway to asymptote 
(as in ROT5) produces nearly the same amount of savings as having reached 
asymptote (ROT10 & ROT40), as subjects rapidly re-acquire the state of adaptation 
they had previously attained. Furthermore, the pattern of learning in all of the 
conditions we tested was different from that expected by a modulation of rate: 
participants rapidly reacquired the position they had previously attained during 
adaptation, rather than showing exponential convergence with an increased rate. We 
therefore suggest that savings is, in general, driven by recall of prior behavior rather 
than modulation of learning rate, but that this recall process can potentially be cued 
by the observation of a specific error.   
 
A further piece of evidence in support of the recall hypothesis is that Parkinsons 
Disease (PD) patients are typically unimpaired in initial adaptation to a perturbation 
104–107, but show impaired savings during re-adaptation 106,108,109.  This dissociation 
suggests that initial adaptation and savings depend on different processes.  Models 
that posit that savings is due to up-regulation of the rate of adaptation processes 
would need to explain how initial adaptation would be unaffected in PD but 
modulation of adaptation rate would be impaired.  Alternatively, the model proposed 
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here, in which savings is attributable to a separate recall mechanism, is entirely 
consistent with observed memory impairments in PD, in which deficits in the 
acquisition and/or retrieval of cognitive information have been observed 110,111. 
 
Conclusions and implications for motor skill learning 
Here we have suggested that savings in adaptation after just a single exposure can be 
entirely accounted for by rapid retrieval of a component of learning that is acquired 
within a few trials, and that this component may be subserved by explicit memory. 
This might suggest that savings actually reflects formation of declarative memory 112, 
rather than formation of a motor memory. In particular, it has been shown that 
savings is absent under constrained reaction time, a condition that likely omits 
explicit or strategic components to adaptation 93. It is also thought that long-term 
motor learning requires extended practice over days and weeks to acquire 113; 114; 115; 
116.  What, then, does adaptation serve as a model for:  motor skill, or some other form 
of memory that is possibly declarative?  The idea that initial acquisition and savings 
both have an explicit component is congruent with recent theories that contend that 
cognition and explicit knowledge are factors critical to learning and performing any 
motor task 28; 57.  Adaptation may therefore serve as a suitable model for how 
cognition and knowledge together may play a role in the formation of long-term 
motor memories.   
The link between explicit processes and motor memory might be that long-term 
motor memory takes the form of a persistent explicit memory. Alternatively, long-
term motor memory might be mediated by an implicit or procedural memory for a 
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component of learning that was initially explicit or declarative. This process of 
transition from one type of memory to another has been suggested as a general 
mechanism for skill acquisition 117,118. If visuomotor adaptation serves as an example 
of the initial, explicit stage of this process, one task that may serve as a model for this 
process following more practice is adjusting grip and load forces for lifting objects of 
unusual densities.  This task is ostensibly similar to visuomotor adaptation, given that 
both show signs of long-term memory formation following only brief periods of initial 
practice 25,119,120. However, visuomotor adaptation is known to be subserved by both 
explicit and implicit processes 23,83, while adjustment of grip and load forces during 
lifting seems to be largely implicit, evidenced by the fact that the size-weight illusion 
persists after appropriate motor adjustments have been made 119. These tasks also 
differ in their dependence on the cerebellum; patients with cerebellar degeneration 
are impaired in adapting to visuomotor rotations 121–126, but show no 
deficit in adjusting grip and load forces to objects of unusual densities 127. 
We suggest that the core difference between visuomotor adaptation and grip/load 
force adjustments is in the duration of prior practice, given that subjects have a 
lifetime of experience lifting objects whose weight is difficult to predict, but generally 
do not have much prior experience with unusual visual manipulations like a cursor 
rotation. It might be that given prolonged experience with adapting to 
rotations, adjusting to novel visuomotor mappings would begin to more closely 
resemble adjusting grip and load forces for novel size and weight combinations, 
including no longer relying on explicit or cerebellar-mediated adaptation 
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The availability of planning prior to movement during adaptation learning modulates 
the speed of compensation, and savings is only achieved when deliberate processing is 
permitted. 
 
Following a change in the environment or motor apparatus, human subjects are able 
to rapidly compensate their movements to recover accurate performance. This 
ability to adapt is thought to be achieved through multiple, qualitatively distinct, 
learning processes acting in parallel. It is unclear, however, what the relative 
contributions of these multiple processes are during learning. In particular, long-
term memories for adaptation have been extensively studied through the 
phenomenon of savings – faster adaptation to a given perturbation the second time 
it is experienced. It is unclear which components of adaptation contribute to this 
effect. Here, I present a study that showed that distinct components of learning in an 
adaptation task can be dissociated based on the amount of preparation time they 
require. During adaptation, subjects were forced to generate movements at very low 
preparation times. Early in learning, subjects expressed only a limited amount of 
their prior learning in these trials, though performance improved gradually with 
further practice. Following washout, subjects exhibited a strong and persistent 
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aftereffect in trials in which preparation time was limited. When subjects were 
exposed to the same perturbation twice in successive days, they adapted faster the 
second time. This savings effect was, however, not seen in movements generated at 
low preparation times. These results demonstrate that preparation time plays a 
critical role in the expression of some components of learning but not others, and 
suggests that savings for visuomotor adaptation is achieved primarily through the 




Motor learning is commonly studied through adaptation tasks, in which subjects 
must learn to compensate for an imposed perturbation that disrupts their 
movements (for instance a distortion of visual feedback77. An important 
characteristic of behavior in these paradigms is that subjects re-adapt faster the 
second time they are exposed to a perturbation. This phenomenon, referred to as 
savings, is thought to reflect the formation of a long-term motor memory40,69 and 
thus potentially provides a critical link between learning in adaptation paradigms 
and other forms of motor skill acquisition. 
Learning in adaptation tasks is known to depend on an implicit23, cerebellum-
dependent125,128–130 learning process that is posited to reflect updating of an internal 
forward model131–133 driven by sensory prediction errors23,125,128. In addition to this 
implicit, error-driven process, multiple additional processes are thought to 
contribute to learning in adaptation paradigms35,42,90,134. In particular, explicit 
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cognitive strategies can account for a significant amount of learning, particularly 
during early exposure16,34,35,74,80. Characterizing the properties of individual 
components of adaptation is challenging, since only the summed contribution of all 
of these components can typically be observed. 
Here, we sought to dissociate components of learning based on their preparation 
time requirements. Reaction times are known to increase during visuomotor 
adaptation16,135. Furthermore, this increase is causally related to adaptation rate16 
and is thought to reflect additional time required for cognitive contributions to 
influence movement. Previous work has also shown that movements released at low 
reaction times through startle136 show reduced expression of prior motor 
learning137,138. 
 
We show how carefully controlling the amount of time available to subjects to 
prepare their movement on a trial-to-trial basis allows us to decompose their 
learning into constituent components. We identified one component of learning that 
is expressible at minimal preparation time and appears to reflect implicit learning 
driven by sensory prediction errors. A further component of learning could only be 
expressed given prolonged preparation times. We speculate that this process 
reflects cognitive contributions to learning. This precise trial-by-trial control over 
the expression of different components of learning allowed us to directly test which 




Materials and Methods 
A total of 24 human subjects (11 women, 13 men; aged 24.6±7.5 years) participated 
in this study (10 in Experiment 1 and 14 in Experiment 2). All participants had no 
known neurological disorder and provided written consent prior to participation. 
All procedures were approved by the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine 
Institutional Review Board. Participants sat in front of a glass-surfaced table with 
their right arm supported on an air sled to allow frictionless planar movement. A 
mirrored display presented targets and a cursor controlled by the hand in the plane 
of movement. Hand position was tracked at 130Hz using a Flock of Birds magnetic 
tracking device (Ascension Technologies). Subjects began each trial by moving to a 
central start location. A target then appeared in one of two possible locations, ±82.5° 
from the straight-ahead direction, at a distance of 8cm from the start position (see 
Figure 11a). A sequence of four tones, each spaced 500ms apart, was initiated as the 
target appeared. Subjects were instructed that, synchronously with the fourth tone, 
they should initiate a rapid movement of the hand in order to move the cursor 
through the target. When the cursor passed the target radius, it was extinguished 
and re-appeared when the subject’s hand came within a 2cm radius of the start 
position when returning to begin the next trial. Subjects were provided feedback 
about the timing of their movement initiation relative to the fourth tone. 
Successfully timed movements had to be initiated within ±100ms of the fourth tone. 
On-screen text informed subjects if they had initiated their movement “Too Early” or 
“Too Late”.  Other than observing the trajectory of the cursor, subjects did not 
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receive any overt feedback about whether their movement successfully hit the 
target. 
Initial Training 
Prior to the main experiment, subjects completed 400 trials of training (200 to each 
target, over 2 blocks) in the basic task in order to practice accurate timing of their 
movement initiation. After this initial training, subjects performed a calibration 
block. In this block the target occasionally (30% of trials) switched from one 
location to the other at a random time before the onset of the fourth tone, chosen 
uniformly between 200ms and 500ms. Subjects were instructed to prioritize the 
timing of their movement initiation but at the same time to also make an effort to hit 
the target when possible. Based on subject performance in this block, we estimated 
the minimum response time each individual subject would require in order to 
successfully compensate for the target switch. We used maximum likelihood 
estimation to fit a sigmoid to the relationship between reaction time (measured as 
the time between target jump and movement onset) and reach direction. This 
threshold was rounded up to the nearest 25ms to obtain a subject-specific switch 
time for all subsequent trials in which the target switched. 
Adaptation Task 
After completion of initial training, we imposed two trial types on subjects (Figure 
11b). In 80% of all trials, the target appeared at the time of the first tone and 
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remained in the same place for the duration of the trial. Subjects therefore had 1.5 
seconds to prepare their movement from the time of initial target presentation to 
the time of movement initiation. We refer to these trials as high preparation time 
(highPT) trials. In the other 20% of trials, the target switched locations shortly 
before movement initiation. The purpose of this late target switch was to force 
subjects to make a movement towards the new target with a minimal amount of 
preparation time. We refer to these trials as low preparation time (lowPT) trials.  
The timing of the target switch was determined based on each subject’s individual 
performance in the earlier calibration block, such that subjects would only just be 
able to react to the target switch. 
Experiment 1 examined the effects of preparation time on subjects’ ability to 
compensate for an imposed visuomotor rotation. Ten subjects participated in 
Experiment 1. Following initial training and calibration, each subject performed 
three blocks: Baseline, Adaptation, and Washout (Figure 11c). Each block consisted 
of 100 trials to each target. The trial order was organized as a series of 10-trial sub-
blocks, with each sub-block containing 8 highPT trials (four to each of the two 
potential target locations) and 2 lowPT trials (one to each target), arranged in a 
pseudorandom order. Each subject received a different, randomly-generated 
sequence of trials (using the randperm function in Matlab). All trial numbers 
reported henceforth refer to trials to a particular target, rather than to the actual 
trial number within the block. 
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During the Adaptation block, a 30° clockwise rotation of the cursor position was 
imposed on the left half of the workspace at the start of trial 11. The rotation 
remained on for the rest of the Adaptation block and for the first 20 trials of the 
Washout block. The perturbation was switched off at the start of trial 11 of the 
Washout block and remained off for the rest of the experiment. 
Experiment 2 examined whether learning expressed in either highPT or lowPT trials 
would be faster upon a second exposure to the perturbation (i.e. whether savings 
would occur).  Fourteen subjects participated in Experiment 2. This experiment was 
conducted over 2 days. On Day 1, subjects performed initial training plus two 
experimental blocks: Baseline and Adaptation1. On Day 2, subjects performed 2 
further blocks: Adaptation2, and Washout (Figure 12a). Each block consisted of 100 
trials to each target, and the sequence of trial types was structured in the same way 
as in Experiment 1. In a preliminary study (data not shown), we found that subjects 
had persistent aftereffects (~10°) when returning after 24 hours. This partial 
retention of learning across days means that baseline behavior is poorly matched 
across days, making it difficult to assess changes in the rate of learning  across 
exposures (savings). We therefore introduced a brief period of washout at the end of 
Day 1 (last 20 trials). On Day 2, the perturbation was switched off during the first 10 
trials and was re-introduced at the start of trial 11 of Adaptation2. As in Experiment 
1, the perturbation was on for the first 10 trials of the Washout block, and was then 
switched off for the remainder of the experiment. The sequence of trial types (i.e. 
left/right, highPT/lowPT) in Adaptation2 was identical to Adaptation1; these blocks 
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differed only in that the cursor rotation was switched off toward the end of 
Adaptation1. Finally, in order to ensure that the effects observed in Experiment 1 
were not the result of biomechanical asymmetries, the overall experiment was 
reflected across the midline such that a 30° counterclockwise rotation was now 
introduced in the right half of the workspace. 
 
 
Figure 11 Timed response with rotation. A) Target layout. Two possible targets are located 
8cm from the start position and ±82.5° from the straight-ahead direction. B) Trial timeline. 
Subjects heard 4 tones spaced 500ms apart. A target appeared with the first tone and subjects 
were trained to initiate movement toward it synchronously with the fourth tone. In 80% of 
trials (highPT trials), the target remained in place throughout the trial. In 20% of trials 
(lowPT trials), the target was switched shortly (~300ms) prior to movement onset. B) 
Perturbation schedule. Subjects performed one block of trials with no perturbation, one block 
in which a 30° clockwise visuomotor rotation was imposed on the leftward target, followed by 
one block in which the perturbation was switched off. D) Trial-by-trial reach direction for a 
representatative subject. Filled, red circles indicate highPT trials, open, orange circles 
indicate lowPT trials. Inset shows the first 15 trials after perturbation onset (grey shaded 
region) in greater detail. Note that this subject failed to make an accurate movement on 




Position data were filtered using a Savitzky-Golay fiter (2nd order, half-width 54ms) 
and differentiated to obtain velocity. We identified the time of movement onset as 
the first time at which the tangential velocity of the hand exceeded 0.02m/s. The 
initial reach direction was calculated as the direction of the smoothed tangential 
velocity vector 100ms after movement onset. 
We compared behavior between lowPT and highPT trials with paired, two-tailed t-
tests on the mean reach direction for each trial type across subjects within a 
particular window of trials. We averaged performance over a window of 15 trials to 
a specific target (12 highPT, 3 lowPT) (with one exception: we considered a window 
of just 10 trials to assess washout at the end of block Adaptation1 in Experiment2). 
To assess savings in Experiment 2, we quantified the rate of initial learning as the 
difference between behavior in the last 5-trial bin before the onset of the 
perturbation and the first 5-trial bin after the onset of the perturbation. We 
quantified savings as the difference in this learning rate between days. The specific 
trial windows used for each test, which were determined a priori, are described in 
the results and are indicated by shaded grey regions in each figure. 
In lowPT trials, subjects occasionally failed to move to the correct post-switch 
target. We deemed a trial to be a ‘miss’ if subjects moved more than 2cm in the 
direction opposite the target.  Such miss trials were an inevitable consequence of 
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switching the target as late as subjects could cope with. These ‘miss’ trials were 
excluded from further analysis. One subject in Experiment 1 and two subjects in 
Experiment 2 missed the target switch in more than half of the lowPT trials. Data 
from these subjects were excluded from subsequent analysis. In addition, the 
remaining subjects were excluded from specific statistical comparisons if they 
missed the target switch on all trials of interest for that particular comparison. At 
most one subject was excluded from each statistical comparison on these grounds 
(though it was not necessarily the same subjects that were excluded from each 
comparison). Of the remaining (retained) subjects, 14.1% of pertinent lowPT trials 
(i.e. those that would have contributed to a statistical analysis) were unavailable 
due to ‘misses’in Experiment 1. This figure was 11.5% for Experiment 2. Miss trials 
were uniformly distributed across (retained) subjects, trial windows, and locations 
within each window. Since the learning rate analysis necessarily included a smaller 
number of trials, a greater number of subjects (4) had to be excluded from this 
analysis. The basis for excluding data – that subjects missed the switch in target 
locations on these trials – is independent of their exact reach direction when they 
moved towards the correct target. Therefore our analysis is unlikely to be biased by 
considering only a subset of the data. 
Shapiro-Wilk tests on data from 34 subjects across all experiments confirmed that 
mean reach directions used in statistical tests were normally distributed across 
subjects in both trial types, during both early learning (trials 1-15) and at asymptote 
(trials 51:75) (p>0.2 in all cases). Variability across subjects was approximately 
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similar across trial types at all points during learning, although slightly larger in 
highPT than lowPT trials during early learning (5.8° versus 3.3° std. dev.). The 
variances could be equalized through a log-transformation of the data, in which case 
the outcome of all statistical tests remained similar to the analysis of the 
untransformed data (not all shown).  
Results 
We sought to dissociate components of motor learning based on the amount of time 
available for subjects to prepare a movement. Subjects made fast reaching 
movements to guide a cursor through a target that was presented either to the left 
or right of a central start location (Figure 11a). We varied preparation time by using 
two distinct types of trial (Figure 11b). In 80% of trials, subjects were allowed a 
high preparation time (highPT trials). In these trials, the location of the target was 
revealed 1.5s before subjects were required to initiate movement and remained 
there for the duration of the trial. In the other 20% of trials (lowPT trials), a target 
was displayed at the start of the trial but the location of the target unexpectedly 
switched sides shortly (~300ms) before movement onset (Figure 11b). 
Selective expression of a distinct component of learning at low preparation times 
In Experiment 1, we tested the effects of preparation time on the amount of learning 
expressed during adaptation and, subsequently, during washout. Ten subjects 
participated in this experiment. After an initial baseline period, a 30° clockwise 
 58 
rotation of the cursor was introduced in the left half of the workspace so that it only 
affected movements to one of the two possible targets (Figure 11a,c).   
Figure 1d illustrates the main features of behavior in this paradigm by means of a 
representative subject. This subject showed little difference in performance during 
the baseline phase given different amounts of time to prepare their movement (red, 
filled circles (highPT) versus orange, open circles (lowPT)). After 110 baseline trials, 
a rotation of the visual cursor position was introduced. This subject was able to 
successfully counter the perturbation within 3 trials of its onset (Figure 11d, grey 
shaded region + inset). In the fourth trial, a lowPT trial, the subject was unable to 
maintain this compensatory behavior and their reach direction reverted back 
towards baseline. In the fifth, highPT trial, the subject was again able to compensate 
for the perturbation. This pattern continued through the next 100 trials: the subject 
was largely able to compensate for the perturbation in highPT trials, but exhibited 
poorer performance in lowPT trials. Performance in lowPT trials, did, however, 
gradually improve throughout the course of the block. During washout, the pattern 
of behavior was reversed: the subject reverted to baseline behavior in highPT trials, 
but displayed a persistent aftereffect in the lowPT trials. 
The key features of this representative subject’s behavior were consistent across all 
subjects who participated in the experiment (Figure 12a-d). The movements 
subjects made at baseline were not distinguishable between highPT and lowPT 
conditions: There was no significant difference in initial reach direction between 
lowPT and highPT trials to either the adapted target (trials 51-100, 
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difference=1.02±3.7°; t(8)=0.82; p=0.43) or the non-adapted target 
(difference=1.44±3.21°; t(8)=1.347; p=0.22). Peak velocities were comparable 
across highPT and lowPT trials (trials 51-100, highPT: 1.04±0.36ms-1, lowPT: 
1.014ms-1; within-subject difference: 0.028±0.063ms-1; t(8)=1.355; p=0.212).  
When a 30° clockwise rotation of the cursor was introduced in the left half of the 
workspace, subjects rapidly adapted their initial movement direction to compensate 
(Figure 12c). Average behavior in highPT trials reached an asymptote after 
approximately 30 trials. Behavior in lowPT trials, by the same subjects in the same 
block, changed much more gradually. Subjects exhibited significantly greater error 
in lowPT compared to highPT trials during early learning (trials 11-25, t(8)=2.548; 
p<0.05). Performance in this period was uncorrelated between lowPT and highPT 
trials (r=0.097; p=0.80) (Figure 12d), suggesting that poorer performance in lowPT 
trials was not simply due to a fixed fraction of overall learning being expressed in 
those trials. Notably, performance in highPT trials during this window appeared to 
be considerably more variable across subjects than behavior in lowPT trials (highPT 
std = 13.4°; lowPT std = 6.2°). Although performance in highPT trials quickly 
reached an asymptote, behavior in lowPT trials continued to improve gradually and 
was comparable to highPT trials at the end of the Adaptation block (trials 86-100, 
t(8)=1.35; p=0.22). The perturbation was removed early in the next block 
(Washout). In highPT trials, subjects’ reach directions rapidly returned to baseline. 
Behavior in lowPT trials, however, revealed a significant aftereffect (trials 86-100, 
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t(7)=-5.92; p=0.001) which persisted until the end of the experiment 90 trials later 
(Figure 12f). 
Critically, the overall pattern of behavior we observed, across initial learning and 
washout, cannot be explained in terms of a single component of learning expressed 
to differing degrees. Although a single-component model could plausibly explain the 
pattern of behavior during initial learning (e.g. if subjects gradually become better at 
expressing this component at low preparation times), such a model, however, 
necessarily predicts that a return to baseline in highPT trials during washout would 
generalize fully to lowPT trials. Instead, we found that subjects exhibited a clear and 
persistent aftereffect in lowPT trials. 
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Figure 12 Preparation time modulates adaptation. A) Perturbation schedule(see also Figure 
1c). B-C) Mean initial reach direction across subjects throughout the experiment to B) the 
unadapted target and C) the adapted target. Filled red circles show highPT trials, open orange 
circles show lowPT trials. The x axis reflects approximate trial number within session. Shaded 
regions indicate ±s.e.m. D-F) Scatter plots showing individual subject behavior during D) Early 
learning, E) late learning, and F) late washout. Data points reflect average reach direction 
across the relevant shaded regions in panel C). G) Estimated contribution of the additional 




This overall pattern of data is instead better explained in terms of two components 
of learning acting in parallel: one that can be expressed regardless of preparation 
time, and one which can be expressed only at high preparation times. These 
processes act in the same direction during initial learning, but in opposing 
directions during washout. We estimated the influence of the component of learning 
that was expressible only at long preparation times by subtracting performance on 
lowPT trials from the average performance on adjacent highPT trials (Figure 2g). 
The contribution of this process was large early in learning but slowly declined to 
near zero with practice. It was re-engaged during washout and remained in effect 
throughout the remainder of the experiment, apparently compensating for a 
persistent aftereffect in the component of learning expressed in lowPT trials. 
Savings for adaptation can only be expressed at high preparation time 
In Experiment 2, we sought to determine which of the two components of learning 
identified in Experiment 1 is responsible for savings, i.e., faster re-learning upon re-
exposure to the same perturbation at a later time. We recruited 14 new subjects for 
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 followed a similar design to Experiment 1, except that 
subjects were exposed to the perturbation twice on successive days (Figure 13a). 
The perturbation was applied to the rightward target, rather than the leftward 
target, to rule out any potential effects of limb biomechanics in the results of 
Experiment 1. In order to minimize carry-over of any aftereffects of learning to Day 
240,96, initial learning on Day 1 was briefly washed out with 20 non-perturbation 
trials (to the adapted target) at the end of the session. 
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Initial behavior on Day 1 of Experiment 2 reproduced the results of Experiment 1 
(Figure 13b,c): we found significantly greater compensation for the rotation in 
highPT trials than in lowPT trials during early learning(trials 11-25, 
t(13)=4.131;p=0.001). This difference disappeared later in learning (trials 66-80, 
t(13)=1.44;p=0.16). During washout at the end of Day 1, lowPT trials exhibited a 
greater aftereffect than highPT trials (trials 91-100, t(13)=-2.26; p<0.05). 
On the second day, subjects exhibited a small aftereffect from the previous days’ 
learning in lowPT trials (Adaptation1, trials 1-10, vs Adaptation2, trials 1-10; t(12)=-
2.290; p<0.05). This aftereffect was, however, very small in size (2.9±4.7°, ~14%) 
relative to the overall change in behavior on Day 1. During adaptation, behavior on 
Day 2 was qualitatively similar to that on Day 1 (Figure 12c). After onset of the 
perturbation, subjects exhibited rapid adaptation in highPT trials but only 
expressed a limited amount of this learning in lowPT trials (Adaptation2 trials 11-
25, highPT vs lowPT, t(13)=4.34; p=0.001). Late in learning on Day 2, performance 
became comparable across trial types (Adaptation2 trials 85-100, t(13)=0.18; 
p=0.86). At the end of washout on Day 2, a clear difference in reach direction 
remained between highPT and lowPT trials (Washout trials 85-100, t(11)=-2.209; 
p<0.05). 
The critical question, however, is how learning compared across days within each 
trial type. We analyzed savings in terms of learning rate, taking into account the 
potential biases present at baseline, particularly in lowPT trials. We quantified the 
learning rate based on the change in behavior immediately before and after the 
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perturbation was introduced (trials 11-15 - trials 6-10). We found that learning rate 
in highPT trials was significantly greater on Day 2 compared to Day 1 (highPT, 
Adaptation1 learning rate vs Adaptation2 learning rate, t(12)=-4.398; p=0.001). This 
savings effect was, however, absent in lowPT trials (lowPT, Adaptation1 learning 
rate vs Adaptation2 learning rate, t(9)=-0.260; p=0.801). Power calculations 
(assuming an effect size of 6°, around half that seen in highPT trials, and variability 
estimated based on data in Experiment 1) suggested that 8 subjects would be a 
sufficient sample size to achieve a power of 0.8 at a significance level of 0.05, 
whereas our sample contained 10 subjects after exclusions for missing switch trials. 
The difference in the extent of savings between lowPT and highPT trials was further 
supported by a significant Learning Rate × Trial Type interaction (Adaptation1 
learning rate vs Adaptation2 learning rate, highPT vs lowPT, t(8) = 3.503, p<0.01. 
Savings, therefore, could only be expressed when sufficient preparation time was 
available. 
The results of all of our analyses did not change substantially if we log-transformed 
the data in order to control for differences in variability across subjects between 
lowPT and highPT trials. In particular, reach direction during early learning was 
closer to baseline in lowPT than highPT trials (Expt 1: trials 11-25, t(8)=2.232; 
p=0.056; Expt 2: trials 11-25, t(13)=4.073, p=0.001).  This analysis also confirmed 
that savings was stronger in lowPT than highPT trials (trial window (6-10 vs 11-15) 
× type (lowPT vs highPT) interaction; t(8)=2.315, p<0.05).  
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In summary, savings was found only in components of learning expressed at high 
preparation times. Behavior at low preparation did not show any change in learning 
rate across days. The only evidence for long-term memory in this component was a 
small (~3°) directional bias that persisted throughout the second session. 
 
Figure 13 Savings is limited to when PT is available: Experiment 2 Results. A) Perturbation 
schedule. Subjects were exposed to the perturbation on Day 1, but adaptation was washed out 
in the last 40 trials of the session. Subjects were re-exposed to the perturbation the next day, 
then washed out again. B-C) Mean reach direction across subjects for B) unadapted target C) 
adapted target. HighPT trials are shown in red, lowPT trials are shown in orange. The x axis 













Figure 14 Comparison of learning across sessions. A) Mean reach direction in high-PT trials on 
Day 1 (gray) and Day 2 (red). B) Difference in state of learning expressed in high-PT trials 
across days. C) Mean reach direction in low-PT trials on Day 1 (gray) and Day 2 (orange). D) 
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Difference in state of learning expressed in low-PT trials across days. The x axis reflects 




We have demonstrated the existence of two qualitatively distinct components of 
motor learning that can be dissociated from one another based on the amount of 
preparation time that they require. Our findings corroborate and extend previous 
work showing a relationship between preparation time and adaptation16. In 
particular, our target-switch paradigm allowed us to vary preparation time on a 
trial-by-trial basis, enabling us to assess the contribution of both components of 
learning in parallel in the same subject during a single exposure. Similar reduced 
expression of learning occurs for movements elicited through startle137. Our results 
suggest that this effect is attributable to the effect that startle has on preparation 
time136, rather than being a property of startle-elicited responses per se. 
Importantly, startle is also known to affect behavior in a similar way following force 
field adaptation137, showing that the effects of preparation time on expression of 
learning is a general property of adaptation. 
 
A potential alternative explanation for our results is that there is only a single 
learning process, but that the target switch in lowPT trials served as a contextual 
label139 which allowed learning to occur independently in the two different types of 
trials. The slow time course of learning in lowPT trials may simply be because of the 
lower frequency of those trials. This explanation, however, cannot easily explain the 
relative rates of learning in lowPT and highPT trials. Furthermore, it fails to account 
for previous work that observed similar effects of preparation time on expression of 
adaptation using either far more16 or fewer138 trials in which preparation time was 
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limited. Furthermore, a contextual argument cannot explain the qualitatively 
characteristics of learning seen in the two different types of trials – in particular, the 
lack of savings in lowPT trials. Therefore, the difference in behavior we saw in 
different trial types does not reflect a contextual effect but rather a difference in 
expression of underlying components. 
 
We exploited this effect to better characterize the nature of savings for visuomotor 
adaptation. We found that prior experience with a perturbation only affected the 
rate of subsequent learning in components that require a high preparation time in 
order to be expressed. In addition to this savings effects in highPT trials, we 
observed a small but persistent aftereffect of prior learning in the lowPT trials on 
Day 2, similar to effects that have been reported before43,96. Although this aftereffect 
could be construed as a form of long-term memory, it was of limited utility to 
subjects facing a dynamically changing environment; the magnitude of the 
aftereffect (~3°) is too small to account for the savings seen in highPT trials (~10°). 
This bias effect therefore appears to be far more limited form of long-term memory 
in comparison to the more flexible behavior afforded by the memory that supports 
savings. 
 
Characterizing preparation-time dependent components of learning 
Learning behavior in highPT trials varied significantly across subjects and across 
learning sessions. By contrast, behavior in lowPT trials was relatively stereotyped 
across subjects (see Figure 11g) and across exposures (Experiment 2). The amount 
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of learning expressed in highPT and lowPT trials was uncorrelated; subjects who 
could compensate well for the perturbation relatively early in highPT trials did not 
necessarily exhibit faster learning in lowPT trials. Importantly, this implies that the 
component of learning expressed in lowPT trials is insensitive to task success. Such 
insensitivity to success is characteristic of implicit learning driven by sensory 
prediction errors23,35. This learning is cerebellum-dependent129 and is thought to 
reflect updating of an internal forward model131–133. We suggest that the component 
of learning seen at low preparation time in our results corresponds to this implicit, 
cerebellum-dependent learning process, though further work will be required to 
confirm this claim.  
 
The second component we identified, which could be expressed at highPT but not at 
lowPT, may reflect explicit cognitive contributions to learning16,34,35,74. Explicit 
contributions to learning exhibit greater trial-to-trial variability, particularly early 
in learning35.  Behavior expressed at high preparation times displays similar 
elevated variability16 and this variability is associated with faster learning. The 
relationship between variability and learning rate is consistent with a learning 
process that is driven by scalar reinforcement rather than vector error55,140. 
Alternatively, learning that is selectively expressed at high preparation times could 
be based on a cognitive model of the perturbation16 that is distinct from the one 
computed by the cerebellum. Our preparation-time-dependent decomposition of 
adaptation may not, however, be entirely equivalent to an explicit/implicit 
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decomposition. For instance, it may be possible, given sufficient practice, to express 
an explicit strategy with minimal preparation time. 
 
Motor learning and rapid motor responses 
Our timed-response target-switch paradigm, inspired by the work of Ghez and 
colleagues141, was devised as a means to elicit movements at minimal preparation 
time. Low-latency motor responses can also be elicited through perturbations to the 
arm142, to a controlled cursor76,143 or to a target144,145 during or immediately before 
movement. Goal-directed responses following such perturbations emerge within 
100-150ms76,142. 
 
Close examination of such rapid motor responses has found that behavior guided by 
explicit knowledge occurs at relatively long latency. If a cursor representing the 
hand location is displaced during movement, an implicit compensatory response is 
initiated in around 150ms76,145. If subjects are instructed to override this natural 
response and instead move their hand in the same direction that they see the cursor 
move, they are able to do so only at much longer latencies (~350ms). The low-
latency compensation for the initial cursor displacement still occurs and therefore 
seems to be involuntary. A similar pattern of behavior is found in object 
interception. Human and animal subjects possess an ability to rapidly (with a 
reaction time of around 150ms) select an appropriate hand and initiate a movement 
to intercept a moving object146. If, however, subjects are asked to override their 
default hand choice and instead use a different hand, they can do so only at the 
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expense of a longer reaction time146. Elevated reaction times also occur in the anti-
saccade task in which subjects must initiate a saccade in a direction opposite to a 
presented target147. In general, therefore, it appears that motor behavior is 
supported by a combination of implicit (perhaps procedural; see below) responses 
that can be executed at short latency, together with more explicit contributions that 
can only be expressed at longer delays. Thus these findings support our 
interpretation that components of learning expressible only at high preparation 
times, including savings, reflects the contribution of explicit components of learning. 
 
Declarative versus Procedural Memory 
A fundamental distinction in long-term memory is between declarative and 
procedural forms of memory. Although exact definitions vary, declarative memory is 
typically associated with knowledge that can be consciously recalled (though not 
necessarily verbalized28), while procedural memory relates to knowledge that can 
only be expressed by doing something148. The distinction between these types of 
memory rests largely on dissociations in amnesic subjects, who can acquire new 
perceptual4 (Cohen and Squire, 1980) and motor6,7 skills without having any 
conscious recollection of doing so.  More concrete definitions of procedural memory 
have been proposed that appeal to the computational idea that procedural memory 
corresponds to a cached mapping or control policy relating stimuli to actions149. 
According to this theory, procedural memories should correspond to memories that 
are expressible at minimal preparation times. Indeed, procedural memory is 
generally established through reductions in reaction time14,52,150–152. In our results, 
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the long-term memory associated with savings could not be expressed at low 
preparation times and, therefore does not seem to reflect a procedural memory 
according to this more computational definition. Instead, the fact that savings 
required prolonged preparation time to be expressed is more consistent with it 
relating to a declarative memory. 
 
The component of adaptation expressed at low preparation times appears to 
resemble implicit, error-driven learning of the kind that appears to be supported by 
the cerebellum35,89,125,153. Although this component of learning could be expressed at 
low preparation time, the only long-term memory it exhibited was a weak overall 
bias of reach direction on Day 2. We question the degree to which this bias effect can 
be considered a model of procedural memory of the kind that supports more 
complex and dynamic motor skills such as driving, juggling or tying a shoelace. The 
concerns extend to the  Cerebellum-dependent learning, at least as it is currently 
understood, might therefore play a very limited role in acquiring new skills, 
contrary to widely-held beliefs48,154,155. Instead, cerebellum-dependent learning, 
might primarily serve to maintain calibration of control policies subserving existing 
skills49. 
This work and text appeared previously in (Haith, Huberdeau, Krakauer, 2015). I 




5 Memory for adaptation transforms from being 
deliberate to cached 
 
Adaptation is initially supported by deliberate processing, but becomes cached with 
practice. 
 
It is well known that the properties of visuomotor learning can be altered through 
experience. It remains unclear exactly how this meta-learning, often referred to as 
savings, is achieved. Two alternative theories have emerged, each relating to one of 
the qualitatively distinct mechanisms thought to be responsible for adaptation 
learning. One hypothesis is that the properties of a sensory prediction error-
correcting mechanism change with experience so that similar errors are corrected for 
more quickly, leading to savings. Another model suggests that actions deliberately 
made to correct for task errors are remembered and recalled again later. We had 
previously shown that savings is limited to deliberate corrections when prior practice 
is limited, but it has also been shown that the properties of meta-learning continue to 
change with more practice, so it is possible that the mechanism supporting savings 
changes with experience. Here, we sought to measure the relative contributions of 
the adaptation components to the emergence of savings to discover their possibly 
changing contributions throughout practice. We found a qualitative change in the 
deliberative component of adaptation following practice with an alternating 
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visuomotor rotation, but could detected no change in the implicit component of 
learning. These findings suggest that the properties of cerebellum-dependent implicit 
recalibration remain insensitive to experience and that, instead, practice induces a 
qualitative change in the nature of the memory retrieved during savings, ultimately 
enabling it to be expressed rapidly and automatically. The process of converting 
deliberate actions to automatic ones may be the foundation of more general motor 
skill learning in humans, and our results suggest that this process is mechanistically 
independent from implicit recalibration. 
 
Introduction 
Motor learning is commonly studied using adaptation tasks59,67. In these tasks, a 
systematic perturbation is applied during a movement, and participants must learn 
to adjust their actions to cancel the effects of this perturbation to regain baseline 
levels of performance. The properties of adaptation are known to change with 
experience, a phenomenon known as savings or meta-learning37–39,41,43,69,156. 
 
The ability to adapt to an imposed perturbation appears to be supported by at least 
two underlying learning components71. One component is implicit, cerebellum-
dependent, and driven by sensory errors23,35,129. The other is more deliberate, may be 




A critical question linking adaptation to more general human learning is which of 
these components is responsible for savings, as savings is one of the strongest signs 
of long-term memory for adaptation. The mechanisms by which savings emerges are 
thus likely to be the most relevant and relatable to more general motor learning in 
humans. It has been suggested that practice might alter the sensitivity of implicit 
learning driven by sensory prediction errors70,88. However, several recent findings 
appear to show that savings after a single exposure to a perturbation is solely 
attributable to enhanced deliberate compensation rather than to implicit 
recalibration44,45,72. This finding is consistent with the notion that savings occurs 
through retrieval of the actions or strategy that aided adaptation during the initial 
period of compensating for the perturbation71,156. 
 
However, it is also well-known that longer-term exposure to perturbations can 
continue to alter the properties of adaptation70,88,157. It thus remains unclear what the 
nature of longer term savings is – whether it is qualitatively similar to savings after a 
single exposure (i.e., purely at the level of deliberate compensation) or whether it 
might eventually lead to plasticity in the properties of implicit recalibration. 
 
Here, we assessed how repeated practice at adapting to a series of visuomotor 
rotations affected the properties of the multiple components of adaptation. We 
compared two distinct approaches to decomposing learning into subcomponents. 
First, we directly assessed implicit recalibration by instructing participants to halt 
any deliberate aiming strategy they may have adopted, and instead try to bring their 
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hand directly in line with the target35,44,74. Second, we manipulated the amount of 
preparation time that participants were allowed between observing the target 
location and initiating their movement. This has been demonstrated to be an effective 
means of prohibiting the use of an aiming strategy16,72,158 {Haith; Fernandez-Ruiz; 
Leow}, owing to the lengthy computations involved in aiming towards a different 
spatial location30,34,159. 
 
Although it has been suggested that limiting preparation time might isolate the same 
component of learning as measuring aftereffects, it is also possible that the two might 
dissociate following more practice. In particular, existing theories of learning suggest 
that practice facilitates a transition from declarative control, which may require time-
consuming computations to generate the correct action, to procedural control, which 
may be able to be generated more rapidly and automatically. We therefore 
hypothesized that practice might lead to a qualitative change in the nature of the 
memory retrieved during savings, enabling it to be expressed even when preparation 




61 right-handed, neurologically un-impaired participants took part in this study (18 
– 40 years old, 37 women).  The study was approved by the Johns Hopkins School of 




Participants were seated at a glass-surfaced table with their right forearm supported 
by a splint that allowed nearly frictionless planar arm movements.  Participants' arms 
were obstructed from their own view by a mirror, on which was projected a display 
from a downward-facing LCD monitor installed above the mirror (60 Hz refresh rate; 
LG).  
 
Participants’ hand position was recorded by a Flock of Birds magnetic sensor (130 
Hz; Ascension Inc., Shelburne, VT) placed under each participant’s index finger. Hand 
position was reported to participants in near real-time via a cursor (a filled blue 
circle, diameter 0.5 cm) displayed on the screen. Visual feedback of the cursor had a 
delay of approximately 100 ms on account of an approximately 40 ms delay in the 
Flock of Birds and an approximately 60 ms delay in the visual display. 
 
Experiment 1 
21 participants took part in Experiment 1. Participants made rapid “shooting” 
movements using their right upper-limbs from a central start location (a solid green 
circle, diameter 1 cm) through a target (a solid light-blue circle, diameter 1 cm).  The 
target could appear at one of two locations, positioned 8 cm either to the right or left 
of the start location (Figure 15A). Participants were trained to initiate their reaching 
movement coincident with the fourth of four audible tones. The tone sequence began 
200 ms following stable placement of the cursor inside the start marker. Successive 
tones were played at intervals of 300 ms. On each trial, one of the two targets was 
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presented at the onset of the first tone, and remained on the screen until either the 
participant reached 9 cm radially from the start position, or 2.5 s passed from the 
time of the first tone (Figure 15A).   
 
A visuomotor perturbation in the form of a 30° rotation of the path of the cursor about 
the start position (Figure 15B) was applied in repeating cycles (Figure 15C) 
throughout the experiment. Only movements directed to the right half of the 
workspace experienced the rotation.  Seven cycles of cursor rotations were included 
across the experiment duration (the 7th cycle omitted the counter-rotation; Figure 
15C).  The experiment was divided into blocks of 100 trials each (grey vertical lines 
in Figure 15C). Rotation direction was counter-balanced across participants so that 
11 participants in Experiment 1 had the leading rotation as [clockwise or 
counterclockwise] {rotation = 1 had 11 for E1}.  
 
During trials designated as Long-Preparation Time (PT) trials, the target remained in 
its original location for the duration of the trial. During Short-PT trials, the target 
location abruptly switched to the opposite possible target position prior to the fourth 
tone (Figure 15A). The time at which the target switched locations was randomized 
for each Short-PT trial by sampling from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 400 
ms and a standard deviation of 25 ms. Short-PT trials were included among the more 
common Long-PT trials only during the first rotation and during the seventh and final 
rotation (Figure 15C). Within blocks where they were present, Short-PT trials were 
randomly interspersed among Long-PT trials such that for every 10 total trials, two 
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were Short-PT (one to each target) and eight were Long-PT (four to each target). No 
Short-PT trials were permitted as the first or last trial in each sequence of 10 trials.  
 
 
Figure 15: Experiment Design. Participants engaged in a reach task. (A) The amount of 
preparation time prior to movement was controlled by requiring movement initiation to occur 
coincident with the fourth tone of a metronome, and controlling the timing of target switches 
(lower panel). A rotation of the cursor path (B) was imposed in two opposite directions in 
repeating cycles (C) throughout the two-day experiment. Aftereffect trials (D) measured the 
amount of recalibration during adaptation, absent any overt aiming on the part of participants. 




Another trial type, the Aftereffect trial (Figure 15D), was used to measure 
participants' reach direction when explicitly instructed to aim for the presented 
target, rather than possibly applying a strategy or deliberately aiming in a direction 
other than towards the target. A similar method had been used before44 to infer the 
extent of implicit adaptation. A pair of Aftereffect trials, one for each target direction, 
 82 
followed each sequence of 10 Long- or Short-PT trials in blocks when they were 
present (Figure 15C). Aftereffect trials were included in each of the blocks for which 
Short-PT trials were present, except for the initial familiarization block. While Short-
PT trials were randomly interspersed during the blocks in which they appeared, 
Aftereffect trials were instead clearly signified to participants and occurred in a 
consistent order both within and across participants. Prior to each Aftereffect trial, 
text appeared on the participants’ screen for 4.5 seconds reading: “On the next trial / 
take your time / and aim directly for the target”. All participants were literate in 
English.  Participants were also verbally instructed at the beginning of each session 
of the experiment that during these Aftereffect trials, no cursor would be visible, no 
audible tone sequence would sound, no movement initiation time constraints were in 
place, and they were to reach for the target as if they wanted their finger to intersect 
with the target.  
 
Participants were instructed that for Long- and Short-PT trial types they were to 
prioritize the timing of their movement initiation. They were instructed to be as 
accurate as possible in hitting the target with the cursor, and to reach with a speed 
between 4.5 cm/s and 13 cm/s. Feedback regarding movement timing and movement 
speed was provided following every Long- and Short-PT trial through visual displays 
on the screen (similar to Haith, et. al., 201572). 
 
Cursor feedback during the movement was provided throughout each Long- and 
Short-PT trial. The cursor disappeared once participants reached 9 cm radially from 
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the start position. The cursor was not visible during the return movement, until the 
participants’ hand was within 2 cm of the start position. Any cursor manipulations 
(i.e. the rotations) were turned off during the inter-trial period. During Aftereffect 
trials, no kinematic information or end-point feedback was provided.  
 
Aftereffect trials and Short-PT trials were assumed omit any auxiliary component that 
may have contributed to overall adaptation during Long-PT trials, and thus should 
reveal only the recalibration component of adaptation (Figure 15E). 
 
Experiment 2 
20 participants took part in Experiment 2. Experiment 2 was conducted the same as 
Experiment 1, except that in Experiment 2, there were no rotations in between the 
first and final rotation cycles (Figure 18A). 20 participants took part in Experiment 2, 
and the entire experiment was conducted during a single session on one day. 
 
Experiment 3 
20 participants took part in Experiment 3. The reaching task and rotation schedule 
remained the same for Experiment 3 as in Experiment 1.  Experiment 3 included 
Short-PT trials throughout the entire experiment, rather than just the first and final 
rotation cycles as in Experiment 1. No Aftereffect trials were included in Experiment 
3. This experimental design was meant to give a measure of the evolution of savings 
under Short-PT conditions throughout the course of practice without the potential 
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influence of Aftereffect trials. Experiment 3, like Experiment 1, was conducted in two 
sessions across two consecutive days.   
 
Data analysis 
All data were analyzed offline in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA) and in R (The 
R Project, www.r-project.org).  Kinematic data were smoothed with a 2nd-order 
Savitzky-Golay interpolation filter with half width of 54 ms. These smoothed signals 
were then differentiated to obtain velocity, the magnitude of which was used to detect 
movement initiation by searching from the peak velocity backwards in time to find 
the last time at which velocity exceeded a threshold of 2 cm/s.  Reach direction was 
determined by computing the angle of the instantaneous velocity at 100 ms after 
movement onset. Trials during which participants either failed to reach or abruptly 
altered their initial reach direction after having reached 2 cm from the start position 
were excluded from analysis (on average, 5 trials were excluded per participant for 
this reason). This type of error was particularly prevalent during Short-PT trials 
where extra vigilance was needed on the part of the participants to recognize the 
target switch and alter behavior appropriately while also maintaining movement-
initiation timing accuracy.  
 
The initial learning rate during a given rotation cycle was quantified as the average 
compensation over the first few trials of that cycle. We assessed initial learning during 
Long-PT trials based on the mean reach direction over the initial 12 Long-PT trials 
(excluding the first trial following rotation onset and post-Aftereffect trials). For 
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Short-PT trials and Aftereffect trials, the average reach direction in the initial three 
trials of each type during the rotation cycle was taken as the initial learning rate. 
These measures are here referred to as the “early learning” measure for each trial 
type. Similarly, the final 12 trials (for Long-PT trials), and three trials (for Short-PT 
and Aftereffect trials), in each rotation were averaged and used as a summary 
measure for asymptotic behavior (excluding post-Aftereffect trials).  
 
Participants were excluded from any analysis if their Long-PT early learning measure 
during the first or seventh rotation cycles were more than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean of early learning measures, because this would have indicated that they did 
not behave in a “normal” way even in the baseline task. Five participants from 
Experiment 1 were excluded on these grounds, four from Experiment 2, and three 
from Experiment 3.  
 
For Experiment 1, a linear mixed-effects model analysis was conducted on both early 
learning and asymptote measures, with trial type (Long PT, Short PT, and Aftereffect) 
and rotation cycle as fixed factors and subject as a random effect. Since there was a 
significant interaction between trial type and cycle, t-tests tests were conducted to 
detect any difference among groups in early learning or asymptote measures during 
the first and the final rotation cycle, and to detect for savings from the first to the final 
rotation cycle for each trial type.  This linear correlation analysis was repeated for 





Savings during adaptation appears to be limited to circumstances when participants 
are permitted to engage in deliberate compensation for the perturbation44,45,72. We 
conducted an experiment to test the durability of this finding, providing a total of 
seven cycles of visuomotor rotations across a two-day study (Figure 15c) to 
determine whether having more practice changes the nature of the memory that 
supports compensation. Early learning and asymptote measures were taken 
separately for each trial type and for every cycle of the rotation to assess the effect of 
additional practice on adaptation.  
 
Short-PT and Aftereffect trials modulated the expression of learning during the initial 
rotation cycle 
An experiment was conducted to test the effect of practice with visuomotor rotations 
on the nature of savings in adaptation. Adaptation during the initial perturbation 
cycle dissociated, so that under Short-PT and Aftereffect trials, adaptation was lower 
compared to during Long-PT trials (Figure 16A & B). During early learning, the 
amount of compensation differed across the three trial types (Long-PT trials, Short-
PT trials, and Aftereffect trials; one-way ANOVA: F(2) = 4.14, p < 0.05). Post-hoc 
paired t-tests showed that Short-PT trials were significantly different from Long-PT 
trials (p < 0.05), but not detectably different from Aftereffect trials (p = 0.36), 
adjusting for multiple comparisons using the Tukey-Cramer method. There was no 
detectable difference between Aftereffect trials and Long-PT trials during early 
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learning (p = 0.29). At asymptote, there was also a significant difference among the 
trial types (one-way ANOVA: F(2) = 4.33, p < 0.05), with a significant difference 
between Long-PT and Aftereffect trials (p < 0.01) but not between Long-PT and Short-
PT trials (p = 0.093) and not between Aftereffect and Short-PT trials (p = 0.58). Thus, 
during the first exposure to the perturbation, Short-PT conditions and the use of 
Aftereffect trials significantly modulated the expression of learning, consistent with 
previous findings35,44,72,160. 
One potential problem with the above analysis of the differences in adaptation rates 
and asymptotes among the trial types was that these measures may have been biased 
for Aftereffect trials, since Aftereffect trials consistently occurred later than Short-PT 
trials. An additional, finer-grained analysis was conducted to confirm the above 
findings by measuring the mean difference in reach direction between each Short-PT 
or Aftereffect trial from the average of the two nearest-neighbor Long-PT trials 
(excluding post-Aftereffect trials). This analysis revealed a significant difference in 
compensation between Short-PT and Long-PT trials early in learning (t = 5.5, p < 
0.01), but not at asymptote (t = 1.28, p = 0.213; Figure 16C), confirming results from 
the above analysis. Aftereffect trials, however, were found to be significantly lower 
than neighboring Long-PT trials under this more nuanced analysis during both early 
learning (t = 4.39, p < 0.001), and asymptote (t = 3.86, p < 0.01; Figure 16C). Together, 
these analyses demonstrate that adaptation was significantly modulated during 
Short-PT and Aftereffect trials compared to during Long-PT trials. 
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Figure 16: Short-PT savings is not due to recalibration rate increase.  Participants adapted (A) 
under the given rotation schedule. During cycle 1 (B) adaptation was lower for Short-PT and 
Aftereffect trials compared to neighboring Long-PT trials (C). During cycle 7 (D) adaptation 
remained lower for Aftereffect trials, but not for Short-PT trials at asymptote (E). Furthermore, 
there was significant savings for Long-PT trials and for Short-PT trials, but not for Aftereffect 
trials (F). There was a significant interaction in how adaptation early learning and asymptotes 
changed across the trial types (G), showing that practice affected the ability to express faster 
adaptation under shorter PT, but that such savings was not due to a change in the recalibration 







Regression toward baseline following Aftereffect trials 
We noted that in Long-PT trials that immediately followed Aftereffect trials, the reach 
direction was on average lower, or less adapted, compared to the Long-PT trial prior 
to the Aftereffect trial (Figure 17, A & B; t = 5.1, p < 0.001). Previous studies have 
found that when adaptation is interrupted by an idle break in adaptation, the next 
reach following the interruption is closer to baseline than the reach prior to the 
interruption45,161. For this reason, post-Aftereffect trials (which in this experiment 
were always Long-PT trials) were excluded from early learning and asymptote 
measures used to assess the amount of adaptation for Long-PT trials. 
 
 
Savings in Long- and Short-PT, but not Aftereffect trials 
Experiment 1 tested the effect of having more practice with adapting to a variety of 
rotations on adaptation measured through Short-PT and Aftereffect trials. There was 
a clear improvement in early learning between cycle 1 and cycle 7 in both Long-PT 
and Short-PT trials, but not in Aftereffect trials (Figure 16E & F). A linear mixed effect 
model that was fit to the early learning measure and that considering trial-type and 
rotation cycles as factors and subject as a random effect, found a significant trial-type 
by cycle interaction (Figure 16G; chi-s(2) = 9.88, p < 0.01). Post-hoc t-tests confirmed 
that there was significant savings for Long-PT trials (t-test, t = 4.39, p < 0.01) and 
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Short-PT trials (t-test, t = 2.73, p < 0.05), but could not detect savings in Aftereffect 
trials (t-test, t = -1.02, p = 0.32). 
 
The analogous analysis for asymptotic learning also yielded a significant interaction 
of cycle and trial-type (Figure 16G; chi-s(2) = 17.0, p < .001). Post-hoc t-tests showed 
a significant difference in the asymptote measure in Short-PT trials between cycles 
one and seven (t-test, t = 4.84, p < 0.01), but no significant change with practice for 
Aftereffect trials (t-test, t = -2.10, p = 0.11), or Long-PT trials (t-test, t = 0.917, p = 
0.37). Thus, practice led to a significant difference in participants’ behavior in Long-
PT trials, and also to their ability to express that behavior when preparation time was 
limited. Practice had no effect, however, on behavior in Aftereffect trials (Figure 16, F 
& G), suggesting that the properties of implicit recalibration remained unchanged by 
the additional rotation practice.  
 
The problem of a potential bias in Aftereffect trial measures remained during cycle 7 
(Figure 17B), so another analysis comparing the Aftereffect and Short-PT trials to the 
mean of the nearest two Long-PT trials (excluding post-Aftereffect trials) was again 
conducted and found that Aftereffect trials remained significantly different from 
neighboring Long-PT trials in both early learning and asymptote measures (Figure 
16D; early learning: t = 5.7, p < 0.001; asymptote: t = 6.9, p < 0.001). Short-PT trials 
were significantly lower than neighboring Long-PT trials during early learning but 
not during asymptote (Figure 16D, early learning: t = 2.7, p < 0.05; asymptote: t = 0.40, 








Figure 17: Post-Aftereffect trial regression. Trials immediately following Aftereffect trials (post-
Aftereffect trials) were significantly less adapted compared to trials immediately prior to the 
Aftereffect trial. This was true during both the first (A) and during the seventh and final (B) 
rotation cycles in Experiment 1 and form the basis for excluding such trials from further 




Less practice resulted in less savings 
A study we had previously conducted72  showed that savings was limited to Long-PT 
trials following only a single prior rotation exposure. That result, along with the 
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results from Experiment 1, point to a double-dissociation. With little practice, savings 
is limited to trials when PT is long, but following additional practice, savings is 
attainable even when PT is limited, but never, it is assumed, for Aftereffect trials. 
Experiment 2 (Figure 18A) was conducted to confirm this double dissociation. The 
same assays that were done for Experiment 1 were repeated in Experiment 2, but the 
six cycles of rotations and the overnight break were omitted (Figure 14A; see 
methods for details).  
 
In Experiment 2, adaptation was significantly modulated during Aftereffect trials and 
Short-PT trials during the initial perturbation (Figure 17B). An analysis of variance 
was conducted on the early learning measure and found that the Long-PT, Short-PT, 
and Aftereffect trial types differed significantly (one-way ANOVA: F(2) = 5.0, p < 0.05). 
A post-hoc t-test between the Long-PT and Short-PT trial types was significantly 
different (p < 0.01), although there was no detectable difference between Long-PT 
and Aftereffect trials (p = 0.51) or between Aftereffect trials and Short-PT trials (p = 
0.11).  Another analysis of variance was not able to detect a difference among the trial 
types in terms of asymptote (one-way ANOVA: F(2) = 1.87, p = 0.17). 
 
As in Experiment 1, there may have been a bias in the measure of early learning for 
Aftereffect trials since they always occurred a varying number of trials after Short-PT 
trials, so an analysis comparing Aftereffect trials and Short-PT trials to the nearest 
neighboring Long-PT trials (again, excluding post-Aftereffect trials) was conducted. 
This analysis revealed that there was a significant drop for Short-PT trials (Figure 
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18C) for both early learning (t = 4.4, p < 0.001) and for asymptote (t = 3.4, p < 0.01). 
Aftereffect trials (Figure 4C) were also significantly different during early learning (t 
= 4.0, p < 0.001), although not during asymptote  (t = 1.5, p = 0.14). Together, these 
demonstrate a significant dissociation in adaptation among the trial types, as was 
found in Experiment 1 and in prior studies44,72. 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrated the emergence of savings under Short-PT conditions 
when additional practice with alternating rotations was done, however, it remains 
unclear how much practice was necessary to obtain that change. To determine 
whether there would be savings for each trial types without the amount of practice 
given in Experiment 1, the same analyses were done for Experiment 2 as were 
conducted for Experiment 1. These analyses revealed a main effect of trial-type (chi-
s(2) = 31.3, p < 0.001) and of adaptation cycle (chi-s(1) = 8.0, p < 0.01), but no 
detectable interaction between trial-type and cycle (chi-s(2) = 0.80, p = 0.67) for the 
early learning measure. Doing this analysis on the asymptote data revealed a main 
effect of trial-type (chi-s(2) = 12.3, p < 0.01), but not of cycle (chi-s(1) = 1.0, p = 0.31), 
nor of the interaction of trial-type and cycle (chi-s(2) = 3.32, p = 0.19).  
 
Thus, with less practice there existed savings marginally across trial types, although 
the effect was too weak to resolve differences among the trial types using this analysis 
(Figure 18F). However, an analysis to detect any drop in adaptation during Short-PT 
and Aftereffect trials compared to neighboring Long-PT trials found a significant 
difference during cycles two for Aftereffect trials during early learning (t = 4.0, p < 
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0.01), and during asymptote (t = 3.2, p < 0.01). Short-PT trials also showed a 
significant difference compared to neighboring Long-PT trials during early learning 
(t = 3.1, p < 0.01), but only marginally so during asymptote (t = 2.0, p = 0.061). These 
results suggests that far less practice may be sufficient to begin installing a durable 
change in the nature of savings, but that obtaining reliable savings under Short-PT 
conditions may require more practice than was given in Experiment 2.  
 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 together demonstrate that savings can be achieved under both 
Long-PT and Short-PT conditions, and possibly starting from the earliest amounts of 
practice tested. However, the time-course over which this savings emerges remains 
unclear. It is also unclear whether the presence of Aftereffect trials and the 
consequent regression of performance immediately following each such trial 
inadvertently introduced episodes of re-learning that might have affected the 
emergence of savings. Experiment 3 attempted to track behavior in Short-PT trials 
throughout learning, while eliminating the potential confounding effects of 





Figure 18: Testing the effect of prolonged practice. An additional experiment was conducted (A) 
to determine whether the additional practice provided during Experiment 1 was really necessary 
to obtain savings under Short-PT conditions. Participants underwent a shorter practice period 
compared to Experiment 1 (B). Short-PT and Aftereffect trials were lower than neighboring Long-
PT trials during both the first (C) and the last (D) rotation cycles, except for Short-PT trials at 
asymptote during the second rotation. However, while savings was significant for Long-PT trials, 
it was not for Short-PT trials or Aftereffect trials (E). There was also no detectable interaction 





In Experiment 3, early learning and asymptote measures for Short-PT trials 
significantly differed from Long-PT trials during the first rotation cycle (Figure 5B; 
Early learning: t-test, t = 5.25, p < 0.001; asymptote: t-test, t = 3.00, p < 0.01). 
Furthermore, it appeared that savings in Short-PT trials emerged gradually across 
multiple cycles of practice (Figure 19B). To test this statistically, a mixed-effect 
regression analysis was conducted, similar to that for Experiments 1 and 2, only this 
time including all seven cycles and considering cycle as a continuous factor. There 
was a significant effect of cycle on early learning (Figure 20B; chi-s(1) = 21.02, p < 
0.001), and asymptote (Figure 20C; chi-s(1) = 8.54, p < 0.01), and an effect of trial-
type (Figure 20B; early learning: chi-s(1) = 70.04, p < 0.001; Figure 20C; asymptote: 
chi-s(1) = 13.37, p < 0.001). There was no detectable interaction of trial type and cycle 
for early learning (Figure 19B; early learning: chi-s(6) = 4.02, p = 0.68), although there 
was a significant interaction for the asymptote measure (Figure 20C; asymptote: chi-
s(1) = 5.01, p < 0.05). Post-hoc t-tests revealed significant savings (Figure 20A) in 
Short-PT (t = 3.9, p < 0.01) and Long-PT (t = 2.3, p < 0.05) trials between the first 
rotation cycle and the last for the early learning measure, although not for the 
asymptote measure (Short-PT: t = 1.1, p = 0.29; Long-PT: t = 0.05, p = 0.96). Thus, 
savings occurred gradually for Short-PT trials across multiple rotation cycles and 




Figure 19: Measuring the emergence of Short-PT savings. Experiment 3 (A) sought to measure the 
time course of the emergence of Short-PT savings across the longer two-day experiment design. 
Participants adapted to the repeating cycles of rotations that included Long- and Short-PT trials 
throughout (B). Adaptation during Short-PT trials clearly became faster following practice. 
 
Conducting the same analyses on the data from the opposite rotations, where the 
effect sizes might be expected to be larger on account of the larger change in 
rotation (60-deg, rather than 30-deg), results were even more dramatic. The mixed 
effects model analysis found significant interaction as well as significant savings and 
a significant effect of group (Figure 20F) for early learning (cycle: chi-s(1) = 21.6, p < 
0.001; trial type: chi-s(1) = 12.4, p < 0.001), and for asymptote (cycle: chi-s(1) = 
3.52, p = 0.061, trial type: chi-s(1) = 16.2, p < 0.001). Post-hoc tests confirmed 
 98 
significant savings for Long-PT (t = 3.21, p < 0.01) and Short-Pt (t = 2.88, p < 0.05) 
trials as well (Figure 20E).  
 
Furthermore, Short-PT trials were also lower than neighboring Long-PT trials during 
the primary rotation (Figure 20D) for both early learning (t = 3.1, p < 0.01) and 
asymptote (t = 2.4, p < 0.05) during the first rotation, and for early learning (t = 3.1, p 
< 0.01) and asymptote (t = 2.4, p < 0.05) during the last rotation. Finally, the same 
effect was found for the opposite rotation (Figure 20H), for the first rotation cycle 
(early learning: t = -3.6, p < 0.01; asymptote: t = -2.1, p = 0.05), although for the final 
rotation there was no detectable difference between Short-PT and Long-PT trials 
during either early learning (t = -1.2, p = 0.26) or asymptote (t = -1.6, p = 0.13).  
 
Discussion 
Visuomotor adaptation tasks have long been used to study human motor skill 
learning38,65,69,78. Any model of skill learning should at least exhibit the characteristics 
that seem most relevant and prominent to learned motor behaviors, such as having 
durable improvements of performance following practice. Since behavior eventually 
regresses back to baseline in adaptation tasks36, the most consistent sign of long-term 
retention of learned behavior is savings, or the property of re-learning similar 
perturbations faster during subsequent attempts. Were savings absent from 
adaptation paradigms, the relevance of adaptation learning as a model of more 





Figure 20: Caching occurs gradually with practice.  Since Experiment 3 included both Long- and 
Short-PT trials for each rotation direction, analyses were possible in both directions. For the 
leading rotation, there was clear savings from the first to the last rotations in both Long- and 
Short-PT trials (A). The effect of savings was significant for both the early learning (B) and 
asymptote (C) measures, although there was a detectable interaction effect only for the 
asymptote measure. Short-PT trials were significantly lower than neighboring Long-PT trials for 
both early learning and asymptote during the first rotation cycle, but only during early learning 
for the last rotation cycle (D). The data for the rotation of opposite direction was even more 
stark (E). In that case, there was significant savings, effect of trial type, and an interaction in 
both early learning (F) and in asymptote (G). In the case of the counter-rotation, Short-PT trials 
were significantly lower than neighboring Long-PT trials for early learning and asymptote 
periods during the first rotation, but not during the last such rotation (H). * indicates < 0.05 
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Multiple hypotheses regarding the mechanisms responsible for savings have 
emerged. One suggests that the properties of the sensory prediction error-correcting 
mechanism change with practice, leading to increased error sensitivity and, 
ultimately, to savings70. Another suggests that deliberate compensation for the 
perturbation is remembered and recalled71. One difference between these two 
models is what conclusions could be drawn about the nature of savings, i.e. whether 
it is an immutable process intrinsic to the sensory error-correcting mechanism, or 
whether it is more controlled and flexible. Understanding the nature of savings will 
contribute to understanding human learning more generally. 
 
Recent work suggests that savings emerges from deliberate control through the 
application of intentional perturbation compensation44,45,72. For instance, when 
forced to move with lower reaction time72, when instructed to reach without applying 
any deliberate compensation44, or when given a short break leading to regression of 
behavior back to baseline45, savings becomes undetectable. Instead, better 
performance during subsequent exposures to the perturbation is only achieved when 
participants are permitted to deliberately compensate. Thus, it appears that savings 
is limited to deliberate processing, implying that it may in fact be more related to 
memory and recall phenomena, such as remembering events from a week ago, than 
to motor phenomena, such as learning to ski. This would call into question the extent 
to which adaptation learning is a suitable model of more general motor learning, and 
would suggest that it may even be a better model for memory and recall phenomena. 
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Were this the case, many assumptions pervasive in the study of motor control and 
learning would need to be reevaluated, as conclusions based on the notion that 
adaptation tasks invoke “motor learning” would be potentially confounded. For 
instance, it would be unclear which component of adaptation was actually correlated 
to activity of brain regions such as the cerebellum. Additional steps would need to be 
taken to properly isolate the adaptation components to make non-confounded 
inferences about relationships to other phenomena and factors.  
 
However, evidence also suggest that properties of adaptation change with additional 
practice70,88,157. It is therefore possible that while savings appears to initially be 
supported by deliberate processes more reminiscent of declarative memory, another 
mechanism, possibly the sensory error correcting one, may eventually supplant the 
need for deliberate control and the additional processing that it requires. This 
question was the basis for the present study, where participants were given more 
practice than had been given in previous studies on the nature of savings44,72 to test 
whether the mechanism supporting savings changed as a result of the additional 
experience.  
 
We found that savings under Short-PT conditions emerged with practice, but that 
Aftereffect trials remained insensitive to practice. This was evident in Experiment 1 
as a significant interaction in the measures of learning rate (Early Learning) and 
extent (Asymptote) among the three trial types. Post-hoc tests confirmed that there 
was savings under Long- and Short-PT conditions following practice, but not during 
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Aftereffect trials. From this result we concluded that the sensory error-correcting, 
recalibration component of adaptation did not change with experience, and therefore 
could not be responsible for the savings observed in Long- and Short-PT trials. 
Instead, the deliberate component of adaptation that was initially computationally 
expensive (i.e. required more PT) transformed to being cached, or available without 
the need for additional processing. It underwent a transformation from computed to 
cached. 
 
The implication of these results is that savings in adaptation is a model for motor 
learning in a way previously unconsidered. We suggest that the principle of human 
motor skill learning that savings in adaptation illustrates is that novel behavior is 
initially dependent on computationally expensive memory and recall phenomena (i.e. 
computed), but makes a transformation to relying on actions that are more mentally 
effortless following more practice (i.e. cached actions). These results redeem 
adaptation as a model of skill learning, but not necessarily in the way it was originally 
conceived. The sensory prediction error-correcting mechanism appears more 
incidental as it relates to human skill, rather than being the aspect of adaptation most 
relevant as it once was thought. The prediction error-correcting mechanism might 
even be considered a contaminant to adaptation learning as a model of long-term 
human motor skill learning because it changes behavior during the task but is 
apparently not responsible for any of the observed long-term changes in behavior, 
which is better modeled by the transformation of deliberate responses from being 
computed to being cached. 
 103 
 
What aspects of practice caused the transformation from computed to cached? 
We have argued that a mechanism of transforming initially computationally 
expensive deliberate behavior into cached responses accounts for the observation 
from Experiment 1 of the emergence of savings in Short-PT trials. We sought to 
further explore this mechanism to determine the time-course and nature of the 
emergence of this cached behavior. For instance, do responses become cached 
gradually with practice, or abruptly following some threshold event such as a 
minimum amount of experience, a minimum amount of time, or a night of sleep? And 
what form must the practice take: time on asymptote, or episodes of recall?  
 
Evidence is mixed on how these factors (sleep, amount of practice, the passage of 
time, and the nature of practice) affect the transformation that was observed in 
Experiment 1. Part of the challenge in predicting the effect that any of these potential 
factors will have on the transformation that we observed lies in properly isolating 
that process that might be acted on. For instance, sleep appears to enhance the ability 
to recall declarative information, such as a list of words, as well as the ability to 
perform movements under novel visual mappings, such as mirror drawing162. 
Whether the transformation that we hypothesize to have occurred would be affected 
by sleep is unclear. Likewise, with respect to the nature of practice, it appears that, at 
least for certain types of tasks such as foreign language learning, practice with 
retrieval is more important than mere repetition163, but it is unclear if the mechanism 
of transformation in that study is the same was we have observed.  
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Results from Experiments 2 and 3 from this study suggest that the transformation of 
deliberate responses from computed to cached requires practice, rather than merely 
the passage of time, and requires practice at asymptote, rather than with episodes of 
recall alone. Experiment 2, which assayed adaptation under Short- and Long-PT trials 
and Aftereffect trials, while omitting additional practice blocks, was not able to detect 
any difference in savings among the trial types. While savings was detected 
marginally, it was not clear which component saved and which did not, because a test 
for the interaction among them was not significant. Furthermore, savings appeared 
relatively muted in Experiment 2, even for Long-PT trials (Figure 18E) which should 
have shown robust savings (e.g. as in fig 2F). The conclusion we drew from this result 
is that the intervening rotation practice that was included in Experiment 1 but not 
Experiment 2 was necessary to invoke the kind of transformation that we observed 
through Short-PT trials in Experiment 1. Considering that our previous study72 
included an overnight break but no detectable Short-PT savings suggests to us that 
the overnight break was not the important factor contributing to the transformation.  
 
Experiment 3, which omitted Aftereffect trials but included Short-PT trials 
throughout a longer period of practice, appeared to show that savings under Short-
PT conditions emerged gradually across practice, and differently than under Long-PT 
conditions. This was evident in the interaction of the change in asymptote from the 
first to the last rotation between Long- and Short-PT trials for the primary rotation, 
and in the interaction of the change in early learning from the first to the last rotation 
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between Long- and Short-PT trials for the counter-rotation. The results from 
Experiments 2 and 3 together suggest to us that the transformation that we conclude 
caused Short-PT savings requires some form of extended practice with the rotation. 
 
Since Aftereffect trials, which were present in Experiment 1, caused reach directions 
during the Long-PT trials immediately following them to transiently regress towards 
baseline (as shown in Figure 17), these trial types may have acted as recall episodes 
since they would have required an abrupt correction in reach direction. Experiment 
2 included these recall episodes but only limited time on asymptote and did not show 
a strong differential effect of savings among its trial types. Experiment 3 included 
both recall events and time on asymptote and did show a differential effect of savings 
between Long- and Short-PT conditions. We therefore conclude that the 
transformation of the deliberate component of adaptation from computed to cached 
likely requires practice with asymptote, although a more direct test of these possible 
practice types and a more thorough parameterization would be helpful in confirming 
this conclusion. 
 
Interrelatedness of cognitive and motor phenomena 
The idea that a deliberate behavior transforms from being computed to cached is not 
new, nor is it exclusive to motor learning. Theories developed under different 
experimental models and for different kinds of behaviors have made similar 
conclusions. For instance, at least as long ago as William James, the observation of 
seemingly automatic responses forming for behaviors that were often repeated led to 
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an action sequencing model for habit formation164. More modern models of the 
observed difference between computed and cached behavior use language borrowed 
from reinforcement learning and artificial intelligence63,149,165, including the 
description of rapidly expressible behavior as being model-free while slower, 
computed behavior as being model based. There is also evidence that a transition 
between these two general regimes of behavior occurs, either with practice118,166–172, 
or through natural development75. 
 
 The characterization of savings in adaptation learning as being initially 
computationally expensive before becoming cached is consistent with these models 
and suggests that cognitive processes, such as mental rotation30,159 or abstract 
reasoning173, may underlying the computationally intensive component. 
Furthermore, we suggest that these kinds of cognitive processes may be intrinsic to 
motor learning more generally. For instance, were it not for cognitive processing, 
savings may not have been achieved in adaptation at all. Stanley & Krakauer argued 
this point as well in relation to learned human motor skills168. This idea renders the 
labels “motor” or “cognitive” as they pertain to a behavior’s output almost 
inconsequential compared to their mechanistic similarity. This is because, if our 
model is accurate, the difference between a “motor” task (so labeled because it 
involves movement) and a “cognitive” task (so labeled because it involves inferred 
mental processes) may be smaller than the difference between two tasks, both 
involving movement, that lack other mechanistic similarly. For example, brushing 
one’s teeth, an overlearned movement task, seems to be more mechanistically similar 
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to reciting ones phone number than it is to a motor learning task such as learning to 
ride a bike, despite having the commonality of movement as the output. 
 
Implications of the recall model for savings in adaptation to theories of motor learning 
The results from this study may have theoretical implications across other areas of 
neuroscience. For instance, it has been hypothesized that a mechanism mediated in 
the cerebellum is responsible for learning novel skills50, and sensory prediction error-
based learning has been a key model under this hypothesis70,174. If the role of the 
cerebellum in adaptation learning were limited to sensory prediction error-based 
mechanisms23,35, then the present findings would present a challenge to the idea that 
the cerebellum is important in motor learning. However, the reality appears to be far 
more nuanced than this, as cerebellar involvement in normal movement control and 
recalibration is fairly indisputable125,175–177. However, its role in skill learning per se 
might be different from that which is currently hypothesized70,174. For instance, in 
addition to its role in allowing for the production of normal movement and for 
maintaining accurate calibration, the cerebellum is thought to have some influence 
on emotions and cognition178, and it may be in these more abstract functions that its 
involvement is most critical for skill learning in particular. Furthermore, by 
demonstrating that adaptation is initially (i.e. before sufficient practice has been 
done) influenced by computationally expensive processing that may rely on the 
cerebellum in ways different from recalibration, these results force a potential 
reinterpretation of any result in systems neuroscience – behavioral, 
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neurophysiological, or otherwise – that rest on the assumption that adaptation is a 
“motor” behavior.  
 
What is the nature of the representation that is transformed? 
We have made the claim that a memory that is initially computationally expensive, 
and possibly dependent on cognitive processes, transforms to being cached following 
practice. What, precisely, has been cached, though? Are the steps in the computation 
itself cached so that they can be followed or executed more quickly or without the 
same resources or is the response, the action, that resulted from the computation 
what becomes cached and available without having to re-compute? In this rotation 
task, this would be equivalent to asking whether the process of selecting where in 
space to aim becomes cached or if the action that resulted from the selected aim 
becomes cached? 
 
We speculate that it is the latter: declarative processing forms a scaffold that allows 
behavior to converge on a particular policy, but that the behavior itself becomes 
cached, rather than the processes that built the scaffold.  One prediction of this 
hypothesis is that, provided that the actions taken were the same, there would exist 
many possible declarative scaffolds that would result in the same cached behavior. 
This model would explain how athletes can acquire a skill through many various 
means – a coach, trial and error, or their own creativity, -  but end up with essentially 
the same behaviors. Another prediction would be that low-latency savings for 
adaptation would have limited generalization to other other rotation sizes. For 
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instance, if the response to a 30-degree rotation became cached, and then participants 
were given a 60-degree rotation, adaptation to the 60-degree rotation would be 
impaired compared to having previously done a 60-degree rotation. 
 
If skill learning is initially declarative, how do amnesiacs learn? 
Perhaps no result has influenced motor learning theory more than that of patient H.M: 
despite severe anterograde and retrograde amnesia, H.M. and other patients like him 
were capable of learning novel motor behaviors despite having no recollection of ever 
having done the practiced tasks4,5.  These results have led to the principle that motor 
skills are procedural while episodic memory is declarative, and that the two memory 
systems are independent148. Here, we have argued that motor skills rely initially on 
declarative processing before becoming procedural through practice, a theory that 
has been proposed for the formation of habits and automatic responses in other, 
seemingly more cognitive domains as well as motor ones118,118,164,167,168,171,179,180. How 
can the H.M. result and the declarative-to-procedural model co-exist? The answer, we 
suggest, is in the nuance of what actually is impaired in amnesiac patients like H.M. 
Amnesia leaves declarative processing per se intact181–183; it is declarative memory or 
recall that is impaired. Specifically, amnesic patients are unimpaired at most cognitive 
tasks and basic reasoning abilities181–183, provided the tasks do not require holding 
specific facts in memory beyond the capacity of their short-term memory. Thus, in 
principle, our model that declarative processing is initially involved in motor skill 
learning remains consistent with observations of learning in amnesiac patients. A 
better test to expose the actual consequence of impaired declarative memory on 
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motor learning would be one that involves movement instructions that are not 
discernable by affordances and that aren’t explicitly communicated to patients on an 
as-needed basis, such as novel tool use29. When these more specialized tasks are 
attempted, amnesic patients show no savings, i.e. no benefit of having done the task 
before. These findings are more consistent with our model that until sufficient 
practice has been done to cache a policy for a task, declarative-like mechanisms are 
needed as a substitute until the behavior can actually become procedural in nature. 
 
Is there an advantage to having multiple representations  linked by a transformation? 
These results seem to confirm a more widely observed phenomenon that 
differentiates cached from computed behaviors: that procedural memory seems to 
require more experience while declarative memory can, in general, be formed with 
far less experience172. Speculatively speaking, one possible reason for this 
observation is that the assays used to evaluate whether or not and to what degree a 
memory has been formed for a particular policy may not be match in terms of 
difficulty. That is, at least in our task, it may be that the task of recalling a specific 
reaching movement may be, normatively speaking, more difficult than the task of 
recalling a policy to , e.g., “aim to the left or right”.  Alternatively, the reason may be 
neurophysiological and anatomical: if, as has been suggested, there is a 
neuroanatomical difference in the regions where declarative vs. procedural 
memories are stored148,167,172, synaptic alterations may occur at different rates in 
these different regions (e.g. the medial temporal lobe vs. the limbic system).  These 





6 Learning novel continuous behaviors resembles policy 
building 
 
Performance on a novel continuous-action task generalizes to novel conditions 
requiring different actions, suggesting that a flexible feedback policy was learned. 
 
How novel, continuous-action skills are learned is an important and relevant topic in 
human behavioral and neural sciences. Behavioral properties, such as movement 
stereotypy, the emergence of stable feedback responses, and the ability to generalize, 
can inspire or falsify mechanistic theories of learning. We sought to explore these 
properties throughout training in this category of human behavior, which includes 
skills such as skiing, serving in tennis, or riding a bike. We built a custom driving-
simulator video game that was controlled by tilting a tablet computer to steer a virtual 
car along a narrow track. Participants’ behavior changed throughout a maximum of 
ten days of practice through reduction in the risk of failure, increased movement 
stereotypy, and increased compliance with the state-dependent tablet tilt policy. We 
assessed generalization by testing participants’ performance on a novel “Probe” track 
and found that they generalized almost completely. Movement stereotypy and policy 
compliance were unchanged during Probes. However, the risk of failure worsened by 
approximately 10%, but only after a few days of training. Given these results, we 
conclude that a flexible control policy was learned that can generalize under novel 
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conditions. The increase in the risk of failure appeared to be due to an increased 
probability of making aberrant actions, rather than a regression of ability back to a 
previous state of learning. 
 
Introduction 
Learning novel, continuous movement skills is a relevant and important topic in 
human neuroscience, medicine, industry, and sports. Theoretical and practical 
models for how novel continuous behaviors are learned can be used to devise more 
optimal training routines for athletes or better rehabilitation for patients that have 
suffered trauma or stroke. They may also assist in better understanding human and 
animal behavior more generally, or provide a better theoretical grounding for future 
neuroscientific investigation.  
 
Defining what constitutes a “continuous movement” is not straightforward. One 
might consider as a definition any learned behavior whose velocity profile remains 
non-zero, which appears to be the operational definition that others have used184,185. 
However, even behaviors for which any measure of velocity would be essentially 
zero, such as quietly standing, might be considered to require active control186. In 
this chapter, continuous movement skills will be operationally defined as 
movements that require continuous active monitoring, whether in motion or not, 
such that corrective actions would be engaged in response to perturbations, such as 
noise or extraneous forces. Such movements are distinct from ballistic movements, 
like eye saccades, or binary behaviors, like forced choice decisions, in that they react 
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to continuous feedback. Tasks that require behavior to be continuously monitored 
to maintain stability present unique challenges for the nervous system to control 
and learn. Studies of learning movement of this type have found reliably consistent 
patterns of properties across many types of tasks. Practicing a particular task may 
cause movement kinematics to converge towards an optimal shape54,56, adopt an 
optimal covariance structure56,187, become more stereotyped187–190, experience a 
shift in the speed-accuracy function, or SAF54,115,191, require less reaction time (RT) 
prior to movement initiation18,115,192,193, and become more efficient194. Finding 
consistent and reproducible properties such as these has helped to inspire theories 
for how motor skills are learned. 
 
One theory is that, following practice and experience, actions can become sequenced 
and form into expanding representations of actions, or “chunks”17–19,21,195. This 
theory is consistent with observations that movements become more stereotyped, 
have lower RTs, and have improved SAFs. It can also explain some forms of 
generalization, such as if a sequence of actions must be made in a different order, 
because chunks are thought to be permutable while still providing a performance 
benefit18,51,196. However, if a novel action sequence is required that is not a subset of 
the learned sequence, i.e. not represented as a chunk, the theory would predict 
inferior performance. Thus, testing for generalization using a sequence of novel 
actions is one way to study the mechanism of learning of a particular task, and to 
potentially falsify the chunking model.  
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An alternative viewpoint of how novel continuous movements are learned is that a 
mapping from states to actions is learned, sometimes referred to as an internal 
model66,67,78,197. This theory suggests that a mapping is established that dictates 
which actions, u, are executed based on a mapping, F, from states, x; or u = F(x). 
Many studies have investigated the learning properties of adaptation around 
existing mappings66,67,197–199, but exactly how these mappings are formed in the first 
place is less well studied (though see49).  
 
We sought to experimentally explore the characteristics of learning a de novo 
continuous movement skill, including the generalization properties, and thus 
gaining some insight into the computational mechanisms that underlie learning. We 
decided to devise a novel task, as there are potential confounds inherent in some of 
the popular tasks used to study sequence learning and action chunking22, including 
the possibility that tasks such as sequential button-pressing are not even models of 
continuous actions, like skiing22. To do this, we created a novel video-game task that 
required continuous, wrist movements and active continuous monitoring of 
behavior to steer a virtual car along a narrow path at constant speed (Figure 21). 
We reasoned that if performance of this continuous movement skill generalized 
readily under novel required actions, it would be inconsistent with models of 
learning based on action-sequencing. On the other hand, if we found robust 
generalization, it would support the idea that learning continuous movement skills 
involve building a flexible feedback control mapping. We tested for these alternative 
hypotheses by probing for generalization using a track that was the mirror image of 
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the track used during training and that required a sequence of unique actions (see 
Supplement Figure 1). We assessed performance, both across learning and with 
respect to generalization, according to task success and kinematics. The use of this 
novel experimental design and the advanced analysis methods allow a uniquely 




81 human participants (47 Female) completed this study. All participants were 18 
to 40 years of age, had no known neurological disorders, and were self-reported 
right (76) or left (5) hand dominant. The Johns Hopkins University School of 
Medicine Institutional Review Board approved this study and all of its procedures.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
The study was conducted using a custom-built video game (“the game”), developed 
by Max and Haley, Inc. (Baltimore, MD) for the Kata Project at The Johns Hopkins 
University.  The game simulated a driving scenario. Participants steered a virtual 
arthropod (“the car”) along a constrained track by tilting (i.e. changing the pitch, 
yaw, and roll) an iPad (Apple, Inc., Cupertino, CA) computer (Figure 21A). The 
direction of the acceleration of the virtual car was obtained by projecting the 
vertical axis of a world-centered coordinate system onto the tablet’s surface, giving 
a magnitude and direction vector; which, by analogy, would be the direction and 
magnitude of acceleration of a marble rolling off of a flat surface if tilted. The 
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kinematics of the car in the game were obtained from a physics simulation that 
included the interaction of the multiple car segments, introducing nonlinearity. This 
transformation from the tablet tilt signal to the position of the car is thus not 
possible to write in closed form or to compute an exact optimal solution for. 
Nevertheless, these computations acted as a filter that introduced a delay of 
approximately 50 ms between the tablet tilt and the response of the car. The 
magnitude of the tablet tilt vector was set to a constant value, making the tilt 
magnitude a control null-space and effectively controlling the speed of the car in the 
game to a narrow range. The game’s software recorded the magnitude and direction 
of the tablet tilt, and the path of the car along the track (Figure 21B) at 60 Hz.  
 
The experiment included four groups of participants that differed in the number of 
practice trials on the Training track prior to testing for generalization on the Probe 
track (Figure 21C). The Probe track was the mirror image of the Training track, 
which guaranteed that the two tracks were matched in terms of difficulty but 
required different actions in a novel sequence to successfully navigate (Figure 26). 
Each group trained for different numbers of days before encountering the Probe 
(Figure 21D). 
 
Each day included 200 trials and lasted approximately 30 minutes. Trials in which 
the entire track was completed lasted approximately 5s. A 4s delay was imposed if 
the car fell off of the track, which would happen if the track’s edge was breached. 
Inter-trial-intervals lasted 3s on average and were self-paced; participants had to 
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tap a button on the device’s screen to begin the next trial. The car’s dynamics were 
invariant for the duration of the experiment including on the Probe track. Probes 
consisted of a block of 50 contiguous trials in which the Probe track was attempted 
instead of the Training track.  Participants were not pre-warned that a Probe block 
would be experienced.  67 participants took part in the study in the BLAM 
laboratory at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, and 14 had the game downloaded onto 
their personal iPad devices and completed training for the study from home. All 
sessions that included the Probe track were conducted in the laboratory using the 





Figure 21: Video game experimental methods. a, The game design. The game required 
navigating a virtual car along a narrow winding path by tilting a tablet computer. The tilt 
direction was the angle of the vector that would result from projecting a plumb line onto the 
tablet surface. b, Recorded data from the game. The trajectory of the car and the direction of the 
tablet tilt were recorded for offline processing. c, Training and Probe tracks. The Probe track 
was the mirror image of the Training track. Track distances were taken as fractions of the total 
track length. d, Training and Probe trial assignments per group. Groups trained for varying 
numbers of days (grey bars), up to a maximum of ten days, and were probed for generalization 





Data were analyzed offline using Matlab (The Mathworks, Nadick, MA, 2013) and R 
(The R Project, www.r-project.org). For each trial, the position along the track at 
which the car fell off was detected by searching for breaches of the track boundary. 
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The length of track that the car reached by the fall off point was recorded in units of 
the fraction of the total track length, a quantity between 0 and 1. Trials in which the 
car did not fall off were assigned distance 1. The track-length travelled (referred to 
here as the “distance travelled”) measure was used to assess performance in the 
game for each trial, as well as to compare performance in the task between Training 
and Probe tracks.  
 
A linear mixed-effect model was fit to distance travelled data using the window 
within a day (early vs. asymptote), the day of training (one through ten), and the 
interaction of window and day as fixed factors, and using subject as a random factor. 
A log-likelihood ratio test was conducted for each fixed factor to test for the 
significance of including it as a factor in the model. Separate models were fit to test 
for the effect of training within-days and for the effect of breaks across day. The 
initial 25 trials of each day were designated as the early window, and the final 25 
trials as the asymptote window. Data was pooled across groups for this analysis. 
 
To confirm results from the analysis of distance travelled, we analyzed the fall off 
hazard as a function of the length of the track. The hazard rate of car fall-offs, , as a 




Pr⁡(𝑡 < 𝑇⁡ ≤ 𝑡 + ∆𝑡|𝑇 > 𝑡)
∆𝑡
) 
where T is a continuous random variable representing the track length at which a 
car fall off event occurred. Suppose that T has the pdf, or probability density 
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function, 𝑓(𝑡), and cdf, or cumulative distribution function, F(t), then the hazard rate 
function is related to the pdf and the survival function, 𝑆(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡), by the 





Thus, knowing any one of , f, or S is sufficient to compute the others. An estimate of 
the survival function for each participant on each day of Training and during Probes 
was obtained using the Kaplan-Meir method {Therneau, Modeling survival data}.  
 
Cox proportional hazard models {Therneau, R package} were used to represent the 
survival functions from the early and asymptote windows of each day of practice. 
Models were fit using day (one to ten) and window (early vs. asymptote, as before) 
as fixed factors, and subject as a random factor. Log-likelihood ratio tests were 
conducted to test for the effect of day, of window, and of the day-by-window 
interaction on survival. Separate models were fit to determine the effect of across-
day breaks. Data was pooled across groups for this analysis. 
 
For the analysis of kinematics, segments of the cars’ paths were isolated by finding 
the time at which the car reached track length 0.25 and retaining car path data for 1 
s thereafter. Only trials in which a fall off did not occur prior to or during this 
window of time were included in the analysis of kinematics. This window included 
the first turn in the track and the first major peak in the hazard rate. In order to 
compare kinematics across different track orientations, we flipped all car paths to 
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the orientation depicted in Figure 1 as the “Training track”, if they were not already 
in that that orientation. 
 
To assess how kinematics changed with practice, we examined how the mean and 
variance of the car’s path across samples of trials changed with practice. To do this, 
a principal component decomposition was done separately for each individual using 
data from trials 51 to 150 of each day (excluding any Probe trials). Car paths from 
trials 1 to 50 (the early window) and from trials 151 to 200 (the asymptote 
window) of each day were projected onto the axis corresponding to the first 
principle component, and the mean and standard deviation of these samples were 
computed. Any windows of trials that had fewer than eight trajectories that had 
completed the track segment were excluded from further analysis. Linear mixed 
effect models were fit that included window, day, and the window-by-day 
interaction as fixed factors, and subject as a random factor. Separate models were fit 
to test for changes within a day and between days. Log-likelihood tests were 
conducted for each fixed factor to test for its significant toward the model fit.  
 
Another form of kinematic analysis was done to measure compliance with the tablet 
tilt policy that resulted in successful track navigation. For this analysis, the Track 
was discretized along its length, across its width, and for different car direction 
headings to build an empirical state-dependent tablet tilt policy (Figure 25a). The 
policy consisted of the mean and standard deviation of the tablet tilt directions 
within each discrete bin among trials that were ultimately successful. Trials were 
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labelled "successful" if they reached track distance 0.5 and "unsuccessful" 
otherwise. The policy map was generated only for the region of track between track 
lengths 0.25 and 0.45, the region that matched that used in the analysis of car path 
kinematics and that corresponded to a peak in the hazard rate. This region of track 
was discretized into ten bins along its length, ten bins across its width, and 20 bins 
of car heading directions. Data from trials 51 to 150 from each day, excluding any 
Probe trials, were used to build a policy separately for each participant. 
 
To assess how the tablet tilt policy changed with training, deviations from policy 
were computed for trials 1 to 50 and 151 to 200 for each day. The policy deviation 
for each trial was defined as the absolute value of the z-score of the tablet tilt at each 
discrete bin that the car visited along the length of the segment of track. This 
quantity measured the normalized difference in tablet tilt of a given trial from the 
average tablet tilt among successful trajectories, while controlling for the state 
(position and heading direction) of the car.  There was no need to exclude from this 
analysis trials that fell off during the track segment, because the policy deviation 
signal could be computed at each discrete location of the track up to the point at 
which the car fell off. The mean policy deviation across the segment of track was 
obtained separately for those trial that fell off the track and for those trials that 
remained on the track throughout the segment. We tested for changes in 
performance according to this measure by fitting linear mixed effects models to the 
data separately for successful and unsuccessful trials. We tested for effects of days of 
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practice, within day differences, across day differences, and the interaction of day 
and within- and across-day differences using log-likelihood ratio tests. 
 
A comparison of performance during Probe and Training conditions was done with 
respect to distance travelled, hazard rate and survival, across-trial mean and 
standard deviation of car paths, and policy compliance. These comparisons were 
done by testing for changes in each measure between the Probe and Pre-Probe 
windows of trials, which were, respectively, trials 26 to 75 and 76 to 125 of each 
day. For the analyses of kinematics (car path kinematics and policy compliance), the 
data that served as a basis for comparison, i.e. being used to compute the principle 
components and the empirical policy, were drawn from trials 1 to 25 and trials 126 
to 200 from each day. 
 
We sought a second way to analyze performance during Probes, so conducted an 
analysis to estimate the amount of practice with the Training track that most 
resembled behavior during Probes. This analysis was done for the car path, distance 
travelled, and policy deviation measures. Linear models were fit separately to 
estimate the mean and variance of each of these measures as they changed across 
days of training. We found the number of days of practice prior to the Probe that 
behavior during the Probe most resembled by finding the day during practice that 
had the maximum likelihood given the Probe data. A Kolmolgorov-Smirnov test was 
used for each pair of measures to determine whether there were any differences in 
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the regression of behavior during the Probes across the three measures of behavior 
considered. 
We sought to quantify the extend to which portions of the tablet tilt signal for the 
Training track might have been similar to segments of that signal for the Probe 
track, so we conducted an analysis to measure the difference between tablet tilt 
signals from the Training and Probe tracks. The difference between signals was 
taken to be the Euclidean distance between a segment from one signal to the best 
matching segment from the other signal. The maximum similarity between signal 
segments from trials in the post-Probe window and the best matched signal 
segment from trials in the pre-Probe window from group D10 were computed to 
obtain a measure of signal similarity. The window lengths used to isolate signal 
segments were 0.1s, 0.2s, 0.3s, 0.5s, 1s, and 2s. Only trials that had completed the 
track were included in this analysis. Segments of post-Probe trials was isolated 
using a sliding window with a step size that was 33% the width of the window. The 
procedure for measuring the maximal signal difference was repeated for the mirror-
reversed versions of the pre-Probe signals. Since segment window size affects the 
Euclidean measure used in this analysis, relative signal differences was computed as 
the ratio of the Euclidean distance between the Training and Probe signals to the 






We created a video gaming task to assess properties of de novo learning of a 
continuous movement skill. The video game recorded task success and kinematics 
longitudinally with training (Figure 22 a-b), and included a test for generalization on 
one of four possible Probe days. The way in which behavior changed with practice 
and during the Probes can provide insight into the mechanisms responsible for 
learning this novel continuous-action task. If performance generalized to novel 
conditions, retaining movement stereotypy, better task success, and improved 
policy compliance, the evidence would be more consistent with a model of learning 
based on building a flexible feedback control policy. On the other hand, if learned 
performance was track- and action-specific, the findings would be more consistent 
with the sequence learning and chunking hypotheses. 
 
Task success improved with practice  
The distance travelled along the track increased across practice for all groups 
(Figure 22c; log-likelihood ratio test, X2(9) = 272.15, p < 0.001). Performance 
improved within each day (log-likelihood ratio test, Χ2(1) = 88.7, p < 0.001), but 
declined slightly from the asymptote of one day to the beginning of the next day (as 
in Figure 22d; log-likelihood ratio test, Χ2(1) = 15.0, p < 0.001). Data was pooled 
across groups for this analysis (Figure 22e). 
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Figure 22: The distance traveled on the Training track increases with practice. A, Car paths and 
B, tablet tilt signals from a representative participant from group D10. The distance the virtual 
car travelled increased over days, had lower risk of falling off, and experienced increased 
stereotypy. C, The mean distance travelled along the path within bins of five trials and averaged 
across participants (mean ± std. err.) for each group. Vertical lines indicate overnight breaks, 
horizontal lines included for comparison across groups. D, An example of the distance travelled 
in bins of five trials from one day of training. Performance dropped below the previous day’s 
asymptote (the dashed line) but rapidly recovered to a higher asymptote. E, Distance travelled 
during early windows (first 25 trials, out of 200, within a day) and asymptote windows (final 25 




We felt that an additional measure of task success, survival, was necessary to 
account for the potential sources of distortion in the distance travelled measure, 
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which were introduced by the fact that participants could not travel beyond the end 
of the track and the fact that the track was not uniformly difficult along its length 
(Figure 23a). The survival improved across days of practice (Figure 23b; log-
likelihood ratio test, X2(1) = 355.1, p < 0.001). Survival also improved significantly 
within days (log-likelihood ratio test, X2(1) = 1202.3, p < 0.001), but declined from 
the end of one day to the beginning of the next (log-likelihood ratio test, X2(1) = 
683.4, p < 0.001). This analysis confirmed the results from the distance travelled 
measure. However, the analysis of survival also detected a significant interaction of 
within day gains and days of practice (log-likelihood ratio test, X2(1) = 35.5, p < 
0.001), which was not detected under the distance travelled measure (log-likelihood 
ratio test, X2(1) = 13.9, p = 0.13). The median survival at each window (early and 
asymptote) was plotted to succinctly summarize these finding (Figure 23c). 
 
Car paths became more stereotypical with practice 
During learning, both the mean and the variability of behavior might change with 
experience56,58,76,187. We assessed the mean and variability of segments of car paths 
(Figure 24A) chosen to correspond to a spike in the fall-off hazard (Figure 24B). 
Trajectory mean and variability were evaluated by performing a principle 
component analysis (PCA) decomposition and taking the mean and standard 
deviation of trajectories projected onto the axis corresponding to the first principle 




Figure 23: Falloff risk decreased with practice through within-day learning. A, The hazard rate 
(fall offs per 0.02 of track length) as a function of track length, pooling across all groups and 
days. B, The survival functions across days of training. Darker curves signify later days. The 
dashed line intersects the track half-way point and marks the median survival, used in C. The 
Track inset and the track lengths shown correspond to the azimuth of B. C, The median survival 
during early windows (first 25 trials within a day) and asymptote windows (final 25 trials 
within a day). Learning was significant within days but regressed significantly across days, 





Kinematics became more stereotyped across days of practice (Figure 24C; log-
likelihood ratio test: X2(9) = 85.5, p < 0.001), and underwent changes in mean 
(Figure 24D; log-likelihood ratio test: X2(9) = 22.6, p < 0.01). Variability decreased 
with practice within days (log-likelihood ratio test: X2(1) = 39.2, p < 0.001) but the 
mean apparently did not systematically change within days (log-likelihood ratio 
test: X2(1) =1.21, p = 0.27). Variability increased across days (log-likelihood ratio 
test: X2(1) = 13.8, p < 0.001), but the mean did not systematically change from the 
end of one day to the beginning of the next (log-likelihood ratio test: X2(1) = 0.33, p 
= 0.57). These results are consistent with kinematics becoming systematically more 
stereotyped with practice, and drifting slightly towards what may be a more optimal 
mean path. 
 
Tablet tilt became more compliant with the tilt policy following practice 
An alternative way to assess kinematics was to compare the tablet tilt on each trial 
to an empirically determined, state-dependent tablet tilt policy (Figure 25a). We 
measured the compliance of tablet tilt signals separately for successful and 
unsuccessful trials from both the early and asymptote windows of each day to 
assess how compliance may have changed with practice and within and across days. 
Policy deviation among successful trials decreased across days of training (Figure 
25b; log-likelihood ratio test: X2(1) =63.8, p < 0.001). There was significant change 
within each day of training (log-likelihood ratio test: X2(1) = 14.1, p < 0.001), but not 
from the asymptote of one day to the early window of the next (log-likelihood ratio 
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test: X2(1) =1.3, p = 0.26). Among trials that fell off within the segment, policy 
deviation also decreased as a function of days of practice (Figure 25c; log-likelihood 
ratio test: X2(1) = 34.6, p < 0.001), and decreased within days (log-likelihood ratio 
test: X2(1) = 8.7, p < 0.01), but not from one day to the next (log-likelihood ratio test: 
X2(1) = 1.4, p = 0.25).  
 
Figure 24: Trajectories became more stereotyped with practice. A, Sample trajectories from a 
representative participant on Days 2 and 10. Trajectories become noticeably more stereotyped 
(underwent a reduction in across-trial variance) with practice. B, Trajectories were analyzed 
over a segment of track that corresponded to a region with a spike in hazard rate. The segment 
of paths analyzed began at the time the car passed track distance 0.25 (marked by the first of 
two vertical lines) and extended for 1 s thereafter (approximately indicated by the second 
vertical line). C, Variability (the standard deviation of trajectories projected into the first 
principle component) decreased with practice, and decreased significantly within days, but 
regressed significantly between days. D, The mean trajectory (the mean of trajectories projected 
into the first principle component) changed with practice, but not reliably within or between 
days. Gray boxes in C and D signify that group D10 alone contributed data to the average for 







Figure 25: Deviations from the tablet tilt policy reduced with practice for both successful and 
unsuccessful trials. a, The tablet tilt policy consisted of the mean (red lines) and variance, 
among tablet tilt signals that successfully reached track length 0.5, at each discrete state. In a, 
the policy is shown collapsed across the multiple car direction states to show only the track 
discretization. The policy deviation for each trial was computed at each position along the track 
length by taking the absolute value of the z-score of that trial’s tablet tilt at that state (grey 
bars) with respect to the empirically determined tablet tilt policy distribution. The deviation 





Measures of task success regressed during probes by a constant fraction from Day 3 
onward 
Performance on the probe track (Figure 21D) was tested at different times 
throughout training to determine whether learned behavior was specific to the 
actions and states experienced during training, or whether behavior would 
generalize to a novel track. The mirror image track was used to test for 
generalization because it matched the training path with respect to difficulty, but 
required entirely novel actions (see Figure 26 for more details).  
 
The distance travelled dropped significantly during Probe trials compared to during 
the Pre-Probe window for each day, except Day 1 (Figure 27a). The distance 
travelled during the first five trials of the probe dropped significantly for groups D3, 
D5, and D10, but not for group D1 (Figure 25B; D1: t = -1.09, p = 0.296; D3: t = -3.94, 
p < 0.01; D5: t = -5.77, p < 0.01; D10: t = -6.46, p < 0.01; correcting for multiple 
comparisons using the Holm method). The mean distance travelled during the 
remaining 45 trials of each Probe window was also significantly different from the 
mean distance travelled in the Pre-Probe window (Figure 25D; D1: t = 2.41, p < 0.05; 
D3: t = -2.58, p < 0.05; D5: t = -3.88, p < 0.01; D10: t = -4.02, p < 0.01). The distance 
travelled was higher during the Probe window for group D1, while is was lower for 
groups D3, D5, and D10. Additionally, there was a significant difference among 
groups in the steady-state (final 45 trials of the 50-trial Probe window) drop in 
performance during the Probe (Figure 25B; 1-way ANOVA: F = 8.41, p < 0.01). Post-
hoc analyses revealed that this affect was driven by the drop in performance on Day 
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1 being different from that of the other days tested, and that Days 3, 5, and 10 were 
not detectably different from one another (comparing for multiple comparisons 
using the Tukey-Kramer method). Thus, beyond a threshold of practice (i.e. by Day 
3), there was a constant drop in performance as measured by the distance travelled 
that did not vary with the amount of additional practice. This can be seen by 
comparing the distance travelled during the Probe windows relative to the Pre-
Probe windows for each group (Figure 27c).  
 
We sought to confirm the finding from the distance travelled measure, so conducted 
an analysis to test for differences in survival between the Pre-Probe and Probe 
windows. Survival curves show a similar pattern as the distance travelled data; on 
Day 1, performance during the Probe matched that of the Pre-probe window, but on 
Days 3, 5, and 10, performance worsened during the Probe window (Figure 28a). 
Survival was significantly different marginally across the groups (log-likelihood 
ratio test: X2 = 5320.3, p < 0.001), and during the Probe windows (log-likelihood 
ratio test: X2 = 285.42, p < 0.001). There was also a significant interaction between 
group and probe (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 =1117.1, p < 0.001). This analysis 
confirmed that performance during Probes changed, and that the change differed 
significantly depending on the day. Since the interaction of probe and day was 
significant, additional analyses were conducted to test the effect of the Probe in each 
group individually. There was no detectable difference between Pre-Probe and 
Probes windows for group D1 (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 = 0.33, p < 0.57), but 
there was a significant reduction in survival during the Probes for each other group 
(log-likelihood ratio tests: D3: X2 = 50.6, p < 0.001, D5: X2 = 80.0, p < 0.001, D10: X2 = 
 135 
123.8, p < 0.001). Furthermore, repeating the test for group, Probe, and their 
interaction for groups D3, D5, and D10, revealed a significant difference among the 
groups, marginally (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 = 9.8, p < 0.001), a significant effect 
of Probe (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 = 166.5, p < 0.01), but no detectable 
interaction (log-likelihood ratio test: X2 = 5.6, p = 0.06). These findings are 
consistent with those from the distance travelled measure. Thus, it appears that 
generalization was complete during the probe window on D1, but that there was a 
significant drop in performance during the probe on each day tested thereafter that 





Figure 26: Training and Probe tracks required unique car trajectories and tablet tilt signals. a, 
Segments of the Training track resembled segments of the Probe track, but car paths from one 
would not generally be successful in the other. b – c, An analysis of tablet tilt signals measured 
the minimal distance between Probe and Training tracks for segments of trajectory. d, the best 
matched tilt direction signal segments between Training and Probe trials were twice as poorly 
matched as Training trials to each other. e, In the angular velocity domain, the best possible 
match between Training and Probe trials was better, but still 25% worse that expected from 




Figure 27: Distance travelled  during probes compared to during training. A, The distance 
travelled on Day 1 continued to increase through the Probe, but on Days 3, 5, and 10, 
performance dropped during Probe trials. B, The difference in the average distance travelled 
over the first 5 trials of the Probe (left panel) and over the remaining 45 trials of the Probe 
(right panel). * indicates that a paired t-test determined the group's mean to be significantly 
different from zero, with an alpha of 0.05. C, Distance travelled relative to prior window of trials. 
Curves representing Probe days (D1, D3, D5, & D10) show the distance travelled relative to trials 
26 to 75, the Pre-probe window. The curve representing Training days (the grey signal) shows 
the distance travelled relative to the prior day’s asymptote, averaged over days 3 – 10, excluding 





Figure 28: Survival during probes compared to during training. a, Survival curves for each group 
during pre-probe and probe windows. Shading indicates standard error as determined by fitting Cox 
Proportional Hazard models. Vertical dashed lines indicate the position of median survival, used to 
summarize the difference in survival for each group in the included bar chart. b, The Hazard rate 
(related to the slope of the Survival curves) for the pre-probe and probe windows. c, The within-
participant difference in hazard rate (Probe – Pre-probe). The Path inset corresponds to the azithums 
in a – c. All error bars and shading represent standard error about the mean. 
 
 
Why did task success (the distance travelled and the survival) change during the 
Probes in the way that it did – generalizing completely on Day 1, but dropping by a 
constant amount across all days tested thereafter? If the mechanisms responsible 
for learning were track- or action-specific, it would be expected that performance 
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would not generalize at all. The extent to which performance did generalize (i.e. by 
approximately 90% by Day 3 and thereafter, Figure 27c) could indicate that the 
mechanism of learning was partially general and partially specific, or that there 
were two mechanisms: one general and one specific. However, such models could 
not straightforwardly explain the invariance in the drop in performance during 
Probes, as these models would predict that the performance difference between 
Probe and Training conditions should increase with additional practice. Checking 
how the kinematics changed during the Probes may provide additional insights into 
why performance as measured through task success changed at all during the 
Probes. For instance, it could have been that the kinematics regressed to a previous 
state of learning, by undergoing a regression in mean or in variability to a previous 
level. On the other hand, if kinematics did not change commensurately with the drop 
in performance, it would suggest that learned behavior was in fact fully generalized 
under the Probe, but that some other non-skill-related factor affecting behavior was 
responsible for the drop in performance, such as a change in the probability of 
aberrant events leading to fall offs, a qualitatively different potential mechanism 
than regression in ability.  
 
Kinematic mean and variability during the probes cannot account for the drop in task 
success 
Kinematics may have changed, at least, through differences in movement stereotypy 
(trial-to-trial variation), or through changes in the mean movement. For instance, it 
is possible that since the mean movement and movement stereotypy changed 
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significantly across training, that one or both might have regressed to a previous 
state during the probes. However, this did not appear to be the case (Figure 29a). 
Even though the segment of track over which we analyzed kinematics included a 
peak in the hazard rate and a peak in the difference in hazard rates between the 
Probe and Pre-Probe windows for each group (Figure 29b), there was no detectable 
difference in either variability (Figure 29c, D3: t(13) = -0.45, p =0.66; D5: t(16) = 
1.36, p = 0.19; D10: t(17) = -0.63, p = 0.53), or in mean (Figure 29d, D3: t(13) = -
0.054, p =0.96; D5: t(16) = -0.12, p = 0.91; D10: t(17) = 0.17, p = 0.87). We corrected 
for multiple comparisons using the Holm Method200 (Holm). Nor was there a 
difference detected after pooling participants together from groups D3, D5, and D10 
(Variability: t(48) = 0.35, p = 0.73; Mean: t(48) = -0.026, p = 0.98), which increased 




Figure 29: Movement mean and stereotypy did not change during probes. a, Car trajectories 
from a representative participant during the pre-probe window (grey traces), and the probe 
window (brown traces). b, Paths were analyzed within the same segment of Track as in Figure 
24, indicated by the two vertical lines. c, The difference in the variability among Car Paths 
(Probe – Pre-probe) for the groups D3, D5, and D10 (Left panel) and for all participants pooled 
together (Right panel). d, The difference in mean Car Path (Probe – Pre-probe) for the groups 
D3, D5, and D10 (Left panel) and for all participants pooled together (Right panel). Group D1 
was excluded from this analysis because too few participants had a sufficient number of trials 
that successfully navigated the Track for 1s after reaching track length 0.25. All error bars 
represent standard error about the mean. 
 
 
This analysis introduced a paradox: how could performance drop during probes 
when measured with respect to task success (the distance travelled and hazard 
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rate), but remain unchanged with respect to movement kinematics? These findings 
are inconsistent with a learning mechanism that is action- or track-specific for 
several reasons. First, the decline in task success was invariant across practice from 
Day 3 onward, which would not be expected if separate task-specific and 
generalizable components were active in parallel. In such a case, both components 
would be expected to increase with additional practice and experience a practice-
dependent divergence between performance under familiar conditions versus 
unfamiliar conditions. Second, the variability and mean of the car paths remained 
unchanged during Probes compared to during Training, which itself would lead to 
the conclusion that generalization during the Probe was complete.  
 
What accounted for the drop in task success? Given that only those trajectories that 
successfully navigated the selected segment of track were included in the analysis of 
kinematics, it could be that the discrepancy lies in the excluded trials that 
terminated within the track segment. Since the survival was lower during Probes 
compared to during Training, it is evident that there were more fall offs during the 
Probes, but was there any qualitative difference in how trials failed? Trials might 
have terminated in a different way during the Probes than during Training, for 
instance, by deviating more from the established policy on the Probe track than on 
the Training track. Alternatively, failure trials might have deviated in qualitatively 
the same way, only having a higher probability of doing so. These two possibilities 
would support different conclusions as to the underlying reasons that task success 
dropped under the novel conditions. For instance, if failures were more deviant 
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during the Probes, it might suggest a problem retrieving or executing the policy that 
otherwise should be available, as was demonstrated on the successful trials. That is, 
it would suggest that some phenomenon that was not present during Training 
became a factor during the Probe on account of the change in track. On the other 
hand, if failures occurred in qualitatively the same way during Probes as during 
Training, it would be more parsimonious to conclude that the policy was being 
followed during the Probes just as it was during Training, but that factors that 
influenced performance during Training were modulated during the Probes, 
resulting in a higher fall off rate. Plausible factors that might do this include 
motivation or attention. 
 
Fall offs occurred in qualitatively the same way on the Probe track as on the Training 
track 
We conducted an analysis on tilt policy compliance to attempt to distinguish 
between these two hypotheses. Trials that were ultimately successful were analyzed 
separately from trials that fell off during the track segment (Figure 30a).  
Trials that ultimately fell off diverged from the tilt direction policy, while those that 
were successful remained compliant (Figure 30b). This was true during both the 
Pre-Probe and Probe windows. The mean deviation and slope of the deviation along 
the track length was significantly higher during failed trials compared to successes 
(Figure 29D; stats). There was not, however, a significant change in the mean, or 
slope of the policy deviation between Pre-Probe and Probe windows. There was also 
no detectable interaction between the mean and failure status of slope and failure 
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status. Instead, the fraction of successful trials through the segment of track was 
higher during the Pre-Probe window compared to the Probe window (Figure 30d). 
These results demonstrated that, while fall offs may have occurred more often 
during the Probes, they proceeded in the same way during the Probes as during 
Training. This result suggests that some factor or factors that were not unique to the 
Probe condition influenced performance irrespective of the amount of practice and 
in the same qualitative way as it would have done during the more familiar Training 




Figure 30: Analysis of terminal Car Paths. a, Car paths from a representative participant during 
the Pre-probe window (left half) and the Probe window (right half) for successful and 
unsuccessful trajectories (as labelled). The field of red lines indicates the mean tilt direction 
among successful Car paths at that position of track. Missing field lines indicate that an 
insufficient number of paths reached that position of track and successfully navigated the rest of 
the segment. b, The policy deviation aligned to the point of trial termination (for failures) or to 
the end of the track segment (for successes) for the Pre-probe and Probe windows. c, The mean 
(Left panel) and slope (Right panel) of the deviation signals for successful and terminal car 
paths during the Pre-probe and Probe windows. d, The fraction of successful trials during the 
Pre-probe and Probe windows. * indicates a significant difference at the alpha = 0.05 level. For 
this figure and accompanying analysis, successful trials were those where the Car path reached 
at least Track length 0.5. 
 
 
Car path and tablet tilt kinematics during Probes most resembled Training days closer 
to the occurrence of Probes than did distance travelled data 
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An analysis was done to match the day of training whose data most resembled the 
data obtained during the Probe. This form of analysis was done separately for Car 
path data as well as Distance travelled data, and an analysis was conducted to 
determine if the distributions of matched days differed between these two measures 
of performance (Figure 31). A kolmogorov-smirnov test conducted between the two 
distributions found them to be significantly different. This analysis is consistent 
with the position that kinematic measures of performance would suggest that the 
skill level of participants was higher than that suggested by the measure of task 
success.  
 
Figure 31: Kinematic measures during Probes more resembled advanced stages of practice, 
while task success measures more resembled intermediate stages. a, The day of practice that 
best matched measures of performance during Probes was found by computing the maximum 
likelihood of the Probe data among the data from each day of practice. The best matched day 
was more advanced for measures of kinematics (car path and policy deviation) than it was for 





Continuous movement skills – learned behaviors like skiing, or serving in tennis – 
are of special interest in human behavior and neural sciences. Unlike adapting to 
perturbations from baseline movements65–67, or learning new sequences of actions 
already in one’s movement repertoire8,18,22,193, learning novel continuous behaviors 
appears to be a uniquely human characteristic201,202. It is important to study the 
mechanisms responsible for such a unique trait in nature. To do so, we created a 
novel driving-simulator video game, and devised a task that required learning a new 
continuous-movement skill. This task allowed us to study the process of de novo 
learning of novel continuous behaviors in ways that other tasks do not.  
 
Participants in this experiment practiced the game for up to two weeks, with Probes 
for generalization assigned at one of four possible times throughout practice, on Day 
1, 3, 5, or 10. There were significant changes in performance as measured through 
the distance travelled, survival, stereotypy, and policy compliance measures over 
the ten days of practice. During probes, task success (the distance travelled and 
survival measures) dropped by a constant amount from Day 3 onward. However, 
kinematic measures (the mean car path, stereotypy among car paths, and 
compliance with movement policy), did not change significantly during the Probes 
on any of the day tested. Furthermore, data from kinematic measures were best 
matched (in a maximum-likelihood sense) to data from the Training track that were 
more advanced (in days of practice) than was the case for task-success measures. 
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Thus, the kinematics of movements in the task could not account for the drop in task 
success that occurred during the Probes after Day 1. Instead, the probability of 
making an error leading to a fall-off increased. These results mean that, rather than 
the Probes causing regression in execution ability per se, they instead caused an 
increase in the probability of rare, outlier events that occasionally occurred during 
Training as well.  
 
One primary question that motivated this study was whether learning de novo, 
continuous-movement skills is done through an action-sequencing mechanism, as is 
commonly assumed8,18,50,196. These results are not consistent with that theory. The 
extent to which generalization occurred (90% for task success and 100% for 
movement kinematics), is not consistent with a sequencing mechanism because the 
actions required for the Probe track are completely different from those required of 
the Training track. One possible rebuttal to this conclusion, supported by the 
chunking theory of sequence learning18, is that individual movements learned on the 
Training track could be applied in a different order to achieve superior performance 
on the Probe track despite not having had specific practice with it. However, this 
suggestion is unlikely, because the tablet tilt signals required to navigate the Probe 
track were poorly matched to even the most closely matching signal segments from 
the Training track (Figure 26). Thus, the sequence learning theory does not appear 
to be a good model, or to be the appropriate theory, for how de novo continuous 
movement skills are learned. 
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Finding an interaction between the day that a Probe was given and the amount that 
task success dropped during that Probe was unexpected, but may reveal more 
details about the mechanisms of learning in this task. Having observed complete 
generalization in task success during the Probe on Day 1, but only partial 
(approximately 90%) generalization during each Probe thereafter, means that some 
change in representation occurred between Days 1 and 3 that persistent for the 
duration of practice tested. One possible hypothesis for the nature of such a 
transformation is that the representation of actions in the task became, at least 
partially, model-free in nature, and thus became sensitive to changes that would 
require synthesizing novel actions203. However, this idea is inconsistent with the 
fact that the drop in task success during Probes on Days 3, 5, and 10 was constant. 
Were behavior to have become partially task-specific and partially general, the drop 
in task success would be expected to increase with more practice, because the 
additional practice would have acted on both of these components, thereby 
increasing their separation. This, however, was not the case; the drop remained 
constant and insensitive to additional practice. For that theory to hold, it would have 
had to be that the model-free component of learning had a short window of 
sensitivity to practice that closed some time after Day 1 but before Day 3. This idea 
is, to our knowledge, without precedent in the literature, and therefore unlikely. A 
more parsimonious explanation, and one that does have precedent, is that the 
change in representation that occurred was related to motivation22,204–206. Under 
this model, the unfamiliarity with the Probe track might have induced a change in 
motivational state, thus impacting performance. This would simultaneously explain 
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how there was full generalization on Day 1 and a practice-invariant drop on Days 3, 
5, and 10, as the Probe on Day 1 was not particularly unfamiliar, but equally 
unfamiliar on Days 3, 5, and 10. There may be other possible explanations for the 
findings, such as an effect of attention179,207, but in any case, the reason is unlikely 
related to a change in the principle mechanism of learning.   
 
Another clue for the possible mechanism of learning in this task is the incongruence 
between generalization as measured through movement kinematics versus task 
success. While generalization as measured through task success suffered a 10% 
drop on Days 3 and later, kinematic measures registered no apparent change during 
the Probes. This interaction was confirmed by finding that the measures of 
kinematics appeared more advanced when compared to the best-matched Training 
data than did the measures of task success (see Figure 31). The change that 
occurred during Probes was not a qualitative one; fall-offs occurred in the same way 
during Probes as they did during Training. Instead, the probability of making an 
error during the Probes increased. Thus, the learned continuous-movement skill 
generalized completely under novel conditions, but some factor aside from the 
ability to execute the correct actions affected the probability of success. This result 
is also parsimoniously explained by the model suggesting that the Probes caused a 
change in motivation, or some other factor, like attention, rather than causing a 
regression in ability.  
 
How are continuous-action skills learned? 
 151 
The data and findings from this study cannot parsimoniously support a model for 
learning based on action sequencing or chunking. How are novel continuous-action 
skills learned, then? One possibility is that a flexible feedback policy is created that 
effectively maps states to actions66,67,197–199. In the context of this task, such a policy 
might include, for instance, recognizing one’s location on the track and the 
upcoming segment of track (i.e. together, the “state”), and then generating the 
appropriate response given that state. A model such as this could be realized with 
the help of an internal inverse model that is able to generate appropriate responses 
given present conditions66,67,197. This concept has more commonly been used to 
describe feedforward control197, but could readily extend to feedback control as 
well208–210.  
 
The concept of learning an optimal and flexible feedback controller is relatively 
unexplored in human neuroscience, and has the potential to expand understanding 
of behavior and learning. Much work has been devoted to studying the response to 
changes in the environment or conditions, assuming the a priori existence of an 
internal inverse model66,67,197, but much less has been devoted to how such a policy 
is acquired (though see Diedrichsen, et. al.49). Future work will be needed to more 
fully explore the characteristics of learning such a policy, including studying the 
acquisition over longer periods of practice the two weeks, and investigating its 
properties of generalization beyond the simple manipulation that we considered. 
Furthermore, concepts in behavioral neuroscience such as habit formation149,211,212, 
model-free vs. model based control203,213; and the influence of cognition to learning 
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and recall34,35,72,214 are relatively unexplored in relation to feedback control of 
continuous behavior. For instance, might there be habitual selection of controllers, 
rather than just actions? What cognitive or perceptual factors might influence the 
recall and selection of a controller? Do motivational factors always remain a 
modulating influence, or does additional training eventually stamp those influences 
out? 
 
The concept of learning a flexible feedback controller may also have implications 
beyond the study of neuroscience and behavior. In rehabilitation following injury or 
a stroke, for example, therapeutics might need to focus on rebuilding lost 
controllers. From a practical point of view, this may involve focusing rehabilitation 
exercises on more general use of the affected limbs, rather than task-specific 
exercises aimed at re-teaching the specific activities of daily living215. Similarly, in 
sports or industrial training, it may be wise to shift emphasis from specific drills and 
practice routines to more general ones. It may also help to emphasize activities that 
build confidence or promote motivation, as we have shown here that these appear 
to be significant modulating factors.   
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7 General discussion 
In this dissertation, I have sought to study the role of cognition and explicit 
knowledge in the development of motor skills. I conducted several studies that 
investigated the dual-nature of adaptation learning, and devised a novel 
experimental model and methods to study continuous-movement behaviors. 
 
Savings for visuomotor adaptation as action-recall 
In Chapter 3, I asked how much prior experience with a visuomotor rotation would 
be necessary to obtain savings. This study found that minimal practice was 
necessary to obtain savings – as few as 2 trials under the rotation was sufficient to 
impart a systematic improvement when tested later. The amount of prior practice 
did not change the amount of savings observed (i.e. groups ROT10 vs. ROT40 had the 
same strength of savings), and it appeared that the best prior action was rapidly 
recalled. Furthermore, the prior rotation experience needed to be in the same 
direction as the next rotation in order for savings to be observed. This pattern of 
savings is consistent with a model for the recall of actions as supporting savings42.  
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There are several possible mechanisms that could account for how actions are 
retained and recalled. One possibility is that, in the presence of the visuomotor 
perturbation, actions that bring reaches closer to asymptote (e.g. reduced their 
movement error under the rotation) experience a positive reward prediction-
error130 and are retained through a reinforcement learning mechanism42,165. Another 
possibility is that the actions are declarative or explicit in nature, and are remember 
and recalled as declarative memory7,35,44,72,148,216. There may even be a combination 
of the two, where both mechanisms contribute to retention and recall.  
 
This model contrasts with a view in which experience with specific errors 
encountered during adaptation modifies the error-sensitivity of those errors in a 
principled, cerebellum-dependent way, leading to faster re-learning when the same 
errors are experienced again later70. This view, versus the action-recall model, has 
subtly different predictions about the pattern of savings expected during adaptation. 
For instance, the error sensitivity model would expect that the strength of savings in 
adaptation would scale with the amount of practice with the perturbation, even at 
asymptote, as random errors and a bias toward baseline continue to drive changes 
to the errors experienced. This was not evident in the data from this experiment, as 
the amount savings observed was the same whether participants had merely 
reached asymptote or conducted many trials at asymptote. This finding was, 
however, consistent with an action-recall model, where the memory for actions 
would be established primarily during the initial period of adaptation where reward 
prediction error reduced the most, and that period would be the same regardless of 
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the time spent on asymptote. Explicit recall of actions, were that the mechanism, 
would also not necessarily expect for there to be different amounts of savings. 
Furthermore, the way in which savings would manifest would be expected to reflect 
a change in rate under the error-sensitivity model, but to appear more like an 
abrupt jump back to previously acquired reach directions in the action-recall model. 
We observed evidence for the latter in this experiment.  
 
Thus, the evidence from this study point more towards an action recall model than a 
model for modification of error sensitivity, although additional experiments could 
help to bring more confidence to this conclusion. For instance, it is possible that the 
very rapid adaptation seen in this experiment (reaching baseline within 5 to 10 
trials), and the limited ceiling for detecting differences in learning through savings 
might have made differentiating between the predictions of the two alternative 
models difficult. Another way to test which model appears to be more consistent is 
to have a condition that repeats the full range of errors experienced adapting to a 
given rotation from baseline many times. Under such conditions, the error 
sensitivity model would be expected to undergo even more drastic modification of 
error sensitivity which should be reflected in an even faster rate of relearning. The 
action recall model would instead continue to predict recall of the best previously 
attained reach direction. Another change that might make distinguishing between 
these two models more robust would be to increase the magnitude of the rotation 
from30° to 45° or 60° to increase the dynamic range for detecting differences in the 
pattern of relearning.  
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Aside from the new evidence obtained from the experiments described in Chapter 3 
and in the paper71, there is other evidence in support of an action-recall model. For 
instance, this model fits parsimoniously into the dual-system framework of learning 
and memory7,148, in at least two ways. First, the memory for actions could be implicit 
or explicit, and in fact may undergo a transformation from one to the other 
depending on the amount of practice and prior experience. Secondly, the dual-
system framework suggests that other, parallel mechanisms can act simultaneously 
and independently of the action-recall mechanism. Such a dual-component model is 
in fact well supported by data from other studies16,23,35,72,74,216. In contrast, the error-
sensitivity modification model does not parsimoniously accommodate the findings 
of process decomposition in adaptation. For instance, how would the error-
sensitivity modification process account for the effects of limiting preparation-time 
or dividing attention during adaptation, i.e. why should it be sensitive to these 
manipulations? One of the assumptions behind the mechanism is that it is mediated 
in the cerebellum by a principled (i.e. inflexible) process of synaptic weight changes, 
so how could manipulations such as those affect it? The model is capable of fitting 
certain data quite well70, but does not necessarily fit nicely into the broader picture 
of motor skill learning. For instance, another study, presented here in Chapter 4, 
further contradicts the error-sensitivity model of learning by demonstrating that 
recalibration in adaptation remains invariant with practice; i.e. that error-sensitivity 
does not change at all with experience. Furthermore, the study presented in Chapter 
5 goes even further to demonstrate that even after providing much more practice 
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under the rotation, including repeating the initial phase of adaptation from baseline 
multiple times, still does not alter the error-sensitivity of the recalibration 
component of adaptation. These results, present in much greater detail below, fit 
parsimoniously with the action recall model, but much less so with an error-
sensitivity-modification model.  
 
The multiple components to adaptation learning 
It appears that adaptation in visuomotor perturbation tasks is accomplished by at 
least two independent components. One component is implicit and sensitive to 
sensory prediction errors, while the other is deliberate and more sensitive to 
reward and failure16,23,44,71,74,216,217. In Chapter 4, we asked which component of 
adaptation is responsible for savings. To do this, we first confirmed that 
manipulating the reaction time limits the expression of adaptation16,72,74. The most 
parsimonious explanation for this finding is that a deliberate component, most likely 
explicit in nature, was prevented from influencing the reach direction on those trials 
that had limited preparation time, thereby limiting the full expression of adaptation 
that was demonstrated when the preparation time was longer. When we tested for 
savings using the same timed-response paradigm, adaptation was no different that 
the initial exposure when the preparation time was limited. Despite this lack of 
savings during Short-PT trials, there was significant savings when there were no 
restriction on the preparation time.  
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We concluded that savings for adaptation is supported by deliberate, explicit 
processing, because only when sufficient PT was made available was adaptation 
more complete and sensitive to prior experience, expressed as savings. The 
expression of cognitive, deliberative reasoning is thought to depend on the 
availability of sufficient preparation time169,218,219. The distinction between a slow, 
deliberative component that takes into account more information, and a rapid, 
reflexive component that may be subject to more cognitive biases has been 
identified in many domains of human behavior219. The two modes of operation have 
been called “System 1”, for the rapid but error-probe component, and “System 2”, 
for the slower, deliberative component220. These systems may account for the 
behavioral differences observed in adaptation learning from the modulation of 
preparation time; when PT is limited, System 1 is dominant and participants aim 
their reach directly towards the provided target. Any deviation from the target in 
these cases is attributable to implicit recalibration learning, which is driven by 
sensory-prediction error through a cerebellar-mediated mechanism125,133,176. When 
there is sufficient PT, and no other sources of interference that may prevent the 
expression of System 2-like reasoning, adaptation is superior, taking into account 
the more optimal solution of reaching in a direction other than directly towards the 
displayed target and toward a goal that better cancels the rotation. Similar effects 
have previously been obtained either by manipulating the available PT in other 
ways16,72, or in interrupting System 2 processing through dual tasking221, or through 
startle222,223.   
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I would speculate that the nature of the memory that is retained for adaptation is 
explicit, but the study presented in Chapter 4 and in Haith, et. al.72 did not directly 
test for this. It is, however, a parsimonious explanation, and would be consistent 
with the conclusions from other similar studies that do directly test the nature of the 
System 2-like component35,44. If this were the case, it would also suggest that the 
nature of the memory recalled from the previous study, in Chapter 3, was also 
explicit. This conclusion calls into question the extent to which adaptation is a 
suitable model for motor skill learning, as many studies stake their conclusions and 
interpretations on the assumption that adaptation learning is a procedural, or 
motor, phenomenon38,59,224.  If, instead, adaptation learning is an implicit 
recalibration process that is insensitive to prior practice and contaminated by a 
cognitive recall phenomenon, or vice versa, many conclusions about skill learning 
may need to be reconsidered.  
 
However, there may still be principles of motor skill learning hidden in adaptation 
paradigms. The studies presented so far have shown that adaptation is dissociable 
into automatic and deliberate components, and that savings, the best sign of long-
term memory for adaptation, is supported by the deliberate component. However, 
motor skills usually require prolonged practice for substantive changes in behavior 
to be observed47,58,172,180, sometimes called consolidation. It is possible that our first 
two studies did not provide sufficient practice for the mechanisms involved in skill 
learning to be expressed. We conducted a third study to discover if the memory 
supporting savings would ever undergo a transformation from being seemingly 
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explicit in nature to becoming automatic, or expressible under low latency. Another 
way to phrase this hypothesis is that consolidation through practice may transform 
responses from being mediated by System 2 to System 1. This is precisely the 
hypothesis tested in the experiments described in Chapter 5. 
 
Caching of the explicit, but not the recalibration, components of adaptation 
In Chapter 5, we detailed an experiment that provided participants with more 
practice of the visuomotor transformation, while testing for the dissociation of 
adaptation into its two components in two different ways. We manipulated the 
preparation time to test the low-latency response to the perturbation16,72, and we 
used Aftereffect trials, in which participants were instructed to simply omit any 
aiming or deliberate compensation23,44. We specifically sought to test whether 
deliberate compensation for the perturbation would undergo a transformation to 
being cached, rather than cognitively expensive, and thus expressible at low latency. 
Measuring the response to Aftereffect trials allowed us to further test whether the 
implicit recalibration component had also changed, and thus whether any savings in 
the Low-PT measurement could be attributed to a change in recalibration. If the 
Aftereffect trials did not change with experience, it would suggest that the 
recalibration component remains insensitive to practice and does not undergo any 
modification of its properties, at least not from the type and duration of training 
used in this study. This would also suggest that any savings in the Short-PT 
measurements were instead attributable to a process that allowed the deliberate 
component of learning to be expressed automatically, or become cached. We found 
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the latter; adaptation under Short-PT trials gradually showed savings, but it could 
not be attributed to modulation of the recalibration component because Aftereffect 
trials showed no savings.  
 
These findings point to a model of motor learning where actions are initially 
represented and remembered explicitly, but that through practice, the 
representation changes to being cached, or automatic. Such a mechanism may be a 
critical step in the development of skill, because some tasks may require a minimum 
speed and accuracy of response in order to be successfully done. For instance, in ice-
skating or skiing, certain maneuvers may be required within a certain amount of 
time to maintain balance and an upright posture, simply due to the physics of the 
task. Thus, if the appropriate actions become automatic and rapidly expressible, it 
may make certain tasks or behaviors possible that would not have been without that 
transformation.  
 
There are at least two possible mechanisms to account for the transformation from 
deliberate to cached. It could be that deliberative processing forms a cognitive 
scaffold that shapes behavior in accordance with task goals and constraints. Under 
this model, behaviors may become cached through some implicit learning 
mechanism that operates on the movements that were directed by the cognitive 
scaffold. Declarative memory may assist in more rapidly recalling the scaffold, 
leading to savings even before an implicit memory is formed for it, but under this 
model a separate consolidation mechanism remains responsible for caching the 
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behavior. Alternatively, it could be that the processes that formed the cognitive 
scaffold become cached with practice, rather than the behaviors. A cognitive scaffold 
might be, for example, an explicit representation of the planned trajectory of 
movement225.  
 
One possible way to differentiate between these two hypotheses would be to have 
participants cheat in a learning task by either being provided the scaffold without 
the need or ability to form it themselves, or by allowing participants to form the 
scaffold but then deprive them of practice in performing the full movement. 
Whichever of these conditions leads to consolidation of behavior would reveal 
which of the two alternative processes, forming the scaffold or performing the 
actions, are necessary for consolidation. It also might be that both steps, forming the 
scaffold and executing the movements, are subject to becoming cached.  
Whatever the case may be, the principle that behaviors are initially explicit in 
nature, recalled during repeated episodes of practice, and gradually cached through 
some mechanisms throughout practice appears to be a consistent explanation for 
both our observations and many others. These findings are, furthermore, not 
parsimoniously explained by the error-sensitivity-modification theory70. 
 
Our model is also broadly consistent with other findings. For instance, amnestic 
patients are able to learn so-called procedural skills even without explicit memory 
of the task5,6. This has classically been considered as proof of the independence 
between memory for facts versus memory for skills7. However, those who 
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conducted the experiments using amnestic patients instructed the patients in what 
to do for the tasks each time they practiced them, eliminating the need for explicit 
memory recall and allowing them to practice the task despite their impairments. 
Under this arrangement, even amnestic patients improve at the tasks, such as 
mirror drawing5 and rotatory pursuit6. These findings were taken as proof of the 
independence of declarative from procedural memory7. However, when amnestic 
patients were trained in the use of arbitrary, novel objects, they were unable to 
recall how to use the objects without proper instruction29. If, however, they had 
their hands placed in the correct initial configuration to use the objects, they could 
correctly execute the tool’s intended actions. These results show that learning 
appropriate actions, for mirror drawing, rotatory pursuit, or arbitrary associations, 
is possible without functioning declarative memory, but that initiation of that 
behavior must be triggered somehow. When declarative memory is available, and 
participants know the goals of the behavior, they can self-initiate that behavior. 
When that knowledge is not available, such as in the amnestic patients, the initial 
state must be either provided or, presumably, arrived at coincidently, in order for 
the correct behavior to be elicited. These findings give further evidence to the model 
of learning in which cognitive processing serves to build a scaffold that directs 
behavior in accordance with explicit task goals and constraints, and that practicing 




As it pertains to our model, the appropriate response to counteract the perturbation 
is initially represented via declarative memory, being sensitive to the amount of 
preparation time available, and to other manipulations44,74,217, but that practice 
gradually caches that response. When the same errors are encountered during 
subsequent exposures to the perturbation, the appropriate response is recalled 
rapidly. In this sense, the errors serve as a cue for recall, rather than as inputs to an 
inflexible recalibration mechanism. Our results demonstrate that error sensitivity of 
the recalibration component does not change with practice, but that of the 
deliberate component does, which, in a way, demonstrates a memory for errors, but 
not necessarily in the way that had been proposed in70. I would predict that, were 
amnestic patients to participate in Experiment 1 from Chapter 5, they would exhibit 
normal learning behavior. This prediction in part stems from the fact that, while 
amnestic patients are severely impaired in declarative memory, they are not 
generally impaired at cognitive processing31,181,226,227, and thus should be unimpaired 
at discovering the appropriate deliberative actions to counteract the rotation 
beyond the minimum adaptation provided through error-based recalibration. 
Practicing with the assistance of this cognitive scaffold should be sufficient to instill 
the kind of transformation that was observed in unimpaired participants, as 
previous studies have demonstrated that practice on asymptote can establish a set 
point for that behavior42.  
 
Some additional questions remain regarding this model for learning. For instance, 
what is recalled during re-learning: an action, such as an absolute reach direction, or 
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a reach direction relative to the target? And is this representation different before 
and after it becomes cached? One possible way to investigate these questions would 
be to repeat Experiment 1 from Chapter 5, while including tests for generalization to 
different target directions throughout training. This would reveal whether absolute 
or relative actions are represented initially and after being cached, and whether 
those two differ, such as being represented relative to the target initially, but as an 
absolute reach direction after being cached.  
 
Learning novel continuous-action behaviors by creating a feedback control policy 
My final study attempted to explore the mechanisms of learning novel continuous 
action skills. To do this, we used a custom-built driving simulator video game and 
devised a novel task. Participants had to learn to navigate a virtual car along a 
narrow and winding path by tilting a tablet computer. At one of four times 
throughout practice, participants were tested on their ability to generalize their 
learning to a novel track. The Probe track was carefully selected to be match to the 
original, Training track for difficulty and other characteristics (such as the total 
number of sub-movements and the extent of those sub-movements), but also to 
have no overlapping segments, so that the actions required to navigate the Probe 
track were different from all sub-movements needed to navigate the Training track. 
The characteristics of learning and generalization in this experimental design 
allowed us to assess whether learning was achieved via a task-specific, or model-
free, mechanism versus a flexible, model-based one, and whether there was any 
change in mechanism throughout practice. 
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We found that performance generalized almost completely to the Probe track, which 
suggested that a flexible, model-based mechanism must have been responsible for 
learning. Measuring performance in the game according to task success (the 
distance travelled along the track and the survival) suggested that performance 
during the probes dropped by about 10% from Day 3 and onward. The drop 
appeared to be invariant after Day 1, which suggested that the reason for the 
apparent drop in performance might be related to factors other than the ability to 
navigate the track. If the drop in performance were due to the existence of a 
learning mechanism that was task-specific, such as memorization of the actions to 
successfully navigate the Training track, the drop in performance should have 
grown with additional practice, from Days 3 to 10. However, this was not the case; 
the drop in performance was constant across training from Day 3 onward. Instead, 
we suggested that the drop in performance may be due to motivational factors, 
which are known to modulate performance regardless of the ability to actually 
execute a given action or maneuver22,204 (Figure 32). This conclusion was further 
supported by the finding that the kinematics of movement – variability among 
movements, the mean movement, and the policy deviation, - did not regress during 
the Probes. Thus, it appeared that, according to the kinematics, performance was 
fully generalized during the Probes. Instead of the kinematics regressing to a 
previous state of learning, the probability of any given trial being a failed trial 
increased. The way in which those trials failed did not change. This finding is 
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consistent with the hypothesis that the Probe trials modulated motivation, rather 
than changing the state of learning.  
 
 
Figure 32: Model of performance with motivation modulation. It is possible that motivation, or possible 
other, non-skill related factors, can modulate performance when novel conditions are encountered. 
 
 
These results are inconsistent with the action-sequencing50 and chunking51,58,228 
theories of skill learning, because performance generalized to a track that required 
different sequences of actions, and novel actions altogether. This finding will be 
disruptive to popular theories of learning and other concepts in neuroscience, as 
many studies assume that learning is achieved through action sequencing. Another 
consequence of this this study is that it shows that measures of kinematics, like 
stereotypy of movements and improved feedback responses, do not imply a 
sequence learning or model-free mechanism of learning. We observed both 
increased movement stereotypy and generalization of behavior, two findings that 
would not necessarily be expected to co-occur.  
 
 168 
We suggest that a better model for how novel, continuous-action behaviors, like the 
one studied here, are learned is through the creation of a flexible feedback control 
policy that maps states to actions66,198,199,224,229. The idea that a representation of a 
policy exists for completion of a task is popular for explaining learning of discrete 
movements via feedforward control224, but the concept can also be applied to 
feedback control as well208–210.  
 
As a proof of concept, even a very simple control rule can reproduce our findings, 
thus demonstrating how a flexible controller that maps states to actions might be 
implemented (Figure 33). Assuming that participants can learn to aim the direction 
of their car toward an arbitrary goal along the track, simply aiming at the center of 
the track several steps ahead of the car’s current location on the track can produce 
successful trajectories. Such a simple learning rule is consistent with the results 
from this study, as it would be fully generalizable to any new track, and it might be 
subject to errors when motivation or attention are modulated. Thus, it appears that 
learning continuous movement tasks such as the one devised for the study 
presented in Chapter 6 involve building a flexible feedback control policy rather 
than rote chunking or sequencing of actions.  
 
It is worth noting that, while we did not directly test, measure, or evaluate the 
implicit-versus-explicit nature of learning in this task, the study represents a first 
step toward being able to answer more advanced questions regarding the nature of 
learning, including assessing the nature of memory for novel behaviors. For 
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instance, it would be interesting to test whether learning is mediated by a model-
based or a model-free mechanism. This study refutes the idea that learning involved 
the rote memorization of actions, but it does not definitively determine how 
learning was done, and whether the mechanism or mechanisms involved were 
model-based vs. model-free. If the mechanism of learning had been model-based, it 
still may have been implicit, explicit, or a combination of the two, as was the case in 
adaptation. It is possible that the nature of the policy that was learned may have 
been initially explicit (e.g. “I shall aim several car-lengths ahead of where I am”) and 
then transformed into being an implicit policy, such as aiming at a particular goal 
location ahead of the current state of the car without having to explicitly represent 
it.  
 
This idea introduces additional questions regarding the relationship between 
explicit and implicit memory, and model-free versus model-based learning. Do there 
exist mechanisms for each combination of these phenomena, i.e. are their explicit 
and implicit model-free mechanisms and explicit and implicit model-based ones? It 
seems likely that each combination of these would exist. Do all such learning 
mechanisms begin as being explicit and transition, through practice, into being 
implicit, or could the opposite be true, that some behaviors are initially implicit, but 
with experience gradually rise to the level of conscious awareness, and thus become 
explicit? Such a phenomenon, where it to exist, might occur when expert 
practitioners at a behavior, such as a sport, come to have a detailed and explicit 
representation of the appropriate behavioral policies for that sport, like that which a 
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coach might have. It could even be that a behavioral policy is initially represented 
explicitly, becomes implicit through practice, and then later develops a second 
explicit representation, which might be different from the first and allow for new 
modifications of behavior. This may, in fact, be a general principle for how skills can 
continue to improve for many years, which appears to be the case in many human 
endeavors like sports, the arts, and trades230. 
 
 
Figure 33: Proof-of-concept control policy. In this simulation, the filter that generates car kinematics from 
the tablet tilt signal was linearized. Traces in grey show car paths generated from tablet tilt data. The start 
of the path is at the upper left corner, and the end of the track segment is represented by the black bar that 
cuts perpendicular to the track’s center (the bold black curve). Several synthetic car trajectories were 
created using a feedback policy that simply directed the tablet tilt direction towards the track’s center just 
ahead of the present location of the car. Lapses in attention were simulated by breaks in policy updating of 
variable durations. Short breaks were tolerated well (Green traces), while longer breaks led to trajectories 
that would have fallen off of the track (Red traces). This simulation serves as a proof of concept for what 
form a feedback policy may take to produce plausible behavior. There was no need for a representation of 
the actions per se, only a policy for where to aim based on the state of the car. 
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This study also illustrates the difficulty in assessing behavior in motor skill tasks. 
For instance, evaluating performance through measures of task success produced 
one conclusion, while using measures of kinematics produced another. We 
concluded that the discrepancy between the two measures was accounted for 
through an effect of motivation22,204–206. On one hand, this illustrates the importance 
of considering multiple perspectives of the data to draw more robust conclusions 
about behavior when so many possible outcomes exist. For instance, in a simple 
two-option forced choice task, there are fewer degrees of freedom to evaluate than 
in a movement task that generates continuous kinematics (although, as was 
discussed extensively for Chapters 3 – 5, aspects of behavior such as the reaction 
time may well be important considerations even for simpler behaviors like forced 
choice).  On the other hand, our observation of the minor incongruence between 
performance as measured through task success versus kinematics demonstrates the 
potential folly of drawing concrete conclusions in complex psychophysical 
experiments when so many possible reasons exist for a particular phenomenon, and 
it is not always possible to control for each one. Furthermore, this introduces a 
deeper philosophical issue in the evaluation of complex systems, like human 
behavior, in general: is it even possible to study a system of interest when controls 
are applied to it. For instance, controlling factor A while measuring factor B, then 
control factor B while measuring factor A might produce different relationships 
between factors A and B because the systems are different when holding one factor 
constant versus the other. More concretely, and as an example, if we sought to 
eliminate the effect of motivation in our study, we might inadvertently change the 
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system sufficiently so as to make the measurements of performance incomparable 
to those measures taken when motivation was free to change. The resolution of such 
concerns is unclear, but will likely only be overcome through theoretical work that 
gradually, through continued failures to falsify, becomes more convincing. On a 
more practical note, one possible solution to avoiding potential confounds, like 
motivation, is to assess savings, or measuring differences in the rate of relearning. In 
that way, it might be possible to draw conclusions about models and mechanisms 
without altering the properties of the system being studied.  
 
While I believe much has been learned from this study of continuous action learning, 
many questions and issues remain unresolved. For instance, the tests of 
generalization were relatively limited, and tested only the most strict interpretation 
of the action sequencing and chunking theories. How broad is the generalization 
function of this novel continuous-action skill, and what factors must remain 
constant for generalization to be robust? For instance, if a track with vastly different 
states than had been encountered during training were introduced, would 
performance be more affected? If a different context were tested, such as changing 
the background or the visual appearance of the character, but maintaining the same 
relationship between tablet tilt and car dynamics, would performance generalize? 
How would performance change if a different mapping were introduced, and how 
different must the mapping be for behavior to resemble truly naïve performance? 
This study only scratched the surface of studying novel continuous-movement skills, 





Unified theory of motor skill learning 
The studies presented in this dissertation have provided evidence against certain 
assumptions and theories of learning, while demonstrating the plausibility of other 
hypotheses.  With all that has been presented and discussed, it is worth outline a 
general conceptual model for how motor skills are learned, and to clarify how this 
model differs from popular models and assumptions that appear in contemporary 
literature, and what the consequences of this model are. I would like to begin by 
noting that I view skilled behavior as an emergent phenomenon, in the sense that 
there does not necessarily have to be a representation for every aspect of behavior. 
For instance, some characteristics of skilled behavior may be truly stochastic, 
brought about by random noise, or factors that are uncontrolled, like lapses in 
attention. Similarly, the generation of certain characteristics of behavior, such as 
seemingly complex kinematics, might actually have a low-information-content 
representation, much like the generation of fractals is achieved with very simple 
mathematical rules. Therefore, a suitably interesting and useful theory or model to 
“explain” skill learning could be as simple as describing the objects and processes 
needed to engender the behavior, along with the rules or patterns that describe how 
these objects and processes behave and interact.  
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I suggest that some minimum requirements for the ability engage in a skill include 
having a goal, the anatomy and controlled degrees of freedom to plausibly realize 
that goal, the impetus to act in order to obtain that goal, and a means of storing and 
representing a policy that plausibly could lead to attaining that goal. Learning, i.e. 
modifying in some principled way, any of these processes and objects, further 
requires the ability to retain the results of those modifications. This is not to say that 
having these characteristics alone implies that a given system is engaging in skilled 
behavior or skill learning, but rather than any skilled behavior and skill learning will 
have these characteristics at a minimum. Behavior is emergent from these minimum 
objects and processes when policies are executed through the controlled anatomy in 
pursuit of the given goal. Learning is emergent when any of these things are 
modified. This might include identifying a new, better goal, finding a policy that 
results in a better goal, obtaining the goal in a more efficient way, or making the 
tradeoff between cost and reward in the emergence of behavior overall more net 
positive.  
 
In human skill and skill learning, it appears that goals can be concrete, such as a 
visual target, or abstract, such as striking the winning blow in a fencing match. They 
might be identified and selected in a way that requires cognitive processing, or they 
may be cached, or automatic, or even seemingly bestowed by nature, such as 
suckling. They can be subject to learning, with preferences for goals, especially 
relative to other possible goals in the environment, modifiable through experience 
or exogenous factors, like satiation.  
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I will leave considerable latitude in this model as to what may be considered a 
behavior policy. Something as simple as a decision to turn left, or to aim for a 
particular location in pursuit of a target may be enough to count as a policy. 
However, they may also be quite elaborate, including a detailed state-action policy 
map that includes a representation of an action for every possible state. The policy 
may be represented in any number of ways, implicitly, explicitly, requiring cognitive 
planning or being cached, even possibly any combination of these. It might be 
model-based, model-free, or some elaborate mixture. Without taking a strong stance 
on the requirements of the policy, there simply must be one that is sufficient to 
represent and maintain the actions minimally necessary to attain a given goal, and 
to be able to be modified.  
  
Similarly, the impetus to attain a goal may be represented in any number of ways, 
and many studies have identified possible ways in which value, reward, effort, and 
cost are represented231. However, the ability to perceive value in a goal that 
provides the driving force for acting on that goal must exist. Lastly, having the 
anatomy and appropriate control to achieve a goal is both necessary and rather 
obvious. A parrot could hardly be expected to wield an elephant’s trunk skillfully, for 
example. While it may be possible for anatomy to be modifiable through experience, 
in the way athletes may develop more or different compositions of muscles through 
training, this type of modification should most likely not be included as necessary 
for skill learning. Modifiable control, however, may be a critical component of skill 
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learning, as new modes of control may need to be built in order to learn a novel 
behavior in a task, such as how children learn control of their limbs, or elephants 
learn control over their trunks (excluding for developmental reasons).  
 
It is hard to imagine skilled behavior, or skill learning, without these characteristics, 
objects, and processes. There almost certainly is more that is required for learning 
to be considered skill learning. Likewise, there may be behaviors and learning 
mechanisms that have these characteristics which do not count as skilled behavior 
or skill learning. However, delineating these objects and processing represents a 
starting point for better defining what skilled behavior is, what it is not, and how it 
can be learned.  
 
A remaining question is where the divide between learning and skill learning should 
be drawn. For instance, in the Introduction, Chapter 1, I made the claim that skill 
learning is uniquely human (or possibly shared only with a few rare mammalian 
apex predators, such as cetaceans or the great apes). Is this true, and if so, what 
additional processes or characteristics should be added to the list of minimum 
components to better describe skill learning? One possibility, to maintain the 
uniqueness of true skilled behavior from other processes, is that it must initially be 
represented declaratively. This would exclude behaviors like recalibration in 
adaptation, which is implicit and automatic23, and many model-free, or 
reinforcement learning mechanisms, like developing a bias in a choice task on 
account of arbitrarily assigned value pairings. However, would such a definition 
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include developing a cached perturbation compensation strategy, as was shown in 
Chapter 5? Would it exclude to motor acuity learning23, since the improvement in 
performance may have involved the implicit changing of action policies without 







1. Descartes, R. Discourse on Method and the Meditations. (Penguin UK, 2005). 
2. Carter, B. & Charles, N. Human and Other Animals: Critical Perspectives. (Springer, 2011). 
3. Shields, C. Aristotle’s Psychology. in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Zalta, E. 
N.) (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016). 
4. Cohen, N. J. & Squire, L. R. Preserved learning and retention of pattern-analyzing skill in 
amnesia: dissociation of knowing how and knowing that. Science 210, 207–210 
(1980). 
5. Milner, B. Les troubles de la memoire accompagnant des lesions hippocampiques 
bilaterales. in Physiologie de l’hippocampe 257–272 (Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, 1962). 
6. Corkin, S. Acquisition of motor skill after bilateral medial temporal-lobe excision. 
Neuropsychologia 6, 255–265 (1968). 
7. Milner, B., Squire, L. R. & Kandel, E. R. Cognitive Neuroscience and the Study of Memory. 
Neuron 20, 445–468 (1998). 
8. Knowlton, B. J., Mangels, J. A. & Squire, L. R. A Neostriatal Habit Learning System in 
Humans. Science 273, 1399–1402 (1996). 
9. Scoville, W. B. & Milner, B. Loss of Recent Memory After Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions. J. 
Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 20, 11–21 (1957). 
10. Warrington, E. K. & Weiskrantz, L. A study of learning and retention in amnesic patients. 
Neuropsychologia 6, 283–291 (1968). 
11. Warrington, E. K. & Weiskrantz, L. Amnesic syndrome: Consolidation or retrieval? 
Nature 228, 628–630 (1970). 
 179 
12. Warrington, E. K. & Weiskrantz, L. The effect of prior learning on subsequent retention 
in amnesic patients. Neuropsychologia 12, 419–428 (1974). 
13. Packard, M. G., Hirsh, R. & White, N. M. Differential effects of fornix and caudate nucleus 
lesions on two radial maze tasks: evidence for multiple memory systems. J. Neurosci. 9, 
1465–1472 (1989). 
14. Nissen, M. J. & Bullemer, P. Attentional requirements of learning: Evidence from 
performance measures. Cognit. Psychol. 19, 1–32 (1987). 
15. Ap, G. & Jt, M. Cognitive spatial-motor processes. 1. The making of movements at various 
angles from a stimulus direction. Exp. Brain Res. 65, 361–370 (1987). 
16. Fernandez-Ruiz, J., Wong, W., Armstrong, I. T. & Flanagan, J. R. Relation between 
reaction time and reach errors during visuomotor adaptation. Behav. Brain Res. 219, 
(2011). 
17. Berns, G. S. & Sejnowski, T. J. A computational model of how the basal ganglia produce 
sequences. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 10, 108–121 (1998). 
18. Diedrichsen, J. & Kornysheva, K. Motor skill learning between selection and execution. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 19, 227–233 (2015). 
19. Povel, D. J. & Collard, R. Structural factors in patterned finger tapping. Acta Psychol. 
(Amst.) 52, 107–123 (1982). 
20. Allen Newell & Rosenbloom, P. Mechanisms of skill acquisition and the law of practice. 
in Cognitive Skills and their Acquisition (ed. Anderson, J.) 1–51 (Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc., 1981). 
21. Yamaguchi, M. & Logan, G. D. Pushing typists back on the learning curve: Revealing 
chunking in skilled typewriting. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 40, 592–612 
(2014). 
 180 
22. Wong, A. L., Lindquist, M. A., Haith, A. M. & Krakauer, J. W. Explicit knowledge enhances 
motor vigor and performance: motivation versus practice in sequence tasks. J. 
Neurophysiol. 114, 219–232 (2015). 
23. Mazzoni, P. & Krakauer, J. W. An implicit plan overrides an explicit strategy during 
visuomotor adaptation. J. Neurosci. 26, 3642–3645 (2006). 
24. Schwabe, L. & Wolf, O. T. Stress Modulates the Engagement of Multiple Memory Systems 
in Classification Learning. J. Neurosci. 32, 11042–11049 (2012). 
25. Gordon, A. M., Westling, G., Cole, K. J. & Johansson, R. S. Memory representations 
underlying motor commands used during manipulation of common and novel objects. 
J. Neurophysiol. 69, 1789–1796 (1993). 
26. Nissen, M. J., Willingham, D. & Hartman, M. Explicit and implicit remembering: When is 
learning preserved in amnesia? Neuropsychologia 27, 341–352 (1989). 
27. Roediger, H. L. Implicit memory: Retention without remembering. Am. Psychol. 45, 
1043–1056 (1990). 
28. Stanley, J. & Krakauer, J. W. Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. Front. Hum. 
Neurosci. 7, (2013). 
29. Roy, S. & Park, N. W. Dissociating the memory systems mediating complex tool 
knowledge and skills. Neuropsychologia 48, 3026–3036 (2010). 
30. Anguera, J. A., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., Willingham, D. T. & Seidler, R. D. Contributions of 
spatial working memory to visuomotor learning. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 1917–1930 
(2010). 
31. Schacter, D. L. & Cooper, L. A. Implicit and explicit memory for novel visual objects: 
structure and function. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 19, 995–1009 (1993). 
32. Sun, R., Slusarz, P. & Terry, C. The Interaction of the Explicit and the Implicit in Skill 
Learning: A Dual-Process Approach. Psychol. Rev. 112, 159–192 (2005). 
 181 
33. Brown, R. M. & Robertson, E. M. Off-Line Processing: Reciprocal Interactions between 
Declarative and Procedural Memories. J. Neurosci. 27, 10468–10475 (2007). 
34. Keisler, A. & Shadmehr, R. A shared resource between declarative memory and motor 
memory. J. Neurosci. 30, 14817–14823 (2010). 
35. Taylor, J. A., Krakauer, J. W. & Ivry, R. B. Explicit and Implicit Contributions to Learning 
in a Sensorimotor Adaptation Task. J. Neurosci. 34, 3023–3032 (2014). 
36. Kitago, T., Ryan, S. L., Mazzoni, P., Krakauer, J. W. & Haith, A. M. Unlearning versus 
savings in visuomotor adaptation: comparing effects of washout, passage of time, and 
removal of errors on motor memory. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, (2013). 
37. Lackner, J. R. & Lobovits, D. Adaptation to displaced vision: evidence for prolonged 
after-effects. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 29, 65–69 (1977). 
38. Brashers-Krug, T., Shadmehr, R. & Bizzi, E. Consolidation in human motor memory. 
Nature 382, 252–255 (1996). 
39. Kojima, Y., Iwamoto, Y. & Yoshida, K. Memory of learning facilitates saccadic adaptation 
in the monkey. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 24, 7531–7539 (2004). 
40. Krakauer, J. W., Ghez, C. & Ghilardi, M. F. Adaptation to visuomotor transformations: 
consolidation, interference, and forgetting. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 25, 473–478 
(2005). 
41. Zarahn, E., Weston, G. D., Liang, J., Mazzoni, P. & Krakauer, J. W. Explaining savings for 
visuomotor adaptation: linear time-invariant state-space models are not sufficient. J. 
Neurophysiol. 100, 2537–2548 (2008). 
42. Huang, V. S., Haith, A., Mazzoni, P. & Krakauer, J. W. Rethinking motor learning and 
savings in adaptation paradigms: model-free memory  for successful actions combines 
with internal models. Neuron 70, (2011). 
 182 
43. Villalta, J. I., Landi, S. M., Flo, A. & Della-Maggiore, V. Extinction Interferes with the 
Retrieval of Visuomotor Memories Through a Mechanism Involving the Sensorimotor 
Cortex. Cereb. Cortex N. Y. N 1991 (2013). doi:10.1093/cercor/bht346 
44. Morehead, J. R., Qasim, S. E., Crossley, M. J. & Ivry, R. Savings upon Re-Aiming in 
Visuomotor Adaptation. J. Neurosci. 35, 14386–14396 (2015). 
45. Hadjiosif, A. & Smith, M. A. Savings is restricted to the temporally labile component of 
motor adaptation. (2013). 
46. Kleim, J. A. et al. Cortical Synaptogenesis and Motor Map Reorganization Occur during 
Late, But Not Early, Phase of Motor Skill Learning. J. Neurosci. 24, 628–633 (2004). 
47. Wymbs, N. F. & Grafton, S. T. The Human Motor System Supports Sequence-Specific 
Representations over Multiple Training-Dependent Timescales. Cereb. Cortex 25, 
4213–4225 (2015). 
48. Doyon, J., Penhune, V. & Ungerleider, L. G. Distinct contribution of the cortico-striatal 
and cortico-cerebellar systems to motor skill learning. Neuropsychologia 41, 252–262 
(2003). 
49. Telgen, S., Parvin, D. & Diedrichsen, J. Mirror Reversal and Visual Rotation Are Learned 
and Consolidated via Separate Mechanisms: Recalibrating or Learning De Novo? J. 
Neurosci. 34, 13768–13779 (2014). 
50. Marr, D. A theory of cerebellar cortex. J. Physiol. 202, 437–470.1 (1969). 
51. Verwey, W. Concatenating familiar movement sequences: the versatile cognitive 
processor. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 106, 69–95 (2001). 
52. Grol, M. J., de Lange, F. P., Verstraten, F. A. J., Passingham, R. E. & Toni, I. Cerebral 
changes during performance of overlearned arbitrary visuomotor associations. J. 
Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 26, 117–125 (2006). 
 183 
53. Murray, E. A. & Wise, S. P. Role of the hippocampus plus subjacent cortex but not 
amygdala in visuomotor conditional learning in Rhesus monkeys. Behav. Neurosci. 
110, 1261–1270 (1996). 
54. Shmuelof, L., Krakauer, J. W. & Mazzoni, P. How is a motor skill learned? Change and 
invariance at the levels of task success and trajectory control. J. Neurophysiol. 108, 
578–594 (2012). 
55. Wu, H. G., Miyamoto, Y. R., Castro, L. N. G., Ölveczky, B. P. & Smith, M. A. Temporal 
structure of motor variability is dynamically regulated and predicts motor learning 
ability. Nat. Neurosci. 17, 312–321 (2014). 
56. Cohen, R. G. & Sternad, D. Variability In Motor Learning: Relocating, Channeling and 
Reducing Noise. Exp. Brain Res. Exp. Hirnforsch. Exp. Cerebrale 193, 69–83 (2009). 
57. Manley, H., Dayan, P. & Diedrichsen, J. When money is not enough: awareness, success, 
and variability in motor learning. PloS One 9, (2014). 
58. Kawai, R. et al. Motor Cortex Is Required for Learning but Not for Executing a Motor 
Skill. Neuron 86, 800–812 (2015). 
59. Shadmehr, R. Generalization as a Behavioral Window to the Neural Mechanisms of 
Learning Internal Models. Hum. Mov. Sci. 23, 543–568 (2004). 
60. Braun, D. A., Aertsen, A., Wolpert, D. M. & Mehring, C. Motor task variation induces 
structural learning. Curr. Biol. CB 19, 352–357 (2009). 
61. Goodbody, S. J. & Wolpert, D. M. Temporal and Amplitude Generalization in Motor 
Learning. J. Neurophysiol. 79, 1825–1838 (1998). 
62. Berniker, M., Mirzaei, H. & Kording, K. P. The effects of training breadth on motor 
generalization. J. Neurophysiol. 112, 2791–2798 (2014). 
 184 
63. Daw, N. D., Niv, Y. & Dayan, P. Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal and 
dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711 
(2005). 
64. Schwitzgebel, E. Introspection. in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Zalta, E. 
N.) (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016). 
65. Snoddy, G. s. Learning and stability: a psychophysiological analysis of a case of motor 
learning with clinical applications. J. Appl. Psychol. 10, 1–36 (1926). 
66. Shadmehr, R. & Mussa-Ivaldi, F. A. Adaptive representation of dynamics during learning 
of a motor task. J. Neurosci. 14, 3208–3224 (1994). 
67. Krakauer, J. W., Ghilardi, M.-F. & Ghez, C. Independent learning of internal models for 
kinematic and dynamic control of reaching. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 1026–1031 (1999). 
68. Criscimagna-Hemminger, S. E. & Shadmehr, R. Consolidation Patterns of Human Motor 
Memory. J. Neurosci. 28, 9610–9618 (2008). 
69. Krakauer, J. W. & Shadmehr, R. Consolidation of motor memory. Trends Neurosci. 29, 
(2006). 
70. Herzfeld, D. J., Vaswani, P. A., Marko, M. K. & Shadmehr, R. A memory of errors in 
sensorimotor learning. Science 345, 1349–1353 (2014). 
71. Huberdeau, D. M., Haith, A. M. & Krakauer, J. W. Formation of a long-term memory for 
visuomotor adaptation following only a few trials of practice. J. Neurophysiol. 114, 
969–977 (2015). 
72. Haith, A. M., Huberdeau, D. M. & Krakauer, J. W. The Influence of Movement Preparation 
Time on the Expression of Visuomotor Learning and Savings. J. Neurosci. 35, 5109–
5117 (2015). 
73. Taylor, J. A. & Thoroughman, K. A. Motor Adaptation Scaled by the Difficulty of a 
Secondary Cognitive Task. PLoS ONE 3, e2485 (2008). 
 185 
74. Benson, B. L., Anguera, J. A. & Seidler, R. D. A spatial explicit strategy reduces error but 
interferes with sensorimotor adaptation. J. Neurophysiol. 105, 2843–2851 (2011). 
75. Decker, J. H., Otto, A. R., Daw, N. D. & Hartley, C. A. From Creatures of Habit to Goal-
Directed Learners: Tracking the Developmental Emergence of Model-Based 
Reinforcement Learning. Psychol. Sci. 27, 848–858 (2016). 
76. Franklin, D. W. & Wolpert, D. M. Specificity of reflex adaptation for task-relevant 
variability. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 28, 14165–14175 (2008). 
77. Krakauer, J. W., Pine, Z. M., Ghilardi, M.-F. & Ghez, C. Learning of visuomotor 
transformations for vectorial planning of reaching trajectories. J. Neurosci. 20, 8916–
8924 (2000). 
78. Kording, K. P., Tenenbaum, J. B. & Shadmehr, R. The dynamics of memory as a 
consequence of optimal adaptation to a changing body. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 779–786 
(2007). 
79. van Beers, R. J. Motor learning is optimally tuned to the properties of motor noise. 
Neuron 63, 406–417 (2009). 
80. Redding, G. M. & Wallace, B. First-trial adaptation to prism exposure. J. Mot. Behav. 35, 
229–245 (2003). 
81. Keisler, A. & Shadmehr, R. A shared resource between declarative memory and motor 
memory. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 30, 14817–14823 (2010). 
82. Taylor, J. A. & Ivry, R. B. Flexible cognitive strategies during motor learning. PLoS 
Comput. Biol. 7, e1001096 (2011). 
83. Taylor, J. A., Krakauer, J. W. & Ivry, R. B. Explicit and implicit contributions to learning in 
a sensorimotor adaptation task. J. Neurosci. 34, 3023–3032 (2014). 
 186 
84. Krakauer, J. W., Ghez, C. & Ghilardi, M. F. Adaptation to visuomotor transformations: 
consolidation, interference, and forgetting. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 25, 473–478 
(2005). 
85. Xivry, J.-J. O. de & Lefévre, P. Formation of model-free motor memories during motor 
adaptation depends on perturbation schedule. J. Neurophysiol. jn.00673.2014 (2015). 
doi:10.1152/jn.00673.2014 
86. Kobak, D. & Mehring, C. Adaptation paths to novel motor tasks are shaped by prior 
structure learning. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 32, 9898–9908 (2012). 
87. Yousif, N. & Diedrichsen, J. Structural learning in feedforward and feedback control. J. 
Neurophysiol. 108, 2373–2382 (2012). 
88. Gonzalez Castro, L. N., Hadjiosif, A. M., Hemphill, M. A. & Smith, M. A. Environmental 
consistency determines the rate of motor adaptation. Curr. Biol. CB 24, 1050–1061 
(2014). 
89. Medina, J. F., Garcia, K. S. & Mauk, M. D. A Mechanism for Savings in the Cerebellum. J. 
Neurosci. 21, 4081–4089 (2001). 
90. Smith, M. A., Ghazizadeh, A. & Shadmehr, R. Interacting adaptive processes with 
different timescales underlie short-term motor learning. PLoS Biol. 4, (2006). 
91. Berniker, M. & Kording, K. Estimating the sources of motor errors for adaptation and 
generalization. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 1454–1461 (2008). 
92. Ajemian, R., D’Ausilio, A., Moorman, H. & Bizzi, E. Why professional athletes need a 
prolonged period of warm-up and other peculiarities of human motor learning. J. Mot. 
Behav. 42, 381–388 (2010). 
93. Haith, A. M., Huberdeau, D. M. & Krakauer, J. W. The influence of movement preparation 
time on the expression of visuomotor learning and savings. J. Neurosci. In Press, 
(2015). 
 187 
94. Huberdeau, D. M., Krakauer, J. W. & Haith, A. M. Dual-process decomposition in human 
sensorimotor adaptation. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 33, (2015). 
95. Morehead, R., Crossley, M. & Ivry. Savings upon re-aiming in visuomotor adaptation. 
Proc Transl. Comput. Mot. Control San Diego, CA, (2013). 
96. Joiner, W. M. & Smith, M. A. Long-term retention explained by a model of short-term 
learning in the adaptive control of reaching. J. Neurophysiol. 100, 2948–2955 (2008). 
97. Criscimagna-Hemminger, S. E. & Shadmehr, R. Consolidation patterns of human motor 
memory. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 28, 9610–9618 (2008). 
98. Marko, M. K., Haith, A. M., Harran, M. D. & Shadmehr, R. Sensitivity to prediction error in 
reach adaptation. J. Neurophysiol. 108, 1752–1763 (2012). 
99. Semrau, J. A., Daitch, A. L. & Thoroughman, K. A. Environmental experience within and 
across testing days determines the strength of human visuomotor adaptation. Exp. 
Brain Res. 216, 409–418 (2012). 
100. van der Kooij, K., Brenner, E., van Beers, R. J. & Smeets, J. B. J. Visuomotor Adaptation: 
How Forgetting Keeps Us Conservative. PLoS ONE 10, (2015). 
101. Vaswani, P. A. et al. Persistent Residual Errors in Motor Adaptation Tasks: Reversion to 
Baseline and Exploratory Escape. J. Neurosci. 35, 6969–6977 (2015). 
102. Wilson, R. C., Nassar, M. R. & Gold, J. I. A Mixture of Delta-Rules Approximation to 
Bayesian Inference in Change-Point Problems. PLoS Comput. Biol. 9, (2013). 
103. Pekny, S. E., Criscimagna-Hemminger, S. E. & Shadmehr, R. Protection and expression 
of human motor memories. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 31, 13829–13839 (2011). 
104. Stern, Y., Mayeux, R., Hermann, A. & Rosen, J. Prism adaptation in Parkinson’s disease. 
J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 51, 1584–1587 (1988). 
105. Gutierrez-Garralda, J. M. et al. The effect of Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s 
disease on human visuomotor learning. Eur. J. Neurosci. 38, 2933–2940 (2013). 
 188 
106. Leow, L.-A., de Rugy, A., Loftus, A. M. & Hammond, G. Different mechanisms 
contributing to savings and anterograde interference are impaired in Parkinson’s 
disease. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, (2013). 
107. Mongeon, D., Blanchet, P. & Messier, J. Impact of Parkinson’s disease and dopaminergic 
medication on adaptation to explicit and implicit visuomotor perturbations. Brain 
Cogn. 81, 271–282 (2013). 
108. Marinelli, L. et al. Learning and consolidation of visuo-motor adaptation in Parkinson’s 
disease. Parkinsonism Relat. Disord. 15, 6–11 (2009). 
109. Bédard, P. & Sanes, J. N. Basal ganglia-dependent processes in recalling learned visual-
motor adaptations. Exp. Brain Res. 209, 385–393 (2011). 
110. Chiaravalloti, N. D. et al. The source of the memory impairment in Parkinson’s disease: 
Acquisition versus retrieval. Mov. Disord. 29, 765–771 (2014). 
111. Costa, A. et al. Free and Cued Recall Memory in Parkinson’s Disease Associated with 
Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment. PLoS ONE 9, (2014). 
112. Eichenbaum, H. A cortical–hippocampal system for declarative memory. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 1, 41–50 (2000). 
113. Shmuelof, L., Krakauer, J. W. & Mazzoni, P. How is a motor skill learned? Change and 
invariance at the levels of task success and trajectory control. J. Neurophysiol. 108, 
578–594 (2012). 
114. Karni, A. et al. The acquisition of skilled motor performance: fast and slow experience-
driven changes in primary motor cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 95, 861–868 
(1998). 
115. Reis, J. et al. Noninvasive cortical stimulation enhances motor skill acquisition over 
multiple days through an effect on consolidation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 
1590–1595 (2009). 
 189 
116. Sampaio-Baptista, C. et al. Gray matter volume is associated with rate of subsequent 
skill learning after a long term training intervention. NeuroImage 96, 158–166 (2014). 
117. Fitts, Paul M. Perceptual Motor Skill Learning. in Categories of Human Learning (ed. 
Melton, A. W.) 244–83 (Academic Press Inc., 1964). 
118. Anderson, J. Acquisition of cognitive skill. Psychol. Rev. 89, (1982). 
119. Flanagan, J. R. & Beltzner, M. A. Independence of perceptual and sensorimotor 
predictions in the size–weight illusion. Nat. Neurosci. 3, 737–741 (2000). 
120. Flanagan, J. R., Bittner, J. P. & Johansson, R. S. Experience Can Change Distinct Size-
Weight Priors Engaged in Lifting Objects and Judging their Weights. Curr. Biol. 18, 
1742–1747 (2008). 
121. Martin, T. A., Keating, J. G., Goodkin, H. P., Bastian, A. J. & Thach, W. T. Throwing while 
looking through prisms. Brain 119, 1199–1211 (1996). 
122. Maschke, M., Gomez, C. M., Ebner, T. J. & Konczak, J. Hereditary Cerebellar Ataxia 
Progressively Impairs Force Adaptation During Goal-Directed Arm Movements. J. 
Neurophysiol. 91, 230–238 (2004). 
123. Smith, M. A. & Shadmehr, R. Intact Ability to Learn Internal Models of Arm Dynamics in 
Huntington’s Disease But Not Cerebellar Degeneration. J. Neurophysiol. 93, 2809–2821 
(2005). 
124. Chen, H., Hua, S. E., Smith, M. A., Lenz, F. A. & Shadmehr, R. Effects of Human Cerebellar 
Thalamus Disruption on Adaptive Control of Reaching. Cereb. Cortex N. Y. N 1991 16, 
1462–1473 (2006). 
125. Tseng, Y., Diedrichsen, J., Krakauer, J. W., Shadmehr, R. & Bastian, A. J. Sensory 
prediction errors drive cerebellum-dependent adaptation of reaching. J. Neurophysiol. 
98, 54–62 (2007). 
 190 
126. Rabe, K. et al. Adaptation to Visuomotor Rotation and Force Field Perturbation Is 
Correlated to Different Brain Areas in Patients With Cerebellar Degeneration. J. 
Neurophysiol. 101, 1961–1971 (2009). 
127. Rabe, K. et al. Size–Weight Illusion, Anticipation, and Adaptation of Fingertip Forces in 
Patients With Cerebellar Degeneration. J. Neurophysiol. 101, 569–579 (2009). 
128. Synofzik, Matthis, Lindner, Axel & Thier, P. The cerebellum updates predictions about 
the visual consequences of one’s behavior. Curr. Biol. 18, 814–8 (2008). 
129. Taylor, J. A., Klemfuss, N. M. & Ivry, R. B. An Explicit Strategy Prevails When the 
Cerebellum Fails to Compute Movement Errors. Cerebellum Lond. Engl. 9, 580–586 
(2010). 
130. Izawa, J. & Shadmehr, R. Learning from Sensory and Reward Prediction Errors during 
Motor Adaptation. PLoS Comput. Biol. 7, (2011). 
131. Izawa, J., Criscimagna-Hemminger, S. E. & Shadmehr, R. Cerebellar contributions to 
reach adaptation and learning sensory consequences of action. J. Neurosci. 32, 4230–
4239 (2012). 
132. Wolpert, D. M. & Miall, R. C. Forward Models for Physiological Motor Control. Neural 
Netw. Off. J. Int. Neural Netw. Soc. 9, 1265–1279 (1996). 
133. Bastian, A. J. Learning to predict the future: the cerebellum adapts feedforward 
movement control. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 16, 645–649 (2006). 
134. Haith, A. M. & Krakauer, J. W. Model-Based and Model-Free Mechanisms of Human 
Motor Learning. Adv. Exp. Med. Biol. 782, 1–21 (2013). 
135. Saijo, N. & Gomi, H. Multiple Motor Learning Strategies in Visuomotor Rotation. PLoS 
ONE 5, (2010). 
 191 
136. Valls-Solé, J., Valldeoriola, F., Molinuevo, J. L., Cossu, G. & Nobbe, F. Prepulse 
modulation of the startle reaction and the blink reflex in normal human subjects. Exp. 
Brain Res. 129, 49–56 (1999). 
137. Wright, Z. A., Rogers, M. W., MacKinnon, C. D. & Patton, J. L. Startle stimuli reduce the 
internal model control in discrete movements. Conf. Proc. Annu. Int. Conf. IEEE Eng. 
Med. Biol. Soc. IEEE Eng. Med. Biol. Soc. Annu. Conf. 2009, 4590–4594 (2009). 
138. Wright, Z., Patton, J. L. & Ravichandran, V. Startle reduces recall of a recently learned 
internal model. IEEE Int. Conf. Rehabil. Robot. Proc. 2011, 5975376 (2011). 
139. Howard, I. S., Franklin, D. W., Ingram, J. N. & Wolpert, D. M. Gone in 0.6 seconds: The 
encoding of motor memories depends on recent sensorimotor states. J. Neurosci. Off. J. 
Soc. Neurosci. 32, 12756–12768 (2012). 
140. Stafford, T. et al. A Novel Task for the Investigation of Action Acquisition. PLoS ONE 7, 
(2012). 
141. Ghez, C. et al. Discrete and continuous planning of hand movements and isometric 
force trajectories. Exp. Brain Res. 115, 217–233 (1997). 
142. Pruszynski, J. A., Kurtzer, I. & Scott, S. H. Rapid Motor Responses Are Appropriately 
Tuned to the Metrics of a Visuospatial Task. J. Neurophysiol. 100, 224–238 (2008). 
143. Day, B. L. & Lyon, I. N. Voluntary modification of automatic arm movements evoked by 
motion of a visual target. Exp. Brain Res. 130, 159–168 (2000). 
144. van Sonderen, J. F., Denier van der Gon, J. J. & Gielen, C. C. Conditions determining early 
modification of motor programmes in response to changes in target location. Exp. 
Brain Res. 71, 320–328 (1988). 
145. Prablanc, C., Desmurget, M. & Gréa, H. Neural control of on-line guidance of hand 
reaching movements. Prog. Brain Res. 142, 155–170 (2003). 
 192 
146. Perfiliev, S., Isa, T., Johnels, B., Steg, G. & Wessberg, J. Reflexive limb selection and 
control of reach direction to moving targets in cats, monkeys, and humans. J. 
Neurophysiol. 104, 2423–2432 (2010). 
147. Unsworth, N., Spillers, G. J., Brewer, G. A. & McMillan, B. Attention control and the 
antisaccade task: a response time distribution analysis. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 137, 90–
100 (2011). 
148. Squire, L. R. Declarative and nondeclarative memory: multiple brain systems 
supporting learning and memory. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 4, 232–243 (1992). 
149. Dayan, P. Goal-directed control and its antipodes. Neural Netw. 22, 213–219 (2009). 
150. Knopman, D. & Nissen, M. J. Procedural learning is impaired in Huntington’s disease: 
evidence from the serial reaction time task. Neuropsychologia 29, 245–254 (1991). 
151. Robertson, E. M. The Serial Reaction Time Task: Implicit Motor Skill Learning? J. 
Neurosci. 27, 10073–10075 (2007). 
152. Jackson, G. M., Jackson, S. R., Harrison, J., Henderson, L. & Kennard, C. Serial reaction 
time learning and Parkinson’s disease: evidence for a procedural learning deficit. 
Neuropsychologia 33, 577–593 (1995). 
153. Yang, Y. & Lisberger, S. G. Role of plasticity at different sites across the time course of 
cerebellar motor learning. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 34, 7077–7090 (2014). 
154. Hikosaka, O. et al. Long-term retention of motor skill in macaque monkeys and 
humans. Exp. Brain Res. 147, 494–504 (2002). 
155. Nguyen-Vu, T. D. B. et al. Cerebellar Purkinje cell activity drives motor learning. Nat. 
Neurosci. 16, 1734–1736 (2013). 
156. Huang, V. S., Haith, A., Mazzoni, P. & Krakauer, J. W. Rethinking motor learning and 
savings in adaptation paradigms: model-free memory  for successful actions combines 
with internal models. Neuron 70, (2011). 
 193 
157. Turnham, E. J. A., Braun, D. A. & Wolpert, D. M. Facilitation of learning induced by both 
random and gradual visuomotor task variation. J. Neurophysiol. 107, 1111–1122 
(2012). 
158. Leow, L.-A., de Rugy, A., Marinovic, W., Riek, S. & Carroll, T. J. Savings for visuomotor 
adaptation require prior history of error, not prior repetition of successful actions. J. 
Neurophysiol. 116, 1603–1614 (2016). 
159. McDougle, S. D., Ivry, R. B. & Taylor, J. A. Taking Aim at the Cognitive Side of Learning 
in Sensorimotor Adaptation Tasks. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 535–544 (2016). 
160. Anguera, J. A. et al. The effects of working memory resource depletion and training on 
sensorimotor adaptation. Behav. Brain Res. 228, 107–115 (2012). 
161. H, R. & SINGER, G. SENSORY ADAPTATION AND BEHAVIORAL COMPENSATION WITH 
SPATIALLY TRANSFORMED VISION AND HEARING. Psychol. Bull. 67, 307–322 (1967). 
162. Plihal, W. & Born, J. Effects of Early and Late Nocturnal Sleep on Declarative and 
Procedural Memory. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 534–547 (1997). 
163. Karpicke, J. D. & Roediger, H. L. The Critical Importance of Retrieval for Learning. 
Science 319, 966–968 (2008). 
164. James, W. Habit. (H. Holt, 1890). 
165. Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A. G. Introduction to reinforcement learning. (MIT Press, 1998). 
166. Fitts, Paul M. Perceptual-Motor Skill Learning. Categ. Hum. Learn. 243–85 (1964). 
167. Eldridge, L. L., Masterman, D. & Knowlton, B. J. Intact implicit habit learning in 
Alzheimer’s disease. Behav. Neurosci. 116, 722–726 (2002). 
168. Stanley, J. & Krakauer, J. W. Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. Front. Hum. 
Neurosci. 7, 503 (2013). 
 194 
169. Frederick, S. Automated choice heuristics. in Heuristics and biases: The psychology of 
intuitive judgment (eds. Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. & Kahneman, D.) 548–558 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
170. Bryan, W. L. & Harter, N. Studies in the physiology and psychology of the telegraphic 
language. Psychol. Rev. 4, 27–53 (1897). 
171. Kimble, G. A. & Perlmuter, L. C. The problem of volition. Psychol. Rev. 77, 361–384 
(1970). 
172. Martel, G. et al. Dynamic interplays between memory systems depend on practice: the 
hippocampus is not always the first to provide solution. Neuroscience 150, 743–753 
(2007). 
173. Bourne, L. E. Human conceptual behavior. (Allyn an Bacon, 1966). 
174. Li, J. X., Medina, J. F., Frank, L. M. & Lisberger, S. G. Acquisition of neural learning in 
cerebellum and cerebral cortex for smooth pursuit eye movements. J. Neurosci. Off. J. 
Soc. Neurosci. 31, 12716–12726 (2011). 
175. Diedrichsen, J., Verstynen, T., Lehman, S. L. & Ivry, R. B. Cerebellar Involvement in 
Anticipating the Consequences of Self-Produced Actions During Bimanual Movements. 
J. Neurophysiol. 93, 801–812 (2005). 
176. Butcher, P. et al. Cerebellar degeneration disrupts adaptation and strategy use in 
sensorimotor learning. Proc Transl. Comput. Mot. Control San Diego, CA, (2014). 
177. Xu-Wilson, M., Chen-Harris, H., Zee, D. S. & Shadmehr, R. Cerebellar contributions to 
adaptive control of saccades in humans. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 29, 12930–
12939 (2009). 
178. Ito, M. Control of mental activities by internal models in the cerebellum. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 9, 304–313 (2008). 
 195 
179. Berry, D. C. & Broadbent, D. E. Interactive tasks and the implicit-explicit distinction. Br. 
J. Psychol. 79, 251–272 (1988). 
180. Fitts, P. & Posner, M. Human performance. 
181. Schacter, D. L., Wang, P. L., Tulving, E. & Freedman, M. Functional retrograde amnesia: 
A quantitative case study. Neuropsychologia 20, 523–532 (1982). 
182. Squire, L. R. & Zola, S. M. Episodic memory, semantic memory, and amnesia. 
Hippocampus 8, 205–211 (1998). 
183. Tulving, E. Memory and consciousness. Can. Psychol. Can. 26, 1–12 (1985). 
184. Spencer, R. M. C., Zelaznik, H. N., Diedrichsen, J. & Ivry, R. B. Disrupted Timing of 
Discontinuous But Not Continuous Movements by Cerebellar Lesions. Science 300, 
1437–1439 (2003). 
185. Morasso, P., Ivaldi, F. A. M. & Ruggiero, C. How a discontinuous mechanism can 
produce continuous patterns in trajectory formation and handwriting. Acta Psychol. 
(Amst.) 54, 83–98 (1983). 
186. Bottaro, A., Yasutake, Y., Nomura, T., Casadio, M. & Morasso, P. Bounded stability of the 
quiet standing posture: An intermittent control model. Hum. Mov. Sci. 27, 473–495 
(2008). 
187. Mueller, H. & Sternard, D. Decomposition of Variability in the Execution of Goal-
Oriented Tasks: Three Components of Skill Improvement. (2004). Available at: 
http://psycnet.apa.org/?&fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/0096-1523.30.1.212. 
(Accessed: 18th June 2016) 
188. Guo, J.-Z. et al. Cortex commands the performance of skilled movement. eLife 4, 
e10774 (2015). 
 196 
189. Ranganathan, R., Wieser, J., Mosier, K. M., Mussa-Ivaldi, F. A. & Scheidt, R. A. Learning 
redundant motor tasks with and without overlapping dimensions: facilitation and 
interference effects. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 34, 8289–8299 (2014). 
190. Davids, K., Bennett, S. & Newell, K. M. Movement System Variability. (Human Kinetics, 
2006). 
191. Eliassen, J. C., Souza, T. & Sanes, J. N. Experience-Dependent Activation Patterns in 
Human Brain during Visual-Motor Associative Learning. J. Neurosci. 23, 10540–10547 
(2003). 
192. Willingham, D. B., Salidis, J. & Gabrieli, J. D. E. Direct Comparison of Neural Systems 
Mediating Conscious and Unconscious Skill Learning. J. Neurophysiol. 88, 1451–1460 
(2002). 
193. Karni, A. et al. The acquisition of skilled motor performance: Fast and slow  
experience-driven changes in primary motor cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 95, 
861–868 (1998). 
194. Ramkumar, P. et al. Chunking as the result of an efficiency computation trade-off. Nat. 
Commun. 7, 12176 (2016). 
195. David A. Rosenbaum, Richard A. Carlson & Gilmore,  and R. O. Acquisition of 
Intellectual and Perceptual-Motor Skills. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 52, 453–470 (2001). 
196. Korman, M., Raz, N., Flash, T. & Karni, A. Multiple shifts in the representation of a 
motor sequence during the acquisition of skilled performance. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. 
S. A. 100, 12492–12497 (2003). 
197. Kawato, M. Internal models for motor control and trajectory planning. Curr. Opin. 
Neurobiol. 9, 718–727 (1999). 
198. Kobak, D. & Mehring, C. Adaptation Paths to Novel Motor Tasks Are Shaped by Prior 
Structure Learning. J. Neurosci. 32, 9898–9908 (2012). 
 197 
199. Thoroughman, Kurt A. & Shadmehr, R. Learning of action through adaptive 
combinations of motor primitives. Nature 407, 742–7 (2000). 
200. Holm, S. A Simple Sequentially Rejective Multiple Test Procedure. Scand. J. Stat. 6, 65–
70 (1979). 
201. Csibra, G. Teachers in the wild. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 95–96 (2007). 
202. Caro, T. M. & Hauser, M. D. Is there teaching in nonhuman animals? Q. Rev. Biol. 67, 
151–174 (1992). 
203. Daw, N. D., Niv, Y. & Dayan, P. Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal and 
dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711 
(2005). 
204. Mazzoni, P., Hristova, A. & Krakauer, J. W. Why Don’t We Move Faster? Parkinson’s 
Disease, Movement Vigor, and Implicit Motivation. J. Neurosci. 27, 7105–7116 (2007). 
205. Tanaka, H., Krakauer, J. W. & Qian, N. An Optimization Principle for Determining 
Movement Duration. J. Neurophysiol. 95, 3875–3886 (2006). 
206. Niv, Y., Joel, D. & Dayan, P. A normative perspective on motivation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 
375–381 (2006). 
207. Treisman, A. & Geffen, G. Selective attention: Perception or response? Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 
19, 1–17 (1967). 
208. Nashed, J. Y., Crevecoeur, F. & Scott, S. H. Rapid Online Selection between Multiple 
Motor Plans. J. Neurosci. 34, 1769–1780 (2014). 
209. Todorov, E. & Jordan, M. I. Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination. 
Nat. Neurosci. 5, 1226–1235 (2002). 
210. Hadjiosif, A. M. & Smith, M. A. Flexible Control of Safety Margins for Action Based on 
Environmental Variability. J. Neurosci. Off. J. Soc. Neurosci. 35, 9106–9121 (2015). 
 198 
211. Dickinson, A. Actions and Habits: The Development of Behavioural Autonomy. Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 308, 67–78 (1985). 
212. Dolan, R. J. & Dayan, P. Goals and Habits in the Brain. Neuron 80, 312–325 (2013). 
213. Cushman, F. & Morris, A. Habitual control of goal selection in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci. 201506367 (2015). doi:10.1073/pnas.1506367112 
214. Taylor, J. A. & Ivry, R. B. The role of strategies in motor learning. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 
1251, 1–12 (2012). 
215. Krakauer, J. W., Carmichael, S. T., Corbett, D. & Wittenberg, G. F. Getting 
Neurorehabilitation Right: What Can Be Learned From Animal Models? Neurorehabil. 
Neural Repair 26, 923–931 (2012). 
216. Huberdeau, D. M., Krakauer, J. W. & Haith, A. M. Dual-process decomposition in human 
sensorimotor adaptation. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 33, 71–77 (2015). 
217. Hadjiosif, A. M. & Smith, M. A. Savings is restricted to the temporally labile component 
of motor adaptation. Proc Transl. Comput. Mot. Control San Diego, CA, (2013). 
218. Kahneman, D. Thinking, fast and slow. (Macmillan, 2011). 
219. Frederick, S. Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making. J. Econ. Perspect. 19, 25–42 
(2005). 
220. Stanovich, K. E. & West, R. F. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the 
rationality debate? Behav. Brain Sci. 23, 645-665-726 (2000). 
221. Taylor, J. A. & Thoroughman, K. A. Divided attention impairs human motor adaptation 
but not feedback control. J. Neurophysiol. 98, 317–326 (2007). 
222. Hackley, S. A. The speeding of voluntary reaction by a warning signal. Psychophysiology 
46, 225–233 (2009). 
223. Hackley, S. A. & Valle-Inclán, F. Which stages of processing are speeded by a warning 
signal? Biol. Psychol. 64, 27–45 (2003). 
 199 
224. Imamizu, H. et al. Human cerebellar activity reflecting an acquired internal model of a 
new tool. Nature 403, 192–195 (2000). 
225. Wong, A. L., Haith, A. M. & Krakauer, J. W. Motor Planning. Neurosci. Rev. J. Bringing 
Neurobiol. Neurol. Psychiatry 21, 385–398 (2015). 
226. Squire, L. R. & Zola, S. M. Structure and function of declarative and nondeclarative 
memory systems. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 93, 13515–13522 (1996). 
227. Tulving, E. How many memory systems are there? Am. Psychol. 40, 385–398 (1985). 
228. Diedrichsen, Jorn. Motor skill learning between selection and execution. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. 19, (2015). 
229. Shadmehr, R., Smith, M. A. & Krakauer, J. W. Error correction, sensory prediction, and 
adaptation in motor control. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 33, (2010). 
230. Ericsson, A. & Pool, R. Peak: Secrets from the New Science of Expertise. (MARINER 
BOOKS, 2016). 
231. Shadmehr, R., Huang, H. J. & Ahmed, A. A. A Representation of Effort in Decision-






Ph.D. Candidate, Biomedical Engineering   
The Johns Hopkins University  
Baltimore, MD  
Aug. 2010 – Present  
 
B.S., Biomedical Engineering   
The Johns Hopkins University  
Baltimore, MD  
Sept. 2006 – May, 2010  
Work Experience 
• Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab 
Columbia, MD 
National Security Technology Department, Biomedicine 
Intern 
I implemented a real-time signal-processing algorithm for a 
robotic upper- limb prosthesis that was developed for the DARPA 
Revolutionizing Prosthetics program.  
 
 06/2009 – 08/2009 
• Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab 
Columbia, MD 
National Security Technology Department, Biomedicine 
Intern 
I implemented data logging and experiment-control software for a 
model-based design tool that allowed real-time simulation of a 
robotic arm. 
 
 06/2008 – 08/2008 
• American Red Cross 
Washington, DC 
Biomedical Services Division, Presidential Intern 
I presented findings and recommendations from a Six-Sigma study 
of internal document control processes. 
 
 06/2007 – 08/2007 
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• National Institutes of Health 
Bethesda, MD 
PET Radiopharmaceutical Sciences, Intramural Research 
Intern 
I tested micro-reactor designs and compared their synthesis yields 
to conventional protocols. 
 06/2006 – 08/2006 
Refereed Publications 
• Huberdeau D. M., Haith A.M., Krakauer J.W.  Formation of a 
long-term motor memory after only a few trials of practice. J. 
Neurophysiol. 114(2):969-77, 2015. 
• Haith, A. M., Huberdeau, D. M., Krakauer, J. W.  The 
influence of movement preparation time on the expression 
of visuomotor learning and savings. J. Neurosci. 
35(13):5109-5117, 2015. 
• Haith A.M., Huberdeau D.M., Krakauer J.W.  Hedging your 
bets: Intermediate movements as optimal behavior in the 
context of an incomplete decision.  PLoS Comput. Biol. 11(3): 
e1004171, 2015. 
• Huberdeau D.M., Walker H., Huang H., Montgomery E., 
Sarma SV.  Analysis of local field potential signals: a systems 
approach. Conf Proc IEEE Eng Med Biol Soc. 2011:814-7, 
2011. 
• Smith R.J., Huberdeau D.M., Tenore F., Thakor N.V.  Real-
Time Myoelectric Decoding of Individual Finger Movements 
for a Virtual Target Task. Conf Proc IEEE Eng Med Biol Soc. 
2009:2376-79, 2009. 
• Smith R.J., Tenore F., Huberdeau D.M., Thakor N.V.  
Continuous Decoding of Finger Position from Surface EMG 
Signals for Control of Powered Prostheses. Conf Proc IEEE 
Eng Med Biol Soc. 2008:197-200, 2008. 
   
Submitted or In-preparation 
• Huberdeau D.M., Haith A.M., Krakauer J.W.  Dissecting 
learning and generalization of a continuous motor skill with 
a novel video game. In preparation. 
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• Huberdeau D.M. Krakauer J.W., Haith A.M. Practice induces 
a qualitative change in the memory supporting savings for 
visuomotor learning. In preparation. 
 
Reviews 
• Huberdeau D.M., Krakauer J.W., Haith A.M.  Dual processes 
and decomposition in human sensorimotor adaptation. Curr 
Opin in Neurobiol. 33:71-77, 2015. 
   
 
Patent Submissions 
• Hoi, Jennifer; Luong, Eli; Rupprecht, Laura; Medina, 
Christine; Huberdeau, David; Chao, Joe; Harran, Michelle; 
Acharya, Soumyadipta.  2008.  Surgical Metal Detection 
Apparatus and Methods.  Patent Application 20080294036, 
filed Nov. 27, 2008.  Patent Pending. 
   
Conferences & Presentations 
• Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting.  Chicago, IL.  
October 2015:  Proceduralization of declarative knowledge in 
a motor adaptation task following prolonged training.  Poster 
presentation. 
• Neural Control of Movement Conference.  Charleston, SC.  
April 2015:  The relationship between task specificity and 
training duration for a novel video gaming skill.  Poster 
presentation. 
• Johns Hopkins University Sensory Motor Research Day. 
Baltimore, MD. December 2014: The curse of task-specificity 
in motor skill learning. Podium presentation. 
• Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting.  Washington, DC.  
November 2014:  Long-term learning in adaptation 
paradigms: Cognitive versus motor memory.  Poster 
presentation. 
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• Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting. Washington, DC. 
November 2014:  The curse of task specificity: Skill becomes 
more task specific with practice.  Poster presentation. 
• Motor Control and Rehabilitation: A Collaborative Johns 
Hopkins University - University College London Meeting. 
Baltimore, MD. September 2014: Procedural Versus 
Declarative Motor Memory. Podium presentation. 
• Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting.  San Diego, CA.  
November 2013:  Model-free reinforcement of learned 
movements is invariant to exposure duration.  Poster 
presentation. 
• Society for Neuroscience Annual Meeting.  New Orleans, LA.  
October 2012:  Continuous and discrete re-planning of 
reaching movements following abrupt changes to task goals.  
Poster presentation. 
• Neural Control of Movement Conference.  Venice, Italy.  April 
2012:  Behavioral insights into neural mechanisms of 
movement planning: Continuous and abrupt updating of a 
motor plan following changes in task goals.  Poster 
presentation. 
• Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society Annual 
Conference (EMBC).  Boston, MA. August 2011:  Analysis of 
Local Field Potential Signals: A Systems Approach.  Podium 
presentation. 
• Biomedical Engineering Society Annual Meeting.  Pittsburgh, 
PA.  October 2009: Independent Linear Classification of 
Forearm Myoelectric Signals for the Control of a Multi-
Fingered Prosthetic Hand with Reduced System Training 
Requirements.  Poster presentation. 
• Decisions and Controls Conference.  Cancun, Mexico.  
December 2008:  Real-time Myoelectric Signal Processing for 
Control of Dexterous Virtual Prostheses.  Workshop 
presentation. 
• Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society Annual 
Conference (EMBC).  Vancouver, BC.  August 2008:  
Continuous Decoding of Finger Positions from Surface EMG 
Signals for the Control of Powered Prostheses.  Workshop 
presentation. 
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• Northeast Bioengineering Conference. Providence, RI.  April 
2008:  Real-time Finger Tracking to Improve Upper-Limb 
Prosthetics Control.  Podium presentation. 
Research Experience 
• Brain, Learning, Animation, and Movement (BLAM) Lab  
PI: John W. Krakauer 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
I studied human cognition, movement, and learning. I designed 
custom-built video games to study computational mechanisms of 
longitudinal motor learning. I performed psychophysical studies 
and analyzed movement kinematics. I published three journal 
articles, one review article, and have two journal articles in 
preparation. 
 
 08/2011 – 05/2017 
(expected) 
• Neuromedical Control Systems Lab  
PI: Sridevi Sarma 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
I developed a computational model as a tool to detect differences 
in neural firing patterns between affected and unaffected regions 
of the globus pallidus in human dystonia patients. 
 
 11/2010 – 4/2011 
• Vestibular Neuroengineering Laboratory 
PI: Charles Della Santina 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
I conducted experiments to test methods of stimulating the 
vestibulocochlear nerve with an infrared laser in chinchillas. 
 




• JHU Neuroengineering and Biomedical Instrumentation Lab  
PI: Nitish Thakor 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
I built software for a sensor-laden glove that measured finger joint 
angles in real time. I developed signal-processing algorithms for 
control of a dexterous upper-limb prosthetic device. I published 
two refereed articles. 
 09/2007 – 10/2009 
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Design Experience 
• Biomedical Engineering Design Team, Team Leader  
Mentor: Dr. Harikrishna Tandri 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
I led a team of ten students to design the Rapid Hypothermia 
Induction Device, a device intended to induce hypothermia in 
cardiac arrest patients to mitigate hypoxic brain damage. I served 
as project manager, led the conceptual design of the device, led 
proof of concept testing, served as spokesman, and applied for 
funding grants. My team won a $500 funding grant, a $10,000 
national prize, and two prizes at the Johns Hopkins Design Day 
competition. 
 09/2009 – 05/2010 
• Biomedical Engineering Design Team, Team Member 
Mentor: Dr. Lew Schon 
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 
The team designed a surgical metal detector instrument to assist 
removing orthopedic screws. I designed, prototyped, and tested 
the metal detecting circuit, managed the fabrication of the 
hardware, and delivered team presentations to judging panels. The 
team won a prize at the Johns Hopkins Design Day competition 
and applied for a patent for the device. 
 01/2007 – 05/2007 
 
Teaching Experience 
• Teaching assistant for the Center for Biomedical Innovation 
and Design (CBID) 
 06/2013 – 05/2014 
Review Services 
• Served as reviewer for Experimental Brain Research.  08/2012 
Affiliations/Memberships 
• Member, Society of Neuroscience  2012 - Present 
 206 
Honors and Awards 
• National Collegiate Inventors and Innovators Alliance $500 
stipend 
 2010 
• Johns Hopkins University Design Day Audience Choice 
Award  
 2010 
• Johns Hopkins University Design Day Second Place Prize  2010 
• National Collegiate Inventors and Innovators Alliance 
$10,000 BMEidea prize 
 2010 
• Johns Hopkins University Provost Undergraduate Research 
Award 
 2008 




• Experiment design 
• Motion capture and movement analysis 
• Human behavior modeling 
• Statistics  
• Matlab and Simulink 
• Written and oral communications 
 
